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1 
The Origins 
"Pirate .... Middle English from Latin pirata, from Greek peirates, 'attacker,' from 
peiran, to attempt, attack, from peira, an attempt .... From Indo-European root per-."5 
"per..5 .... To try, risk;" from which come the modem English words: fear, peril, 
experience, expert, empire, and pirate. 
American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language (William Morris, ed.) (1969), pp. 998, 1534. 
T he word "piracy" is used in modern English in many different ways, from a half-admiring description of the shrewd practices of an 
assertive businessman cutting the corners of morality but strictly within the 
law, to a highly technical legal word of art related to some crimes for which 
people have been hanged. In between lie uses that relate to unrecognized 
rebels, naval vessels acting beyond their authority, naval vessels acting within 
their national commissions to interfere with peaceful commerce in ways the 
international legal order will not tolerate, and many other shades of meaning. 
The most cursory examination of learned literature, treaty articles and 
national statutes shows at least six different meanings: (1) A vernacular usage 
with no direct legal implications; (2) An international law meaning related to 
unrecognized states or recognized states whose governments are not 
considered to be empowered at international law to authorize the sorts of 
public activity that is questioned, like the Barbary States of about 1600-1830, 
the Malay Sultanates of about 1800-1880, and the Persian Gulf Sheikhdoms of 
about 1820-1830; (3) An international law meaning related to unrecognized 
belligerency, like Confederate States commerce raiders and privateers during 
the American Civil War of1861-65 in the eyes of the Federal Government of 
the United States; (4) An internationallaw meaning related to the private acts 
of foreigners against other foreigners in circumstances making criminal 
jurisdiction by a third state acceptable to the international community despite 
the absence of the usual territorial or nationality links that are normally 
required to justify the extension abroad of national criminal jurisdiction; (5) 
Various special international law meanings derived from particular treaty 
negotiations; and (6) Various municipal (i.e., national, domestic) law 
meanings defined by the statutes and practices of individual states. It is 
possible to elaborate this list to take account of ambiguous or inconsistent 
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state practice and diplomatic correspondence, special technical interpreta-
tions within the learned international legal writings and different states' 
positions as to particular incidents, and other traditional modes of legal 
analysis. 
All of these uses of the word "piracy" have been argued from time to time 
to rest on classical writings and precedents. In the days leading up to the 
Westphalian settlement of Europe in 1648, citations to Greek and Latin 
sources were a major element oflegal argumentation. Those renaissance legal 
arguments and the municipal law of the European sea powers, particularly 
England, purported to rest on Roman law and usage. Thus, to understand 
fully the modern meanings of the term "piracy" it is necessary first to 
examine the Greek and Latin writings and Roman usages. 
Time changes the meaning of words, and it is an error in scholarship to 
attribute to ancient or even not very ancient authors the full range of 
implication that a word carries in current usage. An amusing example appears 
in the 14th century Middle English poem Sir Gawain and the Green Knight where 
the Green Knight, entering King Arthur's great dining hall, asks, "Where is 
... the governour of this gyng?" and it can be shown by analyzing the uses of 
the word "governour" and "gyng" ("gang") in other medieval works that 
the modern cockney connotation of jocular contempt that might be implied 
from the context of the Green Knight's speech is simply not there.1 
When, in 1811, Sir T.S. Raffles, the British Lieutenant Governor of Java, 
wrote to Lord Minto, the Governor-General ofIndia, that "It is unfortunately 
the practice in some of the Malay States rather to encourage the young nobles 
of high rank, especially those of the Rajah's own extraction, whose 
maintenance would fall otherwise upon the Rajah himself, to subsist 
themselves by piratical practices"2 he was using the word in a non-legal sense 
insofar as the attitudes of the Malays was being explained. At the same time, 
from its European legal implications he concluded that suppressive activities 
by the British Navy might be justifiable as a matter of international law. He 
seems to have been conscious of the two meanings of the word when he 
advised that the British in the first instance, rather than bearing the burden 
themselves of sweeping the "pirates" from the seas, should "oblige every 
Rajah to refuse to every description of pirates ... any sort of assistance or 
protection in his own territories."3 This suggestion, with much legal 
difficulty, became translated into British policy and assertions of interna-
tionallaw over a period of sixty or seventy years. 
In the light of this and similar persistent confusions, before embarking on 
an analysis of the precise meaning of the word "piracy" as used in ancient 
texts it might be useful to set forth a few of the many instances in which the 
word or its derivatives has been used by translators to reflect their own ideas 
as to when it is appropriate to use it despite the fact that the word does not 
appear in any form in the text being translated. Since so much nineteenth and 
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twentieth century writing about "piracy" cites ancient usages that in fact 
exist only in the nineteenth and twentieth century purported translations, but 
not in the ancient texts, it might be possible to clear away some common 
misconceptions of our own time, when some citations to earlier scholars, 
which in turn rest on still earlier scholarly citations, which in turn appear to 
rest on non-legal translations of words that have no connection with the 
ancient conception of "piracy, " seem to have become conventional wisdom; 
i.e., seem to be accepted as correctly reflecting the ancient concepts merely 
because so often repeated in scholarly writing. 
Coleman Phillipson, whose analysis of classical conceptions of interna-
tionallaw is justly famous to the degree that it seems to have almost cut off 
later scholarship, wrote: "In the Homeric age the practice [of "piracy"] was 
looked upon as a creditable ... means of enrichment."4 Without disputing 
Phillipson's point, which will be examined more closely below, it is 
interesting to check his citations. These include Homer's Iliad,s and Odyssey,6 
and Thucydides's History of the Peloponnesian War.7 In fact, in none of these 
places cited by Phillipson does the word "peirato" or any of its derivatives 
appear in the original Greek.8 Instead, the original Greek uses derivatives of 
the word "diapertho"9 or the word "Ieia. "10 Indeed, even if the word "peirato" 
did appear in the places cited in Homer, it would not indicate a clear usage of 
the word, since, aside from some clearly inappropriate contexts, what most 
commonly appears is a formula of words that seems to have been a customary 
greeting addressed to strangers: 
Is it on some business, or do ye wander at random over the sea, even as 'pirates,' who 
wander hazarding their lives and bring evil to men of other lands?11 
This particular formula, which does not include the word "peirato" or any of 
its derivatives in the original Greek, is repeated in many places, including 
Hesiod12 and Thucydides.13 And yet it is the very Thucydides passage not 
using the word "peirato" or any of its derivatives that is mentioned by at least 
one very eminent twentieth century scholar as evidence that "piracy" in the 
modern sense was accepted as legitimate in ancient Greece.14 Obviously, it 
was not "piracy" that was legitimate, but something else, labeled with a 
different word, that mayor may not have been analogous to the modern legal 
conception of "piracy." 
It may be significant that the more or less standard glossary, Autenrieth's 
Homeric Dictionary, defines "peiran . .. -ato" as "test, attack, make trial of, put 
to proof, contend with" etc., but does not record any usage in Homer that 
would correspond with a sense of illegality or even roving to seize the 
property of others regardless of legality .15 
Similarly, in Herodotus's history of the Persian War, the passage most 
frequently cited as mentioning "piracy" does not use the Greek word or any 
ofits derivatives, and that passage is translated properly as saying merely the 
coming of "Bronze men of the sea" was predicted by an oracle.16 
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Perhaps the most egregious anomaly of translation is in the frequent 
citation to an historical episode in which the citizens of the "polis" of 
Halonnesos refused to receive their property back from Philip of Macedon as 
a gift, but insisted that they had never lost title since the capture had been by 
"pirates," who lack the legal power to alter rights to title in property. But the 
Greek original does not contain the word "peirato" or any of its derivatives.t7 
As for Roman sources,IS again some of the most often cited writings 
purportedly defining the classical conception of "piracy" do not use the word 
in either its Greek or Latin ("pirata") form. For example, Cicero, in his second 
speech Against Verres, does not mention "pirata" in the passage cited time and 
again by renaissance and later scholars as one of the sources of the law of 
"piracy." The word he uses is "praedones. "19 And Livy's translator gives a 
totally distorted impression of the legal relations between the Great 
Pompey's son, Sextus Pompey, and Octavian Caesar, building on the 
distorted picture painted by the not wholly impartial Livy himself, in this 
passage: 
When Sextus Pompey again made the sea dangerous through acts of piracy [latrociniis], 
and did not maintain the peace to which he had agreed, Caesar undertook the inevitable 
war against him and fought two drawn naval battles.20 
In the original Latin the word "pirata" or its derivatives does not appear.21 
There are other anomalies in this passage that point out the need for great 
circumspection in drawing far-reaching legal conclusions from the use of 
Latin words in ancient sources. The word "bello" (war; belligerency) is used 
to describe the conflict between two claimants to some public authority in 
Rome in the turmoil following Julius Caesar's assassination and before 
Octavian achieved full mastery of the political system and became Caesar 
Augustus. But if the Roman law of war applied, as the word would seem to 
indicate, then the fundamental Roman conception of "war" as a legal status 
with legal implications would have applied in the absence of declaration. And 
it would have applied against those who commit "latrociniis" acts. This path of 
analysis leads to complications of significant magnitude and in the light of 
other writings seems wholly misguided. It is very likely that Livy was using 
the word "latrociniis" perjoratively and not legally, and the word "bello" to 
mean "struggle" or some similar non-legal idea, rather than war. Since these 
distinctions are vital to a careful legal analysis, it may be concluded that not 
only translations, but even original texts must be read very carefully before 
legal implications are drawn from them. 
The Greek and Roman Conception of "Piracy" 
Thucydides's description of political life in the Aegean area rests not only 
on the poetic formula of greeting, but on other passages in Homer22 and, no 
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doubt, oral and perhaps lost written traditions familiar enough to his 
generation that citation was not felt to be necessary by him. Modern 
scholarship sees this proud description as evidence not only of a political 
system accepting the organized use of force by small bands without pejorative 
implications or any deep analysis of the political structure of the bands ' 
themselves,23 but also of a far-reaching economic order. During the 10th and 
9th centuries B.C.,24 such wars and raids reflected the struggle for survival 
and economic gain by combinations of families and small communities as part 
of a larger economic system in which "Forcible seizure followed by 
distribution in this fashion, was one way to acquire metal or other goods from 
an outside source."25 The seizures did not necessarily involve essential 
supplies, and the concepts of justifiable behavior apparently extended to 
permit these raids by Greeks against Greeks and non-Greeks alike merely for 
gain. Given the state of politics and economics in the area, such raids were 
probably not the principal means of commerce, and it has been suggested that 
gift-exchanges were the main mechanism for economic transfers.26 The 
system might bear some similarity for purposes of this study with the Viking 
political and economic system of Scandinavia in the 9th to 11th centuries 
A.D.27 
The earliest time when the surviving literature in Greek uses the word 
peirato and its derivatives to describe anybody appears to be about 140 B.C., 
and it is to some specific political and economic communities of the Eastern 
Mediterranean littoral that the word was applied. Polybius, whose Histories is 
the principal source of much of our knowledge of the rise of the Roman 
Republic, uses the word peiraton in a passage translated by W.R. Paton in a 
way avoiding the confusions wrought by too frequent use of the English word 
"pirate," but creating an equivalent confusion. He refers to: "Euripidas with 
two companies of Eleans together with his freebooters [peiraton] and 
mercenaries ... "28 Just what "freebooter" means in that context seems very 
unclear. But what does seem clear is that the word "peirato" and its derivatives 
was being applied not to brigands or others outside the legal order, but to 
small communities including fighting men who were regarded as capable of 
forming alliances and participating in wars as they were fought between 
acknowledged political leaders within the legal order of the time. 
Diodorus Siculus, writing about 60 B.C., uses the word in connection with 
events of 304 B.C.: 
[Amyntas] ... suddenly confronted some pirates [peiratais] who had been sent out by 
Demetrias . . . the Rhodians took the ships with ... Timocles, the chief pirate 
[arclJipeirates ].29 
The usage of Livy, writing in Latin 29 B.C.-14 -A.D., is similar. In 
describing events of190 B.C., he refers to Nicander, whom he calls a pirate 
chief (archipirata) , fighting with five ships as an ally ofRome.30 In referring to 
the "war" of 68-67 B.C. by which Pompey the Great cleared the Eastern 
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Mediterranean of Cilician commerce-raiding communities,31 Livy not only 
refers to the struggle as "war" and describes it as ifit were legally indeed a 
"war" at Roman law, but he refers to its ending by a negotiated surrender 
under which the "pirates" agreed to conform to more settled ways: 
Gnaeus Pompeius was ordered by a law passed by the popular assembly to pursue the 
pirates, who had cut off the traffic in grain. Within forty days he had cleared them from 
all the seas. He brought the war [belloque] against them to an end in Cilicia, received the 
surrender of the pirates and gave them land and cities.32 
Finally, the Greek Plutarch, writing in about 100 A.D., paints such a clear 
picture of the "pirates" to which Livy referred in his brief synopsis of the 
"war" of Pompey to end their control of commerce in the Eastern 
Mediterranean, that it seems worth setting out in some detail. Throughout 
this translation, wherever the word "pirate" is used, the word "peirato" or 
one of its derivatives is used in the original Greek, 
The power of the pirates [peiratiki] had its seat in Cilicia [in Asia Minor, where they 
flourished during the wars of Rome against Mithridates [88-85, 83-81,74 B.C.] ... until 
they no longer attacked navigators only, but also laid waste islands and maritime cities. 
And presently men whose wealth gave them power, and whose lineage was illustrious, 
and those who laid claim to superior intelligence, began to embark on piratical [peiratike] 
craft and share their enterprises, feeling that the occupation brought them a certain 
reputation and distinction ... Their flutes and stringed instruments and drinking bouts 
along every coast, their seizures of persons in high command, and their ransoming of 
captured cities, were a disgrace to the Roman supremacy [hegemonias].33 
To complete the picture of political societies conforming to the archaic 
Eastern Mediterranean pattern, Plutarch mentions the unique religious 
worship of the "pirates," whose rites centered on the town of Olympus in 
southern Asia Minor.34 This combination of settled communities, religious 
rites, musical tradition, and the conception of the "pirates" that what they 
did was entirely proper, is what brought them into conflict with Rome. It is 
hard to see how they were considered outlaws or violators of any law other 
than the Roman conception of hegemony; a conception obviously not shared 
by non-Romans at that time,35 and possibly not by many Romans of the 
pre-Augustan age that Plutarch was writing about almost a century after the 
reign of Augustus. On the other hand, Plutarch seems to have accepted the 
idea that such political societies, no matter how conforming to a traditional 
pattern, were an anachronism beyond the orderly system within which Rome 
had become accustomed to operate. The word "peirato" and its derivatives 
seems to be applied to traditional Eastern Mediterranean societies operating 
in ways that had been accepted as legitimate for at least a millenium. But the 
conception of Roman order, the idea that Roman hegemony was a matter of 
right, of law, had begun to make the continued existence of "pirate" 
communities unacceptable even if no justification for distinguishing those 
"pirate" communities from their less assertive neighbors could be found 
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directly in Roman or general international law as it was applied between 
Rome and other political communities of the Eastern Mediterranean. 
The procedures for the "war against the Pirates" adopted by the Roman 
Senate were extraordinary and reflect these legal doubts as to the precise 
status of the Roman hegemony and its legal basis. A law was passed by the 
Republic's Senate in 68 B.C. under which Pompey the Great was 
commissioned to subdue them not as a naval commander (the word" admiral" 
had not yet been invented, but the Loeb Classical Library's translator of 
Plutarch uses it here) but as a king deriving his sovereign powers from the 
Roman donation, thus opposing the "pirates' " sovereignty with Roman 
sovereignty and making of the piratical society something like rebels. 
Plutarch makes it clear that this procedure was shocking: Pompey was 
commissioned by the Roman Senate to take the seas away from the "pirates 
[peiraton] " by giving him "not an admiralty, but an out-and-out monarchy and 
irresponsible [sic: "unbridled" might be a better translation] power over all 
men. "36 His authority was decreed to extend to land areas within 400 furlongs 
of the sea, thus to include the entire territory of the Aeg~anJslaD.ds, CreteAIld 
the Dodecanese and enough of the land of Asia Minor to include all their 
villages and Olympus, the "pirates' " religious center. 
Plutarch's description of the course of the war, and the negotiation for 
peace, seems to confirm this impression, that Rome treated the "pirates" not 
as outlaws but as enemies to be met in war and defeated. After dispersing the 
"pirates' " fleet, 
Some of the pirate bands [peiratorion] that were still roving at large begged for mercy, and 
since he [Pompey] treated them humanely, and after seizing their ships and persons did 
them no further harm, the rest became hopeful of mercy too, and ... betook themselves 
to Pompey with their wives and children, and surrendered to him. All these he spared, 
and it was chiefly by their aid that he tracked down, seized, and punished those who 
were still lurking in concealment because conscious of unpardonable crimes.37 
But the most numerous and powerful had bestowed their families and treasures and 
useless folk in forts and strong citadels near the Taurus mountains, while they 
themselves manned their ships and awaited Pompey's attack near the promontory of 
Coracesium in Cilicia; here they were defeated in a battle and then besieged. At last, 
however, they ... surrendered themselves, together with their cities [poleis] and islands 
of which they were in control ... The men themselves, who were more than 20,000 in 
number, he [Pompey] did not once think of putting to death ... [but] determined to 
transfer the men from the sea to land ... to till the ground. Some of them, therefore, 
were received and incorporated into the small and half-deserted cities of Cilicia ... To 
most of them, however, he gave as a residence Dyme in Achaea, which was then bereft 
of men and had much good land.38 
Pompey's monarchical position under the commission issued by the Roman 
Senate received something of a comeuppance shortly after, when Metellus, 
another Roman general, was with rather less mercy wiping out Cilician 
"pirate" villages in Crete. Since all of Crete lay within 400 furlongs of the sea 
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Pompey apparently regarded this as an encroachment on his authority and 
sent one of his lieutenants, Lucius Octavius, to join with the "pirates" 
fighting against Metellus. Metellus won, "captured the pirates [peiratas] and 
punished them, and then sent Octavius away ... "39 There is no further 
reference to Pompey's commission in this context. 
It seems clear that the word "pirate" was used by Plutarch to classify 
communities with which Pompey felt it was appropriate not only to go to war 
and conclude a peace treaty, but even to send military assistance to, as to an 
ally, when they accepted the Senate's ordinance subjecting them to the law of 
Roman "hegemony." 
On the other hand, it appears that there was a change in Roman concepts 
underway. To label a group "pirates" was not merely to classify their way of 
life within a legal order as we still use the word "Viking" to evoke a way of 
life legitimate within the harsh legal order of the middle ages. By the time 
Plutarch wrote, there was an implication of impropriety to that way of life. It 
had nothing to do with political motivation or criminality even under the law 
of Rome as applied in the Empire or allied areas. It dealt instead with the place 
of an antiquated way of life in a new commercial and political order that 
could not countenance interference with trade in the Mediterranean Sea. It 
was not bound to "piratical" acts on the "high seas," but to a conception of 
"piratical" villages forming a society [poleis] on land which refused to accept 
Roman supremacy. Relations with the "pirates" were relations of war, not of 
policing the internal or imperial Roman law; the results of Roman victory 
were the normal results of a victorious war at that time and in that place.40 
"War" to the Romanjurists was not merely a condition of fact with people 
of one village or religious worship killing or enslaving people of another 
village or divine descent. War was regarded as a legal status even if no active 
fighting was occurring, and since victory or defeat in war had such enormous 
consequences for the belligerents and their families, reflecting the vitality of 
the vivifying force given by the tribe's or community's "God" or totemic life 
source to some eponymous ancestor or founder, the ceremonies involved in 
the creation of that status were essentially religious. The religious element of 
the status of war was not a mere prayer for victory, but reflected much deeper 
concerns for the continuance of the race. Virgil's epic poem, Aeneid, telling 
the mythology surrounding the founding of the Roman tradition in Italy by 
Aeneas, a son of the defeated King Priam fleeing from the sack of Troy, is 
unmistakably, in this sense, a religious work. 
The interplay between religion and the secular law between "nations" or 
"races" or god-protected communities and tribes, is evident from the 
narration of the great literary (but not always accurate) historian Livy, who 
grew to manhood during the days of Julius Caesar, and wrote his history of 
Rome with access to sacred documents during the early days of the reign of 
Augustus. He details from the oldest treaty in the holy archives (c. 670 B.C.) 
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the treaty-making procedures of Roman tradition, setting out some of the 
formulas of words and symbolic acts, involving a freshly plucked holy plant, 
the sacrifice of a pig, and metrical ritual (which in part, alas, he fails to record 
as "not worth the trouble of quoting"). Through these rituals the titulary 
gods on both sides (in this case the Romans and the Albans) were called upon 
separately to witness the commitment of the current holders of the life of each 
god's own community to the sanctity of the pledge.41 In this particular 
incident, as reported by Livy, the "war" between the Romans and Albans was 
put into the hands of three representatives from each side, chosen for their 
martial vigor and thus presumably reflecting the vigor of the holy life of each 
community as well as its mere secular martial prowess. The Romans won in a 
close contest, only one champion for each side surviving, and Horatius for 
Rome ultimately killing his Alban antagonist as the two armies stood by and 
watched. The two sides then buried their dead and Alba accepted Roman rule 
submitting their entire treasure and lives to the mercy of the Roman god 
represented by the Roman political organization.42 
Livy also details the ceremony followed by the Romans even into his own 
time when "war" was to be begun. In Livy's version, the ceremony for a 
formal declaration of war was adopted from the religious rites of the ancient 
Roman tribe of the Aequicolae and taken over by priests (fetials) representing 
the entire Roman community. It is worth repeating in its entirety for an 
understanding of the importance of the ceremony and the significance of 
Cicero's argument in Livy's own time43 that "war" against "pirates" could be 
begun without it: 
\"hen the envoy arrives at the frontier of the state from which satisfaction is sought, he 
covers his head with a woolen cap and says: Hear me, Jupiter! 'Hear me, land of 
So-and-so! Hear me, 0 righteousness! I am the accredited spokesman of the Roman 
people. I come as their envoy in the name of justice and religion, and ask credence for my 
words.' The particular demands follow and the envoy, calling Jupiter to witness, 
proceeds: 'If my demand for the restitution of those men or those goods be contrary to 
religion and justice, then never let me be a citizen of my country.' [Presumably so that 
the results ofimpiety will not be visited on the entire community.] The formula, with 
only minor changes, is repeated when the envoy crosses the frontier, to the first man he 
subsequently meets, when he passes through the gate of the town, and when he enters the 
public square. Ifhis demand is refused, after thirty-three days ... war is declared in the 
following form: 'Hear, Jupiter; hear Janus Quirinus; hear, all ye gods in heaven, on 
earth, and under the earth: I call you to witness that the people of So-and-so are unjust 
and refuse reparation ... ' The envoy then returns to Rome for consultation. The 
formula in which the king asked the opinion of the elders was approximately this: Of the 
goods, or suits, or causes, concerning which the representative of the Roman people has 
made demands of the representative of ... [So-and-so], which goods or suits or causes 
they have failed to restore or settle, or satisfy ... : speak, what think you?' The person 
thus first addressed replied: 'I hold that those things be sought by means of just and 
righteous war. Thus I give my vote and my consent.' The same question was put to the 
others in rotation, and if a majority voted in favour, war was agreed upon. The fetial 
thereupon proceeded to the enemy frontier carrying a spear with a head either ofiron or 
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hardened wood, and in the presence of not less than three men of military age made the 
following proclamation: 'Whereas the peoples of [So-and-so ] ... have committed acts 
and offences against the Roman people, and whereas the Roman people have 
commanded that there be war with [them], and the Senate of the Roman people has 
ordained, consented, and voted that there be war with [them]: I therefore, and the 
Roman people hereby declare and make war on [them].' The formal declaration made, 
the spear was thrown across the frontier.44 
These forms, or at least their underlying concepts, were employed against not 
only the South Italian peoples with whom the Romans shared a similar 
culture, but also against the North Italian Gauls45 and presumably everybody 
else with whom it was religiously conceived that a struggle on earth reflected 
competing demands on a divine source of life symbolized by tribal or 
community gods.46 
The most commonly cited authority for the original Roman legal 
conception of "piracy" adopted as the source for modem European views of 
international law on the subject is Marcus Tullius Cicero. Cicero, an active 
lawyer and politic an contemporary with Julius Caesar, killed apparently by 
order of Marc Antony in 43 B.C. in the aftermath of the murder ofJulius,47 has 
been cited inappropriately often,48 but did in fact mention "pirates [pirata]" in 
one passage that evidences the changing legal conceptions of the generation 
that gave Pompey the legal power to subdue them by simply asserting a 
superior legal power over the territory and seas in which their outmoded 
culture survived. In that passage he merely denies any legal obligation to keep 
an oath to "pirates" on the ground that by being the enemies [hostes] of all 
communities, they are not subject to the law of the universal society that 
makes oaths binding between different communities.49 There are many 
reasons for regarding this statement as not indicating any considered legal 
opinion. Hugo Grotius himself, the great Dutch scholar and jurist of 
intemationallaw of the first half of the 17th century, criticized this passage on 
the ground that the observance of an oath is owed to God, not to the person 
receiving the benefit of the oath.so Other factors not usually considered by 
those citing this passage of Cicero as evidence that "pirates" in his day were 
common criminalss1 include the fact that the passage appears in a work on 
moral duties, not law; as Cicero himself noted, the two do not always 
coincide.52 Moreover, bearing in mind Cicero's political situation in 44 B.C. 
when this was written, and the episode in Julius Caesar's life involving the 
same Cilician "pirates, "53 and the peculiar legal authority given to Cicero's 
sometimes friend Pompey coupled with Pompey's use of that authority 
against Metellus and the fact that Pompey was by now dead and his twenty-
five year old treaty with the "pirates" could be discarded without personally 
insulting him, and some notion of the complexity of Cicero's thinking can be 
appreciated. Indeed, the "pirates" that had been suppressed by Pompey in 67 
B.C. had revived by the time Cicero was writing this, and Marc Antony was 
believed to have mobilized them against Brutus and Cassius. Cicero's 
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condemnation of the "pirates" seems thus less a statement of a legal opinion 
than a slap at his enemy, Antony.54 
Perhaps the best evidence of the Roman jurists' actual conception of 
"piracy" lies in the collection of undated opinions appearing in Justinian's 
Digest of 534 A.D. 55 There appears to be in fact only one passage in the Digest 
in which the word "pirata" or its derivatives appears. In the section on the law 
of property dealing with the devolution of property rights in case of a 
wrongful taking, the opinion of Paulus (c. 230 A.D.) is given: "P.J:IS.ons_who 
have been captured by pirates or robbers remain [legally] free. "56 
Two other opinions have been so often cited by so many scholars as 
applying to "pirates" that it seems important to set them out here, even 
though by failing to use the word "pirata" or any of its derivatives they seem 
to demonstrate the opposite of the lesson for which they so often are cited. 
Ulpian (d. 223 A.D.) wrote: 
Enemies are th<;>se against whom the Roman people have publicly declared war, or who 
themselves have declared war against the Roma~ people; others are called robbers or 
brigands. Therefore, anyone who is captured by robbers, does not become their slave, 
nor has any need of the right of postliminium. He, however, who has been taken by the 
enemy, for instance, by the Germans or Parthians, becomes their slave, and recovers his 
former condition by right of postliminium.57 
And Pomponius (c. 130 A.D.): 
Those are enemies who declare war against us, or against whom we publicly declare 
war; others are robbers or brigands.58 
The concept of property rights_needing reassessment after a legal capture, 
and that in some circumstances captives would become free and property 
would revert to its former owner on the conclusion of a war or on recapture, 
was an important one. 59 It becomes much more important for purposes of this 
study later when the European-based international law of naval prize makes 
it significant that the captor be classified as a person able to change legal title 
or not. It was by reading the word "capti" in the passage ascribed to Paulus, to 
apply to goods and not merely to persons, and by classifying "pirates" as 
covered by Ulpian and Pomponius as if they were brigands [latrones] or 
robbers [praedones], that this legal conclusion was reached. But that analysis 
belongs to a later chapter.6o 
One other implication of these passages seems significant. By attaching the 
word" hostes [enemies J" to those against whom legal war [bellum] was waged, 
and refusing to attach the word to police action against brigands and robbers 
[latrones et praedones], an entirely different light is shed on the phrase" common 
enemies of all mankind [hostes humanigenerisJ"61 as a paraphrase of its original, 
Ciceronian, meaning. If this analysis is correct, and Cicero was speaking as 
the technical lawyer later scholars have assumed in drawing their implications 
from this reference to "pirates," then what he really seems to have meant was 
that "pirates," are not robbers or brigands but legal enemies with the sole 
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exception regarding promises to them that Grotius rightly criticises as 
illogical and which is incorrect as history. 
It may be concluded that the fundamental Greek and Roman conception of 
"piracy" distinguished between robbers, who were criminals at Roman law, 
and communities called "piratical" which were political societies of the 
Eastern Mediterranean, pursuing an economic and political course which 
accepted the legitimacy of seizing the goods and persons of strangers without 
the religious and formal ceremonies the Romans felt were legally and 
religiously necessary to begin a war. Nonetheless, the Romans treated them as 
capable of going to "war" -indeed as in a permanent state of "war" with all 
people except those with whom they had concluded an alliance. There is some 
evidence that the Romans refused to extend the technical law of postliminium 
to them, perhaps on the ground that since they never ceased to be at war, 
there was no opportunity to determine the title to captured goods and no need 
to recognize title in those deriving rights from belligerent capture; the goods 
remained subject to recapture by anybody, and the rights of postliminium 
would be applicable against the recaptor, just as in war goods recaptured 
before the end of hostilities reverted to their original owner subject only to 
payment of costs attributable directly to the recapturing action.62 The legal 
rationalization found by the Roman Senate for suppressing the communities 
of "pirates" was not an asserted Roman right to police the seas (although 
Plutarch seems to have thought that rationale would have been better than the 
one actually used by the Senate), but the quite different assertion of a Roman 
right to territorial as well as maritime jurisdiction in the Eastern Mediter-
ranean. To examine the full implications of this popular Roman view on the 
course of Roman, and, indeed, world history, is far beyond the limits of this 
study. For present purposes it seems enough to point out that "piracy" to the 
Romans was a descriptive noun for the practices of a particular landbased 
Eastern Mediterranean people whose views of law and intercommunity 
relations appear to have reflected a millenium-Iong tradition that had become 
an obstacle to Roman trade and inconsistent with Roman views of the world 
order under Roman hegemony. The word did not imply criminality under any 
legal system, Roman or law of nations. It was applied to a fully organized 
society with families and a particular religious order that seems to have been 
not shockingly different from the social organization and religious orders of 
many other peoples of that time and place. 
It is not beyond conjecture that something of this pattern was in the mind of 
Sir T.S. Raffles when he called "piratical" some of the Malay sultanates with 
which he had to deal in 1811.63 
None of this is meant to imply that non-polis-connected marauding at sea, 
what today might (or might not) be called "piracy" as a result oflater legal 
developments, was permissable at Roman internal law, Roman imperial law 
relating to hegemonial rights, if any, or international law as perceived by 
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Roman statesmen. But those acts were called something else, and to analyze 
the full range oflegal results that flowed from using those other labels would 
involve a discussion beyond the limits of this study. To Europeans oflater 
times whose education included familiarity with Greek and Latin writings in 
which the words "peirato" and "pirata" or their derivatives were used, some 
hint of the earlier meaning remained despite later legal uses of the word in 
forms contemporary with the later Europeans in special legal contexts. And 
that classical meaning did not carry the implication of criminality or violation 
of general international law that other meanings carried; it justified a kind of 
political action, perhaps, and also perhaps had some legal implication in 
general international law particularly as it related to the laws of war and 
postliminium. But these are factors better discussed later on. 
The Reorganization of the Renaissance 
"Piracy" Enters Vernacular English as "Privateering." For a thousand years 
after Justinian the word "pirate" appears to have remained buried in the 
Greek and Latin texts familiar to learned monks but not considered 
significant to soldiers and statesmen. Norse raiders of the 9th to 11 th centuries 
A.D. following a career that seems in many ways analogous to that of the 
"pirates" of the time of Cicero and Pompey were not usually called "pirates" 
in English or Latin in contemporary documents, but were called by the names 
they gave themselves, "Danes" or "Vikings." Ranulf Higdon (or Higden) 
wrote a general history of the world in Latin in the first half of the 14th 
century, referred to by a Greek abbreviation for its long title as the 
Polychronicon, that received some popularity for a century or so after its first 
production in manuscript. In it he drew the obvious analogy, calling the 
Vikings "Dani piratae." John de Trevisa, a don at Oxford 1362-1379, translated 
Higdon into his native Middle English, translating the word "piratae" as "see 
theves [sea thieves]." The earliest use of the word "pirate" in English found 
by the compilers of the Oxford English Dictionary is in the second quarter of 
the 15th century.64 That early usage seems to have no legal connotation. 
Meantime, in the Mediterranean Sea area, the old Greek and Roman usages 
seem to have survived. Merchant ships that passed near enough to fishing or 
small agricultural villages of the Mediterranean to be safely attacked by the 
inhabitants of those communities were, from time to time, attacked. The 
dangers of trade and travel during the rise of Venice, the Crusades, the 
establishment of the Ottoman Empire and the dominance of Suleiman the 
Magnificent in 16th century Turkey and the Eastern Mediterranean gener-
ally, and the establishment of stable Muslim rule in the maghrebi towns of 
Algiers, Salee (Rabat), Tripoli and Tunis did not evoke images of "piracy" as 
a violation of any law. 
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Later writers have used the word "piracy," with its modern legal and 
romantic connotations, in wholly misleading ways. As with later references 
to "piracy" attributed to classical authors, the most eminent modern writers 
have used the word to refer to a host of activities in the Mediterranean of the 
16th and 17th centuries that mayor may not have been considered "piracy," 
or even wrongful under any legal system. The situation is summed up 
admirably by Fernand Braudel, a French historian who himself uses the word 
"piraterie" in the most confusingly vague and unhistorical ways: 
In the 16th century [as in Homeric times] the sea was filled with pirates, and pirates 
perhaps even more cruel than those of earlier days. Commerce raiding [fa course] takes a 
mask, disguises itself as semi-official warfare, with letters of marque ... 
I have repeatedly said that piracy was the child of the Mediterranean. True enough, but 
historians have often lost sight of the generality of the practice while focusing their 
attention and reproofs only on the Barbary corsairs. Their fate, which was grand, 
overshadows the rest. Everything else is deformed. That which is called "piracy" when 
done by the Barbary corsairs is called heroic, pure crusading spirit when done by the 
Knights of Malta, and the equally ferocious Knights of St. Stephen, based at Pisa under 
the protection of Cosimo dei Medici.6S 
Thus, while the picture painted by Braudel66 is brilliantly clear and 
imaginative, the fact that he uses the word "pirate" to include licensed 
warfare at sea should not be forgotten. He describes the Mediterranean of the 
16th century as featuring: "Sea-pirates ... aided and abetted by powerful 
towns and cities. Pirates on land, bandits, received regular backing from 
nobles. "67 But the picture is actually, legally, one of lively and dangerous 
commerce and conflicting claims to authority that might be called an 
authority to tax nearby shipping lanes with capture of the vessel, confiscation 
of its cargo, and the enslavement of the crew the penalty for tax evasion. 
Another legal basis for "piracy" as the word is used by Braudel was the 
medieval law of war: "One of the most profitable ventures of Christian 
pirates in the Levant became the search of Venetian, Ragusan or Marseillais 
vessels for Jewish merchandise, ... likening it to contraband, a convenient 
pretext for the arbitrary confiscation of goods."68 The "Christian pirates" 
referred to here seem to have been the Knights of Malta, a crusading Order 
asserting sovereign rights to govern land and to participate in lawful war.69 
For theft to be profitable, "stolen" goods must have a market. Where the 
market is in the control of a "government," a person or body to whom is 
conceded the legal power to change title to property, and a "taking" is 
authorized by the proprietor of that market, it is difficult to conceive of 
"stealing" as distinct from "lawful capture" or "taxation." By the end of the 
sixteenth century such markets were flourishing in Valetta (Malta), Leghorn 
(Livorno, Italy) and Algiers. Their legal basis was thus the law of the 
Christian Knights of Malta, Cosimo de' Medici, and the Muslim Governor 
(under Turkish control) of Algiers.70 
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For the pattern of conunerce to be profitable the goods must continue to 
flow; the taxation or belligerent interdiction ( or robbery) must not be so 
burdensome as to drive trade away; even risk-sharing through insurance must be 
managed in such a way that the risk does not become so great as to be 
uninsurable.71 Examining this economic reality and the undeniable vitality of 
Mediterranean trade in the period 1580-1648, when captures at sea were most 
vigorously condemned by European writers as intolerable, even iflegal, it can 
be conjectured that the forcible exchange of goods and slave-taking was in fact a 
tolerable part of the economic system of the Mediterranean at that period. 
Indeed, even a century later, the risk of being taken as a slave in the waters near 
Algiers and Morocco was significant, and the fate of the slave once taken was 
not always as grim as might be assumed by a 20th century reader.'72 
England was already a major sea power by the time the Spanish Armada 
was defeated in 1588, soon to dominate large areas of the sea and express 
through the application of force its sentiments as to the proper order of 
conunerce and private property. 
John Chamberlain, whose letters written 1597 to 1626 constitute a major 
source of insight into the trade and politics of that period in England, 
apparently uses the word "piracies" as a synonym for "privateering under 
license" in a letter to Dudley Carleton dated 31 January 1599: "Upon the 
Duke of Florence's embargo and complaint of our piracies, here is order upon 
pain of death that no prizes be taken in the Levant seas. "73 A similar usage 
appears thirteen years later when Chamberlain refers to unlicensed takings as 
a matter of state authority bearing no apparent relationship to abstract 
notions of morality or international law: "Many of our pirates are come home 
upon their pardon for life and goods, but the greater part stand still aloof in 
Ireland, because they are not offered the same conditions, but only life ... "74 
The same usage was applied to Algiers and Tunis, whose licensed or 
unlicensed prize-takers were called "pirates" while routine treaty negotia-
tions were conducted with the rulers of those places. 
Sir Thomas Roe had taken great pains and thought he had done a chef d'oeuvre in 
concluding a truce or peace for our merchants with the pirates of Algiers and Tunis. But 
he is in danger to be disavowed and all this labor lost (howsoever it comes about) and we 
left to the mercy of those miscreants who have already seven or eight hundred of our 
able mariners, among whom many gunners and men of best service at sea, who by this 
treaty should have been delivered.75 
About the beginning of the 17th century "pirates" began to take the place 
of "Spaniards " as the villains in English popular ballads. A ballad published in 
1609 condemning John Ward and a Dutchman named Simon Danseker for 
their villainies under Barbary license illustrates the changing mood: 
Gallants, you must understand, 
Captain Ward of England, 
A pyrate and a rover on the sea, 
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late a simple fishennan 
In the merry town of Feversham, 
Grows famous in the world now every day. 
Men of his own country 
He still abuses vilely; 
Some back to back are cast into the waves; 
Some are hewn in pieces small, 
Some are shot against a wall; 
A slender number of their lives he saves. 
At Tunis in Barbary 
Now he buildeth stately -~ 
A gallant palace and a royal place, 
Decked with delights most trim, 
Fitter for a prince than him, 
To which at last will prove to his disgrace. 
There is not·any Kingdom, 
In Turkey or in Christendom 
But by these pyrates [Ward and Danseker] have 
received loss; 
Merchant-men of every land 
Do daily in great danger stand, 
And fear do much the ocean main to cross 
But their cursed villanies, 
And their bloody pyracies, 
Are chiefly bent against our Christian friends; 
Some Christians so delight in evils 
That they become the sons of divels, 
And for the same have many shameful ends. 
London's Elizabeth 
Of late these rovers taken hath, 
A ship well laden with rich merchandize; 
The nimble Pearl and Charity, 
All ships of gallant bravery, 
Are by these pyrates made a lawful prize. 
The ballad ends with three more verses describing a quarrel between Ward 
and Danseker, and seeing in their separation, Ward to stay near Tunis and 
Danseker to hover near "Argier" (Algiers), the hand of God which will lead 
to their overthrow.76 
The realities reflected on this ballad led to a diplomatic expedition to 
Algiers in 1621 under Sir Robert Mansell, which failed,77 and an unsuccessful 
attempt by Parliament to ransom 1500 Christian captives in 1624. Popular 
indignation over the plight of the captives is reflected in a frankly polemical 
ballad of that year: 
Not many moones have from their silver bowes 
Shot light through all the world, since those sworne foes 
To God and all good men ... [sic] that hell-borne crew 
Of Pirates (to whome there's no villanies new), 
Those halfe-Turkes and halfe Christians, who now ride 
Like sea-gods (on rough billows in their pride), 
Those renegadoes, who (their Christ denying) 
Are worse than Turkes ... 78 
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In 1637, 3-400 souls were taken from Salee by the English ship Rainborow, 
apparently peacefully.79 
The English conception of when the word "pirate" was appropriate in 
international relations at this period had not come to be stably reflected in a 
specific legal context.80 As is apparent from the last quoted line of the ballad 
of Ward and Danseker, at least in the popular mind there was no distinction 
between privateering and "piracy;" a "pyrate" could make "lawful prize" of 
a captured vessel. It is possible, although not entirely clear, that the word was 
a pejorative used for privateers of any nationality who captured English 
vessels. The word appears to have slipped so quickly into the general 
pejorative vocabulary that whatever legal precision it might have derived 
from classical sources eroded by the late 16th century. 
Some clues as to the evolving meaning of the word, and some insight into 
the pattern of governance and trade that gave rise to the changes in meaning, 
are implicit in contemporary documents relating to the East India Company's 
business in Southeast Asia. There are mentions, for example, of English and 
Dutch ships in 1622, during one of the very brief periods of cooperation 
between the merchants of the two nations, keeping company "for fear of 
pirates" near Java, but it is unclear precisely who or where the "pirates" 
were.81 Similarly there is mention in December 1623 in a communication 
from the Council at Batavia to the English merchants atJambi (in Sumatra) 
that it is deemed "dangerous to send one ship for England alone, because of 
the abundance of pirates lurking in all places, "82 and a few days later the same 
Council referred to the need for homeward-bound ships to be prepared 
"against the invasion of that cursed crew of pirates."83 Again, it is unclear 
precisely who or where the "pirates" were, but they were probably not the 
Dutch; there is a reference in instructions given to an English trading voyage 
to Bantam (in Java) by the "President and Council of Defence" in Batavia on 
16 August 1623 to the need to defend against an assault by the Dutch "as from 
pirates,"84 apparently distinguishing between the two threats. 
King James I, convinced that the East India Company was withholding 
from the Admiralty its tenth share of prize money taken under license by the 
Company as "reprizals" (apparently against Portugal), is reported to have 
called the Company itself "pirates. "85 In the Court Minutes of the East India 
Company the same transaction is explained: 
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... Mr. Governor replied that upon receipt of the release promised for the time past and 
the warrant and direction for the future they were ready to pay the money. His 
Majesty's answer was that this was to give them leave to be pirates; the answer was that 
the Company delighted neither in blood nor rapine, and therefore humbly besought his 
Majesty would be a means that peace might be between the English and PortugaIs ... or 
else that his Majesty would explain in what cases the English might defend themselves 
by offending others if there were cause.56 
It seems likely that two different conceptions of "piracy " were involved, one 
asserted by the Company referred to "blood" and "rapine" and seems to 
relate to English criminal law as it might be applied generically to robbery 
within the jurisdiction of the Admiral; the other implied by King James I 
reIated to any unlicensed taking. It is tempting in this to see a Stuart King 
seeking a legal basis for classifying as criminals those who merely failed to 
submit to total centralized control over their activities, and a private 
Company seeking to restrict royal control to what was permitted by 
Parliament in its criminal statutes. But, as shall be seen below, the dispute 
probably reflects differing conceptions of law on a much deeper level. 
It does seem to be concluded by all who have examined the facts of 
Mediterranean commerce in the 16th and 17th centuries that licensed 
"privateering" of many European powers, including England, made trade 
not only in the Mediterranean but also in the North Atlantic and elsewhere, 
hazardous for all traders of any nationality, and that the four Barbary 
communities of Tunis, Tripoli, Algiers and Salee joined in this practice in the 
early 17th century.87 The word "piracy" was used increasingly around the 
turn of the 17th century to refer to privateering, possibly by analogy to the 
classical "pirates" of Cilicia in the Eastern Mediterranean, but the word was 
assuming a more specific meaning related to unlicensed "privateering" as the 
century progressed. 
"Piracy" Enters the Legal Vocabulary as "Outlawry." The professional 
international law scholars of the 16th and 17th century left in their writings 
evidence of this evolution of meaning, and how the word "piracy" acquired 
technical international legal meanings reflecting the popular culture. 
The North Italian Pierino Belli, publishing his major work on military 
subjects and war in 1563, rests on the medieval post-glossator Baldus Ubaldus 
(1327-1400) as authority for interpreting Cicero's and Plutarch's writings to 
mean that while war should not be begun without a declaration, "it is 
customary to make an exception in the case of pirates [piratae], since they are 
both technically and in fact already at war; for people whose hand is against 
every man should expect a like return from all men, and it should be 
permissible for anyone to attack them. "88 He distinguishes "pirates," 
towards whom the laws of war apply, from persons whom the Pope or Holy 
Roman Emperor have branded as public enemies; public enemies, but not 
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"pirates," are termed "outlaws" whom even persons without soldiers' 
licenses may kill.89 But Belli makes a major departure from precedent when 
repeating Cicero's condemnation of Marc Antony's agreement with the 
Cilician "pirates" in 44 B. C. 90 as if applicable in all contexts and disregarding 
any evidence that treaties with the Cilician "pirates" had in fact been 
concluded and observed by Pompey as well as by Marc Antony. Indeed, the 
inconsistency between the two passages in Belli, one affirming the 
applicability of the law of war to relations with "pirates" and the other 
asserting a rule of law that would make the termination of that war 
impossible except by the complete annihilation of the "pirates," seems to 
reflect some confusion of thought. 
Balthasar de Ayala, a native of Antwerp (now part of Belgium, then part of 
the provinces of the Habsburg monarchy ruled from Spain) writing in 1581 
carried the confusion a step further. By reading the passages of] ustinian' s Digest 
relating to captivity and postliminium as if all references to "brigands" 
("latrones") applied equally to "pirates," he actually denied the status oflawful 
enemy ("hostes") to pirates in apparent disregard of all the ancient writings: 
For the same reason, the laws of war and of captivity and of postliminy, which apply to 
enemies, do not apply to rebels, any more than they apply to pirates [piratis] and robbers 
(these not being included in the term "enemy"). Our meaning is that these persons 
themselves can not proceed under the laws of war and so, e.g., they do not acquire the 
ownership of what they capture, this only being admitted in the case of enemies; but all 
the modes of stress known to the laws of war may be employed against them, even more 
than in the case of enemies, for the rebel and the robber merit severer reprobation than 
an enemy who is carrying on a regular and just war and their condition ought not to be 
better than his.91 
Nor is it clear why he denied the status oflawful enemy to rebels, although 
legally the case for criminality was easier to make regarding "rebels" than 
"pirates" in 1581, since rebellion wp's obviously a violation of the law of the 
monarch against whom it was aimed, and was committed by people within 
the "allegiance," of that monarch, while "pirates" were beyond the reach of 
municipal law under normal feudal concepts. The possibility that rebels 
might achieve an independent status under international law before the 
former monarch accepts that negation of his monarchy's internal law, and 
thus become best viewed as entitled to the protection international law gives 
to lawful belligerents even if their precise status is doubtful, was not 
considered by Ayala. Perhaps his views were influenced by loyalty to the 
Habsburg monarchy during the violent days of the rise of the Dutch 
Republic.92 
The Legal Order and Outlawry 
Positivist Theory: Law as a Support for Policy. The first writer of 
lasting eminence to convert the confusions of the time to legal principle, to 
argue that the label "pirate" carries with it unmistakably the meaning of 
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outlawry and that what "pirates" do is forbidden by international law, was 
Alberico Gentili. Born in Italy in 1552, but forced by the Inquisition to leave 
when his father, and apparently he himself, converted to the Protestant 
religion in the 1570s, Gentili settled in England in 1580 and was appointed to a 
teaching post at the University of Oxford in 1581. He was made Regius 
Professor of Civil Law there in 1587 and published the first volume of his 
Commentaries on the Law of War in 1588. Two other volumes followed in 1589, 
and all three were reissued together in 1598. He appeared with Royal 
permission as the advocate for Spain in several cases before the Royal Council 
Chamber in London, dying in 1608 full ofhonors.93 
After defining the legal state of war ("Bellum est") as a ''just [lawful?] and 
public contest of arms [publicorum armorum iusta contentio] , "94 and asserting on 
the basis of quotations from Justinian's Digest that only Princes have the legal 
power to resort to war,95 Gentili devotes an entire chapter to demonstrating 
by legal logic that "pirates" cannot be public enemies; cannot wage "war. "96 
"A state of war cannot exist with pirates and robbers, in the opinion of 
Pomponius and Ulpian [cum piratis & latrunculis bellum non est. vt ita Pomponius, & 
Ulpianus definierunt]. "97 He goes on: "Pirates are the common enemies of all 
mankind, and therefore Cicero says that the laws of war cannot apply to 
them. "98 But the passage Gentili immediately quotes from Cicero does not 
mention "pirata" or any of its derivatives or the law of war; it is a passage 
relating only to promises given to "praedones."99 
It is, of course, possible to quote the entire chapter, but it is not the function 
of this study to subject to critical analysis the influential scholarship of others 
except as necessary to trace the evolution and legal meaning of the concept of 
"piracy" in modern international law. Thus, without further examples, it is 
possible to conclude that Gentili in 1588 took an argumentative position, 
supported with an advocate's brief, that "piracy" was not a matter of 
permanent war with communities pursuing violent tax collections at sea or 
basing part of their economy on booty seized from their neighbors. "Piracy" 
to Gentili was apparently any taking of foreign life or property not 
authorized by a sovereign, synonymous with brigandage or robbery on land, 
i.e., that his conception of the criminal law implications of the words praedones 
and latrones or latrunculi in Roman law, which he does not analyze, applied 
equally to "pirates" without analysis. 
It seems clear that the license of an established sovereign was the key to his 
thinking. The chapter concludes with a famous example illustrating precisely 
that: 
But what a~e we to think about those Frenchmen who were captured by the Spaniards in 
the last war with Portugal and were not treated as lawful enemies: They were treated as 
pirates (pirataeJ, since they served Antonio, who had been driven from the whole 
kingdom and never recognized as king by the Spaniards. But history itself proves that 
they were not pirates (piratas J and I say this because of no argument derived from the 
number and quality of the men and ships, but from the letters of their king which they 
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exhibited; and it was that king whom they served, not Antonio, although this was 
especially for the interest of Antonio: a consideration, however, which did not affect 
their status.IOO 
The implications of Gentili's position were great. If it were generally 
accepted, whatever the weaknesses of the appeal to classical writings in 
support of it, that all takings were in some sense "criminal" unless authorized 
by a person whose legal power to issue such an authorization were 
acknowledged, no degree of political organization or goal could make a 
"rebel" into a lawful combatant or require the application of the laws of war 
to the struggle against the rebel army. A tool of enormous power was placed 
in the hands of "sovereigns." The political struggle to unify France and to 
engorge the royal power of the Stuart kings of England would be helped. 
Moreover, each "sovereign" would seem to be accorded the legal power, by 
"recognizing" anybody's legal status needed to license privateers or naval 
commanders (or withholding that "recognition"), to determine what legal 
-regime would be applied to any struggle between the "sovereign" and an 
enemy of uncertain status. The Barbary states could be rendered "piratical" 
by simply withholding recognition of his governmental position from a new 
Dey or "recognizing" a rival, thus depriving the one not liked of the power to 
issue the Turkish equivalent of letters of marque and reprisal. Gentili's 
approach was clearly attractive to him as an advocate for Spain in England 
1605-1608.101 
Many of the cases in which Gentili was concerned involved "postliminy" 
in its renaissance form, the determination of title to goods and status of 
persons taken by a foreign sovereign, his agent, or a "privateer" (or "pirate") 
possibly acting in excess of his foreign license. While it is not necessary for 
purposes of this study to set out the complexities of the Roman law of 
postliminium, a few words as to its growing importance in renaissance 
Europe seem needed. 
Some Technicalities: Property Law and Privateering. "Postliminium" 
was the Roman law word of art to denote that branch of the law which dealt 
with rights of property during wartime. Questions involved primarily the 
status of persons (slave or free) captured in war and brought to the territory of 
a neutral before the war ended; would it be unneutral of the third country to 
deny the property right of the captor in his slave? If so, could the captor sell 
the slave and pass title to a neutral? And if that neutral sold the slave to a buyer 
from his original country, what then; would the captive soldier become a 
slave in his own country? The analogy to captured goods and vessels seems 
clear. 
By late medieval times, the legal status of war, retaining some of its 
religious background, no longer applied to many lawful private takings. It 
was, in fact, in an effort to avoid bringing about a state of war between 
princes that letters of marque and reprisal were issued to private persons 
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authorizing them to recapture from foreigners goods that had been 
wrongfully taken by those foreigners. There were no judicial proceedings 
prior to the issuance of the letters, thus there could be, and presumably were, 
serious questions about the "wrongfulness" of the original taking and the 
propriety of the supposed "recapture." Moreover, it was rarely possible to 
assure that the goods "recaptured" were identical with the goods originally 
taken, and it was but a small step to issue letters of marque and reprisal 
(" licentia marcandi" in 1295) for the taking not necessarily of the original goods, 
but of any goods up to the value of the original goods; and not necessarily 
from the original taker, but from his fellow-citizen. 102 
Little help in determining the precise meaning and origin of the system 
exists in etymology. "Reprisal" comes from Latin via French and means 
"re-taking." It is possible to speculate that the original sense in law involved 
simply an authority to recapture goods wrongfully taken by another. 
"Marque" seems to have an obscure origin and some relationship to the 
technical old Proven~allaw of pledge. It has no English usage other than in 
"Letters of Marque" and almost always the words "marque and reprisal" 
appear together. On the other hand, as noted above, the phrase "licentia 
marcandi," clearly meaning a letter authorizing a taking in the sense of "letters 
of marque and reprisal," appears in a document of 1295, and the phrase 
"marquandi sue gagiandi" in an English legal document of 1293, predating by 
some sixty years the earliest reference to "la lei de Mark & de represailles" found 
by the compilers of the Oxford English Dictionary in an English statute of 
1354. The word "marquandi" seems to relate not to seizures and pledges but to 
merchantability; the legal power to pass title to goods.103 
These shifts in the system of private "reprisal" and equivalent capture for 
sale to satisfy the original claim in money terms by the end of the 16th century 
had failed of their purpose to avoid war between the sovereigns over private 
claims. The issuance of such letters had begun to be regarded in Northern 
Europe as necessarily involving the centralizing monarchies in the attack on 
foreigners whom it was the legal duty of their own sovereigns to protect. 
Thus, the issuance of letters of marque and reprisal was becoming itself a 
belligerent act, justifiable only by the law of war. The old forms persisted, 
and it was apparently felt not necessary that the war be declared before the 
letters were issued, while it was felt to be necessary to apply the laws of war 
to determine the lawfulness of the capture. Thus the license, the letters, held 
by the captor were felt to be subject to examination and the legal status of the 
foreign "sovereign" issuing an equivalent license could be called into 
question. The question would arise whenever goods or a ship purchased in 
Algiers or Tunis arrived in England or Holland, for example, and some 
former owner identified it as his. This was often done in the case of a ship; 
Admiralty proceedings to determine rights in a vessel became the typical 
forum for hearing questions of this sort. Thus, while "prize courts" in any 
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countryl04 might deal with wartime captures, and the Royal Council 
Chamber in England dealt with various claims involving the dignity of the 
Crown in the early 17th century, ordinary Admiralty courts in England dealt 
with a variety of cases arising out of peacetime capture under letters of 
marque and reprisal. 
The proceedings in Admiralty, Royal Chamber and Prize were proceedings 
before national courts; i.e., only the sovereign could authorize an adjudication 
of property rights within his domain, so all the courts there, whatever their 
title or form, derived from him their authority to adjudicate title to property. 
But the substantive law they applied was necessarily a law that had to be 
acceptable both at home and, if the new title were to be of any use to the 
winner of the case, abroad. Thus rationales or, probably more accurately, 
justifications based on legal logic and precedent for the determinations of the 
tribunal, had to be found in terms that would seem persuasive to the tribunals 
erected by foreign sovereigns dealing with the same or similar cases. This 
pattern of logic and the appeal to precedent based on incidents not tied to 
local circumstances and legislation might be best described as the application 
of "international law" to the case, or of a special branch of municipal law, or 
even as a sort of conflict oflaws situation where the municipal hiw refers the 
tribunal to a foreign system oflaws (in this case "international law") which in 
turn refers the questions of title to a foreign law (perhaps the law of Tunis in 
the case of a Tunisian capture followed by legal proceedings equivalent to 
Prize or Admiralty or Royal Chamber proceedings in Tunis). Which set of 
concepts was used would depend on the complexity of the mind of the analyst 
and the consistency of the particular legal model with other legal principles 
important to the tribunaL 
Gentili, as the Advocate of Spanish interests in England at the highest legal 
levels, apparently phrased his pleadings, when he could, as pleadings on behalf 
of English merchants deriving title through Spanish claimants, and seems 
frequently to have omitted the Spanish middle step. Thus, where he argued on 
behalf of English merchants against other English merchants, he was actually 
doing his proper jobof representing Spanish interests. Where he could, he also 
described the interests of the other side as foreign, even where it seems likely 
that they were as deeply (or as shallowly) rooted in England as his own side's 
were. 
In the first cases in his book of pleadings, Gentili argued that the Roman 
writers and precedents created a law of "postliminy" that should be applied 
in the Royal Chamber to permit lawful title to pass to a captor only as a result 
of lawful capture during time of war, and then only after the capture is 
perfected by the captive people, goods or vessel being brought to the territory 
controlled by the capturing person's sovereign and the capture declared good 
there. He noted, as if merely in passing, that "To Pirates and wild beasts no 
territory offers safety [Piratis, & jeris territorium nullum praebet securitatem]" 
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because "Pirates are the enemies of all men [Piratae sunt hostes omnium]"lOS and 
cannot perfect their captures any more than wild beasts can. In a case 
involving a purchase by English merchants directly from "pirates" in a 
market under the supervision of the treasury officials of the "King of 
Barbary," Gentili argued that the Roman law forbidding pirates to alter title 
(he did not distinguish between title to persons and title to goods) applied i:a 
Barbary as it applied in Turkey, the territorial descendant of the Eastern 
Roman Empire of which Justinian was' Emperor. That law, he argued, 
nullified the purported legal effects of the English purchase even though there 
was some official Barbary connection with the sale. As an additional reason in 
policy for adopting the legal pattern he proposed, he argued that a contrary 
result would give to "pirates" a "very convenient place, which is quite close 
to the Spanish lines of trade and occupied by English merchants, where they 
may distribute their booty among their confederates. Does this make for 
trade? "106 
On the other side, when attempting to support title derived by purchase in 
Tunis from "pirates" against the Venetian original owners, he argued that 
there are exceptions to the absolute rules. Under one such exception at 
Roman law the payer of a ransom to pirates could hold the persons ransomed 
until repaid the amount of the ransom; rights of possession might thus be 
passed by pirates even if full rights of property could not. 107 It is not clear just 
who the" pirates" were (they were asserted to be English) or what they did or 
if they had any letters from a foreign prince. Since they were not parties to the 
case,. and Gentili's argument did not rest on asserting the legitimacy of their 
acts (which might have been conformable to international law but forbidden 
by English municipal law under some special definition of "piracy")108 these 
issues were not presented. 
Finally, in a case involving English possessors of "pirate" property deriving 
their title through purchase at Tunis, with Gentili arguing for the English 
possessors, he was forced to depart still further from his theoretical position 
that the Barbary states were "piratical" when they licensed takings without 
going to war. Admitting that his former argument109 went the other way, he 
tried to distinguish the cases on the ground that the involvement of the 
Turkish Treasury (''fiscus'') in the first case was merely a matter of form 
while in this case the involvement was direct. But major stress is placed on a 
more solid policy ground: That those who are safe under the law of the place 
of the transaction must be safe in their rights in England also. This is a basic 
principle of conflict of laws and necessary for any country involved in 
international trade. It thus indicates a limit to the theoretical discretion of 
lawyers and statesmen to attach legal labels to suit the particular interest of 
the moment. Gentili went even further: "Our countrymen have their trade 
with Tunis, Algeria, and many another state taken from th~m by this claim of 
the Venetians that those states are nothing but piratical retreats and that there 
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is none in them but pirates and that the very magistrates in them are pirates 
too. "110 This frankly political argument for attaching the label "state" to the 
Barbary organizations, and "government" to their officials, is consistent 
with Gentili's basic idea: That legal labels are attached not on the basis of 
facts, but on the basis of their legal and political results by a policy choice. 
Thus Gentili's "recognition" approach had its limits. Reality and the needs 
of commerce exposed it as not a rule for judgment by a third party or scholar, 
but as a tool of advocacy attractive primarily to flexible-minded lawyers and 
statesmen seeking a justification for actions that might not stand moral 
scrutiny. 
It was not even clear that the Gentili approach would help "legitimate" 
monarchs dispose of rebels as "pirates." Not only was its legal basis shaky, but 
it was not clear politically that treating a dynastic claimant as a "pirate" chief 
would have any significant effect in the world of affairs. It was not clear, as it 
is not clear today, that the legal results of loss in war are less harsh on the 
vanquished than defeat as "pirates." Hanging for treason, for political 
convenience or influence, or for crime differ as far as the victim is concerned 
only to the degree that some sense of dignity might attach more easily to the 
political prisoner than to the common criminal. Yet, it has been common in all 
ages that political prisoners suffer far more than common criminals in times of 
stress. And if the alternative to fighting on in a hopeless cause was to be death 
on a criminal's scaffold, it is not clear that calling "piracy" what others might 
call "privateering licensed by an unrecognized sovereign" would always 
shorten the struggle or make victory easier for the established sovereign. 
Thus the particular example does not seem to support the principle Gentili 
argued to underlie it. 
There are other implications to Gentili's approach. His approach to "law" 
seems dominated by the ephemora of policy. If "piracy" is criminal, by what 
law? Apparently, by giving to each sovereign the power by "recognition" or 
"non-recognition" to classify belligerent behavior as "piracy" when engaged 
in by licensees of a foreign government or of a political movement whose 
status could be denied, the privateers or soldiers of that government or 
movement could be subjected not to international law, but to the domestic 
("municipal," to use the usual word of art) criminal law of the "non-
recognizing" sovereign. In theory, Gentili' s approach, based on an advocate's 
twist to Roman municipal law, reached the same position as was condemned 
by Plutarch when considering the authority the Senate had given Pompey to 
suppress the Cilician "pirates" in 68 B.C. Now any sovereign could extend 
his municipal law to the high seas, and possibly even to foreign land, by 
authorizing his Admiral or General or other delegate to wipe out the 
"pirates" there. Clearly, this broad authority would not survive the politics 
of Europe, where the extension of one state's municipal law to the land 
claimed by another would result either in a system of competing empires and 
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"war" unmodified by the humanitarian and chivalrous law of war that was 
generally acknowledged in Europe as necessary, or in the acknowledgment 
that a European sovereign of sufficient political power and a claim to 
authority along traditional lines could not be properly denied "recognition" 
as such. But outside of Europe, where the competition for empire among 
European sovereigns and their subjects was becoming intense, the claims of 
non-European rulers to the legal authority of a European sovereign could be 
denied without those implications. And if the struggle grew too difficult to 
manage or the non-European too strong to ignore as a political actor or too 
adept at finding European allies who would "recognize" his legal capacity to 
license soldiers and privateers, the European power that had overextended 
itselfby abusing the legal tools Gentili would place in its control could simply 
withdraw for a while to reconsider the politics and law of its position.111 
The vistas opened by Gentili's discovery in the ancient Roman law relating 
to latrones and praedones of a pattern of rules that could justify the most extreme 
action against non-European political societies, and against internal forces 
resisting the move towards centralized control in the monarchies and 
bureaucracies of European expansion, were immense and very attractive to 
the rising merchant classes. 
Naturalist Theory: Law as a Moral Order Governing Policy. Gentili's 
approach was not universally adopted by scholars. Hugo Grotius (Huigh de 
Groot) was a Dutch prodigy whose reformulation of the basic conceptions of 
the law that governs relations among states was so influential that he became 
known as the father of modern international law. Born in 1583, he began 
University studies at Leyden eleven years later, received his Doctorate at 
fifteen from the University of Orleans while accompanying Johan van 
Oldenbarnevelt on a diplomatic mission, and was greeted on that occasion by 
King Henri IV as "The miracle of Holland. "112 The first edition of his 
masterwork, On the Law of War and Peace, was published in France in 1625 and 
incorporates writings dating back to 1604. Later editions with his own 
corrections in them appeared in 1631, 1632, 1642 and 1646, the last being 
published posthumously.ll3 His active life included government service in 
many capacities, including Ambassador from Queen Christina of Sweden to 
France in 1634-1645,114 and the 1646 edition of On the Law of War and Peace 
incorporates not only vast classical scholarship and literary precision, but 
distills the experience of an active statesman deeply involved in the political 
struggles of his time. 
Without mentioning Gentili by name, Grotius took issue with him on at 
least two vital points: (1) His classical scholarship, which Grotius corrected in 
large part; and (2) his emphasis on the power of an established sovereign 
through non-recognition to place an active political community within the 
legal classification "pirate." Most importantly, by describing some character-
istics of "pirates, "Grotius implied a view of the legal order which permits an 
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objective classification; he indirectly created a definition of "pirate" 
quite different from the Gentili definition and equally influential in the 
long run. 
As to the disagreements, Grotius addressed the same preliminary question 
that Gentili addressed as to whether "war" was a fitting legal classification 
for all armed contentions. Quoting Pomponius and Ulpian among others, 
Grotius came to no sweeping conclusions regarding "pirates" on the basis of 
their opinions. Instead, he turned to a more direct analysis of the character-
istics of a society before it should be denominated "piratical," asserting that 
the label properly fits only those who are banded together for wrongdoing 
but does not include societies formed for other reasons even if also 
committing illegal acts. ll5 
Moreover, a commonwealth or state to Grotius did not immediately cease 
to be such if it commited an illegality, even as a body; and a gathering of 
pirates and brigands was not a state, even if they did perhaps mutually 
maintain a sort of equality. The reason, according to Grotius, is that pirates 
and brigands are banded together for wrongdoing; the members of a state, 
even if at times they are not free from crime, nevertheless have been united 
for the enjoyment of rights, and they do render justice to foreigners. 116 The 
problem comes in practice when trying to distinguish a "piratical" 
community from a wrong-doing state. Comparing Ulpian's conclusions 
about captives not losing their liberty if taken by brigands117 with the 
willingness ofUlpian to allow lawful capture to German marauding tribes on 
land as described in the works of Caesar and Tacitus,11S and comparing the 
celebration of a Roman "Triumph" at the end of the "war" with Illyrian 
indiscriminate sea-borne marauders with the refusal of Rome to order a 
Triumph to end Pompey's aGknowledged war with the Cilician "pirates, "119 
Grotius simply reiterated his view that these legally vital distinctions which, 
after all, determine rights to potentially large amounts of captured property120 
and the liberty of real people, rest solely on the criminal purpose of the 
marauders' association.121 
This basis for discriminating between "piratical" and non-piratical 
marauding communities in the classical literature seems insupportable. There 
is no evidence that the "peiraton" of Plutarch and Polybius, with their villages, 
religious observances, alliances, etc., were banded together for the purpose of 
plundering their neighbors any more than were the Germanic tribes or 
Illyrians. Moreover, Grotius himself saw that the distinction could not 
survive close legal scrutiny or the need politically to take full account of 
marauding societies no matter what the purpose of their original union, once 
their activities and degree of organization and their political power passed a 
certain point. He argued that a "transformation [mutatio]" may take place 
with regard to individual chieftains of brigand bands [praedonum ducibus] who 
become "lawful chiefs Uusti duces]" in some cases,l22 and also to whole 
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communities by mere evolution.l23 But, instead of reconsidering his definition 
Grotius immediately passed on to other things.124 
In short, Grotius's conception of when the word "pirate" would fit as a 
legal word of art seems to focus not on recognition or the derivation of 
authority from some acknowledged prince, but from facts directly: The word 
would fit robber bands on sea or land; it would not fit the Barbary states or 
other complete communities, whose primary purpose of association is lawful, 
i.e., defense, raising families, making war. The legal results that flow from 
attaching the word seem vague indeed, since Grotius would allow oaths and 
promises to "pirates" to be kept and legation to be maintained. The only 
really significant passage then is the one offhandedly expanding the Justinian 
Digest's rule regarding the impossibility of a piratical capture changing the 
personal status of the captive, to the very important area of general 
postliminium-the disposition after recovery of goods previously captured 
by "pirates." 
Even in this last regard, postliminy, Grotius was not certain that its rules 
and exceptions had any application to his time. The expansion of organized 
political societies in peaceful contact with each other had, in his optimistic 
view, made the Roman law of postliminy obsolete: A lawful capture in war 
followed by prize proceedings would legally change title to captured goods; 
an unlawful capture in war or the lack of a legal proceeding similar to prize 
court proceedings in which the various claimants to the goods would have an 
opportunity to dispute the lawfulness of the capture, the contraband nature of 
the goods and their actual ownership and destination, would not change the 
title, and the loser could reclaim his goods if he could in fact recover them. A 
lawful capture outside of war he regarded as impossible. 
But what, then, about seizures by the Barbary corsairs? Were those 
"states" in a permanent status of war with the states of Europe? Could their 
licensees' seizures and their magistrates' legal procedures confer title on the 
corsairs and thus on the European merchants who eventually bought the 
goods? Or were they "pirates" who, by the ancient Roman law, could not get 
title to goods however elaborate their legal proceedings? Or were they 
"states" not at war whose depredations could give them some rights of 
possession, but with regard to whom the law of postliminy should be revived 
to clarify precisely what those rights were and against whom they could be 
asserted? Grotius reported without comment a judgment of the highest court 
in Paris delivered while he was writing (presumably shortly before 1625): 
The decision held that goods which had belonged to French citizens, and had been 
captured by the Algerians, a people accustomed in their maritime depredations to attack 
all others, had changed ownership by the law of war, and therefore, when recaptured by 
others, became the property of those who had recovered them.125 
Despite Grotius's seeming to doubt the legal strength or practical wisdom of 
the Paris decision, and bearing in mind that his merely recording it added 
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greatly to its weight in those days when there were no formal court reports 
and a necessarily different concept of stare decisis, (i.e., the bindingness of 
common law decisions on later courts) from the current concept, the 
inclusion of this judgment in his book may indicate Grotius' s own uneasiness 
with the classifications that his logic and moral perception of the legal order 
had led him to. Of course, if there were no moral content to the law but only 
form, the decision was clearly correct: Algiers met the criteria of statehood 
by Grotius's own definitions,-and the procedures oflegal title transfer by the 
law of Algiers were not questionedtlMoreover, presumably both the former 
owner and the owner deriving title through the sale in Algiers were innocent 
of the taking and certainty in the law seems always to have been more 
important for practical men of affairs and merchants than its conformity to an 
abstract ideal of morality; a decision against Algiers would have had to come 
in the form of a decision against a merchant who presumably had his insurance 
or other 17th century risk-sharing arrangement to fall back on. It is only the 
moral feeling that such takings seemed more like robbery than like war or tax 
enforcement that seemed bothersome, and that sense of wrong came from an 
analogy to the municipal law of robbery that seems misplaced in an age when 
privateering was the normal way to recover the loss due to the acts of 
foreigners abroad. Perhaps there was an undercurrent of yearning for 
Empire, the imposition o~ Dutch order on the world, or at least on the 
non-European part of it. \ Perhaps it was a deeper sense of order felt 
increasingly as the excitement of trade and travel combined with classical 
learning began to stir European scholars. But this is speculation. 
The practical diplomat's position expressed by implication throughout De 
Jure Belli ac Pacis, that facts and the needs of politics and moral order dictate the 
legal classifications that must be attached to situations, contrasts strongly 
with Gentili's position that lawyers and politicians can apply the labels best 
suited to their legal and political needs by a simple exercise of will. Under 
Grotius's analysis, rebels at a fairly early stage, when their independent 
existence at least as a community capable of belligerency could be objectively 
determined, must be treated as a legal entity exercising belligerent rights 
under international law. That position, of course, suited very well the 
position of the Netherlands rebelling from Spain. Gentili, the Spanish 
advocate in London's Royal Council Chamber sitting in Admiralty insisted 
that only a license from a recognized sovereign could authorize the exercise 
of soldiers' or privateers' privileges, thus that legitimate sovereigns 
attempting to suppress rebellion could treat the rebels as criminals, even 
"pirates," with whatever legal results could be drawn from that classifica-
tion, without raising any questions of international law. 
Under the analyses of both Grotius and Gentili, robber bands not 
purporting to have any license could be treated as "pirates," but the legal 
result of this was not to treat "pirates" directly as Roman law "latrones" or 
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"praedones." It was to justify attaching the label "pirate" to those robber 
bands that would have been called "latrones" or "praedones," but not "pirata," 
before the great reanalysis of the late 16th century. Whatever the Roman law 
treatment of "latrones" and "praedones," the effect of this was to refer the 
treatment of those now called "pirates" back to the municipal law systems of 
the labeling states, presumably by unconscious analogy to the primacy of 
Roman municipal criminal law in questions involving the disposition of those 
whom the Roman law called "latrones" or "praedones." 
There is another aspect to the Grotian view of the international society of 
the time that must be mentioned. Despite Grotius's reputation as an able 
advocate for seas open to all,l26 in De Jure Belli ac Pads the more extreme 
arguments, under which Portuguese monopoly treaties with the Sultans of the 
Malay Archipelago and their enforcement against third states were 
denominated criminal,127 were dropped and Grotius concluded that: 
[SJovereignty over a part of the sea is acquired in the same way as sovereignty 
elsewhere, that is, ... through the instrumentality of persons and of territory. It is 
gained through the instrumentality of persons if, for example, a fleet, which is an army 
afloat, is stationed at some point of the sea; by means of territory, insofar as those who 
sail over the part of the sea along the coast may be constrained from the land no less than 
if they should be upon the land itself.128 
Thus the basis for the extension of municipal criminal law to the activities of 
foreigners on at least parts of the sea was laid in theory. The theory was that 
of effective occupation-the power in fact of a sovereign to dominate a part 
of the sea and apply his law there as he did on land; a power that could be 
exercised not by theoretical claims, but by the use of military force. 
Argumentative support for this position was found in various Greek and 
Roman precedents,129 although the example of the Roman Senate conferring 
monarchical powers on Pompey in 68 B.C. is not cited. Thus, as Gentili had 
found a legal rationale for the extension of municipal law to foreign territory, 
so Grotius, reversing his earlier position as the sea power of The Netherlands 
increased, found a rationale for the extension of municipal law by any state 
with a warship to that part of the sea within the military control of that 
warship. 
Some Implications. It may thus be seen that the word "piracy" entered 
modern English usage in a vernacular sense to cover almost any interference 
with property rights, whether licensed or not, and was applied as a pejorative 
with political implications but no clear legal meaning. The word in its Latin 
form entered the vocabulary of lawyers concerned with public order in the 
late 16th and early 17th century as a synonym for action, whether or not 
related to property rights, which was conceived to be unauthorized within 
the legal system posited by the lawyers using the term. Thus, it could be 
applied to "rebels" violating the constitutional order of a single country; 
persons within the allegiance of one monarch acting against that monarch 
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under the purported authority of another monarch; foreign privateers whose 
property rights were being denied; or even the officials of a political society 
denied legal status as a person subject to the "international legal order," as 
defined by each ruler in Christendom for himself, with the legal effect that 
the officials of that "non-state" would be regarded in the denying state as 
lacking the legal power to change property rights or carry on a legal "war" or 
prescribe law in any territory. In its most expansive meanings, no implication 
of criminality existed; it was not a crime by any law to be an official of an 
unrecognized political society. On the other hand, an individual acting 
against the criminal law, or the law regarding "treason" or "mutiny," of a 
state could not exculpate himself from the operation of that law by claiming a 
license to act issued by an unrecognized "government." A link between 
individual criminality and the international legal order was thus put in place, 
as the existence of political groups outside the legal order, "outlaw" groups, 
meant that action taken pursuant to the " outlaw's" authority was, as far as an 
official within the legal order was concerned, unauthorized and, if that action 
violated a rule of law of the enforcing official, and occurred within his 
perception of his jurisdiction to enforce the rule, could be punished regardless 
of the link to an "outlaw" organization. 
To follow the evolution of this conception further, it is necessary not only 
to understand the fundamental difference in the approaches to defining the 
legal order taken by "naturalists" and "positivists," but to know that as 
governmental control tightened with the rise of a secular legal order in 
Europe based on effective control and ambition, the outer limits of national 
assertions of jurisdiction to prescribe rules of property and criminal behavior 
were explored. Some of those limits have already been mentioned, as it was 
pointed out that legal words that did not reflect reality may have governed 
some statesmen's actions, but that legal policy as well as political action lost 
persuasiveness and effectiveness as it departed from reality as perceived by 
those whose actions were supposed to be influenced by it. As the vice of 
"naturalism" is to attribute legal force to the merely moral commands that 
the lawyer or statesman would like to be law but which is denied by others, so 
the vice of "positivism" is to treat as if real the model built by mere words to 
reflect what the lawyer or statesman would like to be real rather than what 
actually is. Where "naturalism" imputes consensus where there may be none, 
"positivism" can lead to solipsism - an emphasis on the arbitrary aspects of 
consent as the basis of the law-making process, and a retreat to "de jure" 
dreams of power. 
In any case, in addition to its usage in the international legal order, the 
word "piracy" in the 16th and early 17th century was acquiring a meaning in 
the municipal legal orders of the countries of Europe whose views of law 
were to dominate sophisticated thought for the next four hundred years. It is 
impossible to understand the evolution of the conceptions of "piracy" in 
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international law without first understanding not only some rudiments of the 
conception of the international legal order and some legal theory, but also it is 
necessary to consider the municipal law usage, particularly in connection 
with municipal criminal law and its jurisdiction to apply to the acts of 
foreigners abroad, and municipal property law and the need to mesh that law 
with foreign property law so that private property crossing national 
boundaries remain secure in the possession of the foreign "owner." We now 
turn to that. 
English Municipal Law and Piracy in the Renaissance 
Jurisdiction and Substance; Admiralty and Common Law. It is beyond the 
powers of a sole scholar in reasonable time to analyze the municipal laws that 
might relate to the conception of "piracy" of all countries, or even all 
European countries, or even a few major European countries. It is fortunately 
possible to trace the municipal law ofEnglandl30 as it relates to "piracy" from 
the time it began to emerge from the obscurity of time and the vagaries of 
medieval records, through the great formative days of Sir Edward Coke 
(1552-1634) and Sir William Scott (Lord Stowell) (1745-1836) to modern 
times. As in the examination of classical sources, it is necessary to begin with a 
word of caution. The word "pirate" does not appear with a precise meaning 
in English legalliterature until the 16th century, and attempts to trace the law 
regarding "piracy" back beyond that time all seem to assume that other legal 
words carried the identical meaning.131 The assumption may be correct, but it 
is not convincingly argued in any known source despite the extraordinary 
volume of writing devoted to the history of the English law relating to 
"piracy. " Typical of the confusion, and worth mentioning only because of the 
eminence and scholarly reputations earned by the people involved, is the 
elaborate history of the English and international laws of "piracy" by Chief 
Justice Cockburn in Regina v. Keyn132 and the compilations of documents by 
Reginald G. Marsden. 133 In the first, Lord Cockburn refersl34 in some detail to 
two cases of Common Law indictment for "piracy" in the time of Kings 
Edward II and Edward III.135 In fact the word does not seem to appear in any 
of his quotations.136 Marsden, while reproducing several documents that use 
the word in the 14th century and even earlier, notes: 
As a legal term "piracy" belongs to a later date. The Latin word is common from the 
first, but it was not always used in an evil sense. In 1309 wines are stated to have been 
captured" more piratico; " in 1353 "piratae et alii inimici nostri" are spoken of. .. , and in 1359 
one Robert Blake, who robbed a ship at sea, is called "pirata" ... But in the twelfth 
century ships in the service of William II are spoken of as "piratae"-''jam mare munierat 
piratis ... ; Anglici vera piratae qui curam maris a rege susceperant •.. ;" and in 1324 Edward II 
prepared for war "Admiralos et piratas super mare constituendo" ••• Before the la tter part of 
the 14th century robbery at sea seems to have been dealt with in the King's courts as one 
and the same crime as robbery on land; and so of murder and assault. The records do not, 
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to the present writer, appear to support the view insisted upon by some of the judges in 
Reg. v. Keyn ... that piracy has from the first been recognized by the law of England as a 
crime distinct from robbery and murder on land.137 
On the other hand, Marsden himself used the word "piracy" in headnotes 
to various documents in which neither the word nor any clear concept 
appears; his indexes use the word to refer to cases that seem to have nothing to 
do with the word or any clear concept of "piracy, " and in at least one place in 
his table of contents he refers to a document that seems irrelevant in both 
word and sense to anything related to "piracy" and for which he does not use 
the word in his own headnote.138 Occasionally he uses the word to translate 
Latin documents in which the word "pirata" or its derivatives does not 
appear; since his own note quoted above indicates his awareness of how 
deceptive that can be, the practice is inexplicable. In these circumstances, and 
finding similar doubts and problems to attend reference to other deservedly 
reputable works,139 it seems necessary to return once again to primary 
sources, so happily collected by Marsden, hoping only that the reprints 
purporting to set out original language are more accurate than the 
translations. l40 
There are at least three analytically distinct problems that must be seen 
clearly before it is possible to understand the growth of English law relating 
to "piracy" and its relationships to international law. First, there is the 
question of jurisdiction: Is there a court in England empowered by English 
law to consider the case? Second, there is the question of substance: Is the 
particular act complained of a violation of English law? Third, there is the 
question of the reach outside of England of the prescriptions of English law 
and the enforcement jurisdiction of English courts. Each of these problems 
contains within it a whole host of subsidiary questions and the answers to any 
one of them change the pattern in ways that effect the whole problem and, 
indeed, the perceptions of all three problems. Because the interplay of these 
three problems is so complex, and the implications of tracing any particular 
pattern oflegal behavior in disregard of the entire picture are so destructive 
of coherence, a basically chronological approach will be taken. 
In the earliest documents, as noted above, the word "pirate" (the 
documents are in Latin, the word "pirata") and its derivatives are not used in 
any sense pertinent to this study. Indeed, Marsden's headnotes to documents 
of 1216 and 1228 relating to a ship "piratically captured" and "A pirate 
hanged" do not reflect either language or concept in the documents 
reproduced. In the first141 King] ohn directs his port bailiffs to find and deliver 
to its owners on presentation of proof of ownership a ship and goods alleged to 
have been diverted, and to hold for further action those in whose hands the 
ship and goods may be found. The case may involve maritime embezzlement 
and in any case seems a civil rather than a criminal matter with an 
undifferentiated legal power in the King to resolve both civil and criminal 
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aspects of it. In the second, the criminal charge for which one Willelmus de 
Briggeho was hanged involved consorting with general evil-doers who 
robbed a ship off the port of Sandwich ({( ... Willelmus de BriggehoJ suspensus 
postea pro consensu malefactorum navis depredate ante Sandwicum ... ))).142 Not only is 
the word "pirata" or its derivatives not used, but again the facts are so unclear 
as to make any conclusions doubtful. All the people involved might well have 
been English, the vessel robbed might have been English, the location seems 
to have been mentioned for the purpose of identifying the incident, rather 
than as significant to establish any court's or nation's jurisdiction, and the 
location is so closely linked with a bit of land clearly within the realm of 
England that it is impossible to say that any concept of extending that 
jurisdiction seaward was involved. 
The earliest reference to an international incident in the modern sense 
appears in a document of1289. King Edward I by that document established a 
Commission to inquire into "certain trespasses [transgressiones]" committed by 
Englishmen against some Frenchmen and complained of by the King of 
France. The Commissioners were directed to "cause due restitution to be 
made of the goods. "143 
Apparently private recapture, self-help, was the normal remedy of seamen 
despoiled of their property in those rough times, and well into the next 
century,l44 but there is mention ofletters of marque in documents of1293 and 
1295 indicating at least a Royal attempt to get control over the activities of his 
mariners when foreign ships might become involved and protests from 
foreign princes could be expected.145 In the latter case, the letter ("licentia 
marcandi") granted an English petitioner the legal right at the law of England 
to take back from Portuguese "sons of perdition" the value of goods seized by 
them under license of the King of Portugal, who is alleged to have got a tenth 
of the booty. It is noteworthy that the English license is not directed against 
the particular people who took the English goods, but against any subjects of 
the realm of Portugal. What seems to have been involved was not an attempt 
to get control of robbery at sea, but of private legal remedies; to limit the 
rights of English victims to the equivalent of restitution for injury done by a 
foreigner, and to avoid as far as possible committing the public forces and 
resources of the Crown to the petty struggle. 
It was about this time that the post of "Admiral" was established in 
England as a magnate authorized to oversee the issuance ofletters of marque 
and reprisal and their due performance and ultimate cancellation.146 
It is not clear what the source of substantive law was that the Admiral was 
supposed to apply. The Commissioners of1289, responding to complaints by 
the King of France against English seamen, were directed to make the 
restitution "in accordance with the law and custom of our realm," 
England.147 In 1361, a prior commission148 to try the case in a Common Law 
court (the accused having been caught in England with their booty) was 
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revoked and replaced by a commission authorizing" our Admirals" to try the 
case "according to the maritime law. "149 But the "maritime law" is not likely 
to have been conceived as a law foreign to England. The great Code of the 
Laws of Oleron, compiled in a small island within the feudallands of Eleanor, 
Duchess of Guienne, the wife of Henry II and mother of Kings John and 
Richard I, had been promulgated by her for Guienne in the Gascon tongue, 
promulgated with revisions then in England by Richard and John, re-issued by 
Henry III in 1266, and confirmed by Edward III in 1329.150 They were 
distinguished from the Common Law of England by the very fact of royal 
promulgation as a Code; the power of interpretation was given to the 
Admirals as beneficiaries of royal patronage rather than Common Law judges 
with their own traditions of independence and the legal power to develop 
custom, as distinct from statutory or decree law, in both criminal and civil 
matters. Presumably the merchants most directly concerned with the terms of 
maritime law preferred this system also, since their interests could more 
easily be pressed at the royal court or with a royal administrator, the Admiral, 
than with Common Law judges when a change in the law or its interpretation 
was sought in the interest of English sea-borne commerce. Thus, when a 
commission of 1374 directed the leading administrators of England's 
Southeastern coast to hear and determine various criminal matters arising at 
I h " "fK ( h d"· " . sea a ong t e coasts, supra mare per costeras, 0 ent t e wor pIracy IS not 
mentioned: The list of offenses included the Common Law and non-legal 
words "robberies, depredations, discords and slayings")151 it seems significant 
that the law to be applied was "the law and custom of our realm of England 
and ... the law of the sea. "152 The implication is not that the law of the sea is 
different from the King's law in England, but that it is different from the other 
law of England, the Common Law which includes its own custom. The 
reference to the "law of the sea" pointedly omits any reference to custom. 
The word "pirate" enters the English legal vocabulary via Latin 
commissions in the 15th century. The first direct legal use of the word appears 
to have been in an order of Henry VI in 1443 directing the restitution to 
Englishmen of goods taken from them by "pirates. "153 The context is purely 
civil-a question of property rights, not of crimes, and the word seems to be 
used in a pejorative, not a technical, sense. Similarly, a Proclamation by 
Henry VII in 1490 mentions: 
divers and monyfold spoliations and robberies ... uppon the se unto the said subgettis of 
the said most high and myghty princes [of England and various foreign places] ... as well 
by their enemyes as by other pirattis and robbers, which, as it is said, daily resorte into 
divers portes and places of this his realme of England, and ther be suffered to utter and 
sell their prises, spoiles, and pillages .. .154 
This seems to classify the "pirates" with "enemies" as well as with 
"robbers," and classifies what might be lawful spoils with the booty of 
wrongful takings. Significantly, the Proclamation does not purport to apply 
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the law of England or the "law of the sea" or "maritime law" to the first 
takers of the goods. To discharge the King's international obligations to his 
fellow princes it takes a strictly territorial approach, commanding that: 
[N]o manner of persons ... from henssforth comfort, take no receyve, in any ... places 
of this his realme any of the said mysdoers, ne any merchandisez or goo des by them 
spoiled or takyn ... uppon payn of forfeiture of the same merchaundises ... or to the 
value thereof, for restitution to be made to the parties grevid, and uppon payn of 
imprisonment ... at the Kinges wiII.t55 
The command is directed at Englishmen and perhaps foreign merchants only 
when they are in England; punishment for the "enemies," "pirates" and 
"robbers" is not prescribed, but only for the receivers of their goods in 
England. 
The earliest reference to "pirates" in a context that seems to attach specific 
legal results to their activities seems to be a Latin letter of appointment by 
Henry VIII in 1511 to John Hopton, who was directed to: 
[S]eize and subdue all and singular such spoilers, pirates, exiles, and outlaws [praedones, 
pirates, exu/es, et bannitos] wheresoever they shall be seized, to destroy them and to bring 
all and singular of them, who are captured, into one of our ports, and to hand over and 
deliver them, when so brought in, to our commissioners .. .156 
Whether or not this instruction was actually intended to apply to foreigners 
in foreign vessels, or only to Englishmen and persons of any allegiance in 
English vessels, is not clear. Nor is it clear how far from the coasts of England 
Hopton was expected to range; he appears to have confined his activities to 
areas within easy sail of English ports157 and the more general language of the 
letter of appointment may never have been intended to reach farther. 
Moreover, the degree to which the commissioners mentioned in the letter had 
jurisdiction in derogation of Admiralty courts and Common Law courts, 
whether in fact there were Admiralty courts functioning throughout the 
period, are questions it is impossible to resolve without what appears 
excessive research.1ss 
Admiralty Commissions and Common Law: The Statutes of 1535 and 1536. The 
first attempt to organize the administration of justice regarding maritime 
English offenses and have it apply in a regular way, through permanent 
tribunals instead of through ad hoc tribunals set up under ad hoc commissions of 
the King, was not until 1535.159 The Preamble to that statute says: 
Where pirates, thieves, robbers and murders upon the sea, many times escape 
unpunished, because the trial of their offences hath heretofore been ordered before the 
admiral, or his lieutenant or commissary, after the course of the civil laws, the nature 
whereofis, that before any judgment of death can be given against the offenders, either 
they must plainly confess their offences, (which they wiII never do without torture or 
pains) or else their offences be so plainly and directly proved by witnesses indifferent, 
such as saw their offences committed, which cannot be gotten but by chance at a few 
times, because such offenders commit their offences upon the sea ... 160 
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To cure these legal problems, the statute provides that all "felonies, 
robberies, murders and manslaughters" should henceforth be tried by special 
Commissions using the forms of the Common Law, under which conviction 
and execution were easier. The word "pirates" or its derivatives is not used in 
the operative part of the text. 
Section IV of the statute of 1535 allows for an unlicensed taking at sea not to 
be considered criminal if only necessities of the voyage were taken, and a 
written promise to pay for them was given and redeemed within four months 
if the taking were "this side of the straits ofMarroke" or 12 months if on the 
other side (in the Mediterranean). There is no mention of takings across the 
Atlantic or on the other side of the Straits of Magellan; but then Drake had 
not yet made his circumnavigation. The statute is silent as to the nationality of 
the taker or the victim, or the nationality of the vessels. Nor does it deal with 
the defense of vessels anywhere. It appears to envisage the arrest in the 
normal Common Law fashion of accused malefactors in England; it thus 
merely replaces the discretionary Admiralty courts, using Civil Law 
procedures, with tribunals (Commissions) to be appointed and to use 
Common Law procedures outside both Admiralty and Common Law systems 
in England without affecting the normal rules of jurisdiction. 
The statute of 1535 was superseded the following year by a nearly identical 
statute, 28 Hen. VIII c. 15 (1536).161 The Preamble to the statute of 1535 
referred to "pirates, thieves, robbers and murders." The Preamble to the 
statute of 1536 refers to "traitours pirotes theves robbers murtherers and 
confederatours." Presumably, "traitours" and "confederatours" were added 
to the list to take account of evolving Common Law thought that wanted to 
classify "piracy" as an Admiralty term for breach of feudal relationships, 
equivalent to the master-servant bond in days when status seemed more 
important legally than contract ties. Under the laws of Ole ron, the master of 
a vessel had some of the legal powers of a feudal superior over his crew.16: 
Thus, "traitours" and "confederatours" (i.e., conspirators, those who join 
together to commit a wrongful act) would relate to passengers and crew 
within the vessel, and seem to refer to what today would be called 
"mutineers. "163 Like the statute of 1535 the statute of 1536 drops the word 
"pirate" ["pirotes"] in its substantive terms: 
All treasons felonyes robberies murders and confederacies, hereafter to be comytted in 
or uppon the see, or in any other haven ryve creke or place where the admyrall or 
admyralls have or pretende to have power auctorities or jurisdiction, shall be enquired 
harde determyned and judged in such shires and places in the realme as shall be lymytted 
by the Kynges Comission or Comissions to be directed for the same, in like fourme and 
condicioun as if any such offence or offences hadd been comytted or done in or uppon the 
lande; and such comissions shall be ... directed to the admyrall [or his delegates] ... and 
to iij or iiij such other substantiall persons as shall be named or appointed by the lorde 
chauncellor of Englande ... 164 
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The legal words of art did not include any reference to international law or 
Roman law or, indeed, any concept of "piracy" except in the nontechnical 
recitation of the preamble; instead the words of art of the English Common 
Law of crimes were used. It is in that context that the word "felonyes" makes 
sense; the distinction being drawn involved the technical English law of "high 
treason," "petit treason" and Common Law crime, as yet incompletely 
distinguished from tresspass, or tort actions.165 
The extraterritorial reach of this legislation was no more clear than before. It 
was apparently restricted to the places in which the Admiral by the law of 
England had legal power, authority or jurisdiction. That apparently included 
vessels flying the English flag wherever they might be afloat, including foreign 
ports and the navigable waters ofEngland.l66 But it was never clear whether it 
extended to foreign vessels on the high seas or on internal navigable waters of 
England which were within the Conunon Law courts' jurisdiction. The case of 
Regina v. Keyn showed at great length that there was considerable doubt, 
ultimately resolved rightly or wrongly against the Admiral's pretentions, ifhe 
had any, that it extended to foreign vessels outside England's Conunon Law 
jurisdiction even within three miles of the English coast. 
The system remained fundamentally unaltered through the entire period of 
this study.167 
In Rem Property Adjudications. The earliest technical legal usage of the word 
"pirate" in an English court reflects the Roman law origins of the "Civil 
Law" applied in those English courts not governed by the "Conunon Law" of 
England.l68 In 1553 John Clerke, "Proctor General" of the Admiralty court of 
England, referred to goods "left and deposited by Henry Strangwis, Peter 
Killigrew, Thomas Killigrew and Baptist Roane & others ... pirates, robbers 
and malefactors [piratas predones et malefactores] ... now being under arrest. "169 
Apparently it was the goods that were arrested, not the "piratas predones et 
malefactores," who had fled. The goods were confiscated and the various 
claimants were given a chance before the Admiralty court in an in rem 
proceeding to prove their property rights. It is unclear whether the denial of 
property rights to those who had fled (presumably for fear of criminal 
prosecution in the Conunon Law courts or before Admiralty Conunissions 
under the statute of Henry VIII) was a reflection of a legal conclusion that 
"pirates" could not possess property at English Conunon or Civil Law. It 
might equally well have been a mere incident of the Civil Law system of in rem 
proceedings under which those with claims to property must submit those 
claims for adjudication in the light of the claims of others, and failure to 
present a claim for whatever reason resulted in loss of the possible rights and 
carried no criminal law or other general implications. 
The notion that calling the possessor of a ship a "pirate" would deprive him 
of legal rights to the ship seemed very useful to Sir Julius Caesar,170 who 
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applied the word to possible claimants in a series of widely different in rem 
cases. For example, in 1585 the Diana was arrested at the order of Caesar and 
condemned as a "pirate" ship to be sold for the benefit of the Admiral when 
her Master, a Frenchman named Killie, sailing under a French flag, did not 
appear. Killie was considered a "pirate" by Caesar even though it seems 
possible that he had a French commission, or letters of marque and reprisal, 
authorizing in the name of France his depredations against English ships.l7l 
There was no criminal action involved. 
In another case in 1598, Caesar gave title to a prior owner against a 
purchaser who derived his claim to title from an Englishman "commonly, 
openly, publicly, and notoriously reputed to be a pirate [articulatis pro pirata 
communiter, polam, pubiice, et notorie reputatum fuisse et esse]" in the complete 
absence of criminal proceedings or other evidence as to the place of the taking 
or the circumstances surrounding it. l72 
In 1608 another Admiralty judge, Thomas Crompton, used the word in a 
similar way to deny title to James and John Powntis, purchasers "in foreign 
parts" of Venetian goods "captured ... by one John Ward,173 and other 
pirates and sea rovers" and sold to them apparently via official channels in 
Algiers. The goods or their value were granted to the Venetian Ambassador 
for the merchants he represented.174 This case seems to avoid the problem of a 
commission for Ward, or the possibility that his capture was a "lawful prize" 
or a confiscation for non-payment of Algerine transit tolls, by simply calling 
Ward a "pirate" and ignoring the probable subsequent involvement of the 
Algerine officials in a legal transaction to transfer title. There was no 
criminal proceeding or attempt at definition. 
While not pertinent to the definition of the word "piracy," it might be 
mentioned in this place that the use of that word to bring into play the idea 
that stolen goods should be returned to their previous owner because thieves 
by ancient principle cannot pass title they do not have, even to innocent 
purchasers, created special problems with regard to the use of the word. 
Without denying the superior title of the prior owner to the title a thief might 
assert merely by his possession of the goods, the needs of commerce required 
greater stability of title when dealing with a foreign seaman; a merchant had 
to be able to buy goods from one who might later turn out to have been a 
"pirate" (however defined), or a major legal impediment would limit 
international seaborne commerce. The solution to this problem appears to 
have been not only the easy acknowledgment of title transfers under Barbary 
states law for the benefit of corsairs (or "pirates"), but also the application in 
English law of the rule that: 
[I]f a Man commit Piracy upon the Subjects of another Prince or Republique (though in 
League with us) and brings the Goods into England, and sells them in a Market Overt; the 
same shall bind, and the Owners are for ever concluded, and if they should go about in 
the Admiralty to question the property, in order to restitution [sic], they will be 
prohibited.175 
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Englishmen's goods found in England were still to be returned to their English 
prior owner as a matter of statute law.176 
A strange incident in 1615 demonstrates the vernacular use of the word by 
the highest officials of England to refer to an Admiralty in rem case in which 
the word "piracy" was not in fact used but the legal results were drawn 
without it. In 1615, Captain Newporte of the Centaur invited the Captain of 
the French ship L 'Esperance to dinner off Cape Verde. Newporte then seized 
the French ship, whose owner turned out to be the politically influential 
Governor of Dieppe, Francois de Villiers Houdan. The English Admiralty 
court under Judge Daniel Dun decreed restitution of the vessel or its value to 
the French owner, ending a diplomatic crisis. There is no evidence of Captain 
Newporte's authority, if any, for his action, nor is there any known record of 
a criminal proceeding growing out of the incident. But in the Privy Council 
Register for 11 July 1617 there is a reference to money held "for satisfaction of 
a sentence given in the Court of Admyraltie on the behalfe of Viliers 
Howden, a governor ofDeipe, concerning a pyracie committed upon a shipp 
of his by one capten Newporte. "177 Apparently, the word "pyracie" was used 
in a non-legal sense to mean something like "unauthorized taking," with an 
implication of crime; no clear legal sense seems to have been intended. The 
only legal action mentioned was the one for restitution. The word" sentence" 
does not seem to refer to any criminal court's action, but to the judgment of 
the Admiralty court in an in rem proceeding. It is in this context that it is 
possible to interpret the remark of King James I in 1624178 referring to the East 
India Company as "pirates" merely for failing to pay him what he felt was his 
share of their lawful captures. 
Outlawry, Crime and Licenses. From the mid 16th to the mid 17th centuries the 
word "pirate" and its derivatives was used more and more frequently in 
official English documents not related to property-rights cases before the 
Admiralty courts, and had acquired a meaning as a vague basis for ever-
expanding English assertions of jurisdiction. In 1569 Queen Elizabeth had by 
proclamation denounced "all pyrats and rovers upon the seas" and declared 
them "to be out of her protection, and lawfully to be by any person taken, 
punished, and suppressed with extremity. "179 Until 1569 ships suspected of 
involvement in "piracy" and privateering without a commission had been 
treated with strict attention to English forms; they (the ships) were to be 
arrested only after arriving at English ports, and Vice-Admirals were simply 
warned against harboring or countenancing "pirates" within their jurisdic-
tion as that jurisdiction was established by their commissions.180 An indication 
of the difficulties of an increasingly centralized administration gaining legal 
control of English seamen continuing the ancient practice of re-capture 
without a license, abusing their opportunities and making general commerce 
of English as well as foreign merchants unsafe, lies in the recitation of fact 
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accompanying a Warrant from Queen Elizabeth to the Warden of the Cinque 
Ports (the English fortified towns strategically situated on the South coast) in 
1577: 
Whereas there is an unyversall complainte made as well by our owne merchaunts and 
fishermen, as also by other merchaunts straungers, being the subjects of our frinds and 
allyes, of the great number of pyrats and sea rovers haunting and keeping the narrow 
seas and streames thereof ... ; We having care that our streames should be quyet and 
voyde of such malefactors, and understanding that sute hath ben made to our previe 
Counsell on the behalf of divers townes corporat of our realme, being annoyed by such 
pyrates and sea rovers haunting their coasts, to have license to sett fourth shippes for the 
chastening and repressing of the said malefactors, offering to do the same at their owne 
adventure, proper costs and chardges ... by these presents do geve full power and 
authoritie unto you, to give and graunte commissions under the seal of your office of the 
Cinque Portes to as many, as well cities and townes corporat of this our realme, as you 
shall thinke good, as also to others whom you shall thinke such as will not abuse the same, 
to arme and sett fourth ... to purge and clere the sea coasts of such evill persons ... 181 
Despite the language of outlawry in the Proclamation of 1569, the Warrant of 
1577 requires that the forms of English law be followed if any property were 
to change hands as a result of the law-enforcement effort. Persons licensed by 
the Warden of the Cinque Ports under this Warrant, if they wanted any 
compensation for their own costs to be paid out of "the proper shippes and 
goo des of the pyrats or sea rovers" they have caught, could do so only "after 
they have been thereof attaynted in the [ form] of lawe as shall be thought 
convenyent by the [officials] of our Exchequier."l82 The procedure was set 
out in a series of commissions: 
Imprimis that the pyrats taken maye be brought to the next port, and there presented to 
the Vice Admirall, ... or the next justice of the peace, who shall send them to the nexte 
gaol, their [sic: ther (there)?] to remayne untill they be tryed by order of justice. 
That the shippes and goods and merchandizes in the possession of the pyrats be ... valued 
by the oth of fower honest, skilfull, and expert persons ... and then delyvered to the 
custodie of the said customer ... , their to remayne unto such tyme yt maybe appear how 
much thereof shall appertaine to these pyrats, and how much to others.l83 
"c " I " r" . hid· ustomer apparent y meant customs enrorcer, I.e., person 0 mg a 
license to patrol the coast and see to the enforcement of English import laws. 
The word "pyrat" seems to have been applied to smugglers as well as those 
whose acts fell within the legal terms used in the legislation of Henry VIII 
quoted above. 
The term "pirate" was used also to cover Englishmen holding foreign 
commissions as "privateers" without the Queen's permission. In a Proclama-
tion of 1575 the situation is clearly described: 
[H]er Majestie's will and pleasure is that none of her subjects shouldentermeddle in anie 
quarrells of anie forraigne prince or subjects, either on thone side or thother, (speciallie 
by sea), without her Majestie's license ... Because now oflate, under pretence of those 
forraigne services, manie piracies be dailie committed and done, yea in her Majestie's 
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owne ports, and a great number of maryners ... be torned from good subjects to be 
pirates ... And because her Heighnes hathe further bin informed that divers of her 
officers . . . have wincked often at theis disorders . . . express warning to all her 
Heighnes' officers that whosoever shall be hereafter founde to be negligent in the 
apprehending of suche malefactors in the execution of this proclamation, or shall 
wincke at their doinges, ... shall not onlie lose their offices, but shall incurr her 
Majestie's further displeasure., and be suerlie punished .. .184 
This Proclamation apparently rested on the assumption that "piracy" was not 
illegal at international law but only at English municipal law, and that the 
English jurisdiction was felt to be grounded in the relationship between 
subject and sovereign, not in any jurisdiction over the acts of foreigners. Some 
territorial aspect to jurisdiction seems to be iniplied by the failure to 
distinguish between acts done in "her Maj estie' s owne ports" as well as in the 
narrow seas (which were, in any case, regarded as within English prescriptive 
jurisdiction even if only to exclude foreign ships or make them as a legal unit 
obey English law without actually applying English law within them) and in 
the Warrant issued at about the same time to the Warden of the Cinque Ports 
mentioning "oure streames." "Piracy" seems to have meant robbery or some 
other crime listed in the legislation of Henry VIII within the jurisdiction 
given then to Admiralty Commissions, and not acts done by foreigners 
outside of that jurisdiction. As noted above, that jurisdiction was territorial 
and extended to English flag vessels, but, despite the learned arguments of the 
minority in Regina v. Keyn, did not at this time in practice extend to foreign 
flag vessels on the high seas or foreigners within foreign vessels in English 
seas. 
The notion that persons holding a foreign license might be enemies but not 
criminals even if acting on board English vessels or against English vessels, 
even if acting in English rivers and portions of the seas, may be seen in the 
restriction to English subjects of the terms of the Proclamation of 1575. In 
approving the draft Warrant of1577 Lord Burghley, the head of Elizabeth's 
administrative office, indicated that this was his conception. He wrote to the 
Warden of the Cinque Ports, Lord Cobham, that if there were peace between 
England and Spain the entire fuss would subside "for lack of victims. "185 
Further evidence that the word "pirate" was applied in 1577 without specific 
meaning at international law exists in a note by David Lewes, an Admiralty 
judge apparently consulted by Lord Burghley in this matter. At the bottom of 
a draft letter of assistance to Sir William Morgan ordering her Majesty's 
officials to help him prepare for his voyage of discovery and "also (if occasion 
so serve) to serve against the Turkes and Infydells, " Lewes wrote "Instede of 
this make a permission to take pyrates, according to her Majestie's 
warrant. "186 It is hard to see how "Turkes and Infydells" were necessarily 
criminals at English law or how English law extended to places in which the 
discovery of unknown lands might be made. And there is no evidence at all 
Origins 43 
that "Turkes and Infydells" were conceived at that time as necessarily 
violators of international law in Europe. Indeed, it would seem that Lewes's 
note was not a legal translation of Morgan's request, but a denial of that 
request as it might apply to "Turkes and Infydells," restricting Morgan's 
authority to whatever authority was given to commissioners under the 
warrant of 1577. 
The needs of English commerce and possibly imperial policy seem to have 
influenced Lewes, and two years later, in 1579, he issued a legal opinion in 
which the earlier documents other than the Proclamation of 1569 were 
ignored and the most expansive statement of English jurisdiction was given to 
the Lord High Admiral: 
First it is lawful for every man, by the lawes of the sea, to apprehend and take pyrats, 
being public enemies to all estates, without authority 0; commission. 
Secondly, the Queen's Majesty for proclamation published in Aprill ano 11° regni sui 
[1569], hath declared and denounced all pyrats and rovers upon the seas to be out of her 
protection, and lawfully to be by any person taken, punished, and suppressed with 
extremity. 
Thirdly, the first and principall part of the Lord Admirall's office by law is, and ever 
hath been, to clear the jurisdiction apperteyning to his office, being the sea, of pyrats and 
rovers haunting the same; in respect whereofhe hath, and ever hath had their goods and 
chattels, being condemned and atteynted for the same. 
Fourthly, by his Lordship's letters patents it may appeare that he hath a more ample and 
larger power than to set forth ships to take pyrats.187 
The implementation of this opinion, which seems to have no legal argument 
in it to support its conclusions oflaw, indicates that it was not taken seriously 
as a statement of international law by the Crown. Shortly after it was issued, 
Elizabeth complained to Lewes as an Admiralty judge, Sir Gilbert Gerrard as 
A ttorney General, and 13 others involved in the enforcement of the law, that 
the 1577 warrant had not worked well. Instead of simply instructing the 
Admiral to suppress "piracy" by seizing "pirates" wherever he found them 
under the general law of the sea or as outlaws under English law as Lewes's 
opinion seems to have urged, she stiffened the enforcement in England of the 
English procedures by providing for small Commissions consistently with the 
statute of Henry VIII: 
To enquire searche and trie out ... by oathes of twelve good men or otherwise by all 
waies and meanes you can devise of all manner of person or persons that have offended 
... contrarie to the lawes and statutes of this our realme or equitie and justice ... 188 
The possibility that" equitie and justice" was intended to include interna-
tional law seems to have been overborne by the need to dispose of the 
property of the "pirates," however defined, under the forms of English law. 
Those forms were essential to the prosperity of the Admiral however 
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inconsistent with the view Lewes might have had as to the legal justifications 
at international law for individuals unlicensed by the Crown to seize 
"pirates." When a fearless adventurer like Sir Walter Ralegh was involved, 
there was no thought of his simply seizing "pirate" goods any place. His 
appointment in 1585 to be "Vice Admiral" was restricted to "the countie of 
Cornwall and the sea quoasts thereunto adjoyning," and he was required to 
post bond against the possibility that he might fail to make true account" of all 
suche piratts' goods, concelmentes, profitts, and casualties, as shall happen to 
growe and rise within the precincte of the said Viceadmirallshippe." Fully 
half of the "pirate" goods coming to him in his new post was to go to his 
political senior, the Lord Admiral.I89 And in 1589 an Order in Council was 
issued that all English captures, with no exceptions, must be submitted to an 
Admiralty court to have the lawfulness of the prize adjudged; failure to abide 
by the procedure meant that the buyers got no title and the commission under 
which the prize was taken was to be considered void.190 
Coke'sSl'nthesis. There are many documents relating then to the growth of 
the English law regarding prize and commissions, letters of marque and 
reprisal under the centralized administration Lord Burghley organized for 
Queen Elizabeth. In them there is no indication that "pirates" might be taken 
without a commission,l91 and by 1599 there is some indication that the word 
"pirate" was acquiring yet another meaning in English, as a generic term 
carrying with it the implication of criminality and applied to English captains 
who ignored the rules under which the Admiral made his living: 
[H]er Majestie now commaundeth, that whosoever shall herafter intermeddle with, or 
take at sea, any shippe or vessell coming from, or going to, any port or haven belonging 
to the sayd Seigneurie of Venice, or Grand Duke ofTuskane, and shall break the bulke of 
the goodes of any such shipp or vessell, (though the prise be lawfull), before the same 
shalbe adjudged good prize in the high court of the Admiralty, such offendors shalbe 
executed as pirates, and the shippe, with the prize also, shalbe forfeited to her 
Majestie.l92 
The relationship between the English municipal law regarding "piracy" 
and the international law of "piracy," if there was any before 1600, received 
attention at the most prestigious levels of English municipal law in 1615 when 
Sir Edward Coke, Chief Justice of England at the Common Law criminal 
court of King's Bench, presided over two cases in which "piracy" was an 
issue. The reports of these cases by Rolle are important to an understanding of 
the English conception of "piracy" as the word entered common legal usage 
and England became the world's greatest sea power. 
Marche's Case, alias Palachie's Case,193 concerned a capture of a Spanish 
ship by a Moroccan official during a time when England regarded Morocco 
and Spain as legally at war.194 Acknowledged as a subject of the King of 
Morocco, Palachie represented to the court that: 
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He is the Moroccan Ambassador to the Netherlands and that on the sea he captured a 
Spanish ship (there being war between the King of Barbary [sic] & the King of Spain) and 
then coming with the ship in England, & thereupon the Spanish Ambassador complained 
against him as a Pirate, & diverse Civil Law experts were commanded by the King [of 
England] to give their opinions on the matter. They agree that an Ambassador is immune 
from local law by the law of nature & of Nat ions, but if he commits any offense against 
the law of nature or of reason, he loses his immunity; not so ifhe offends only a positive 
law of any particular country, such as laws regarding clothing, etc. And many other 
questions were answered by the civilians; but as we [the panel]195 and other common law 
Justices are asked for our opinions, we should say that the civilians have missed the point, 
because the Defendant is being tried here for piracy, and being tried under the statute of 
28 Henry VIII cap. [15? The text has a blank space here], which says that piracy should 
be tried as a felony committed on land under the common law. And what is charged as 
piracy here is not piracy nor would it be even a felony had it been committed on land [the 
report repeats some words here and seems slightly garbled] because it is legal for one 
enemy to capture another on land. According to our opinion and the relevant statute 
[which is cited] we hereby rule accordingly, that if anybody wants to bring charges 
against another under the pertinent statute [ citing another] he who is robbed must prove 
that he himself was a legal friend of our Lord the King, and that he who robbed him was 
within the jurisdiction of our Lord the King or in legal friendship, because if the taking 
was by an enemy it was not robbery but lawful capture. As to Palachie's Case, we agree 
with the civilians that the [Spanish] Ambassador could proceed against him civilly for 
the goods that are here, for those are in friendly territory, (R[ olle]: I question whether it 
seems that by the law of nations an enemy can legally take from another [in neutral 
territory?]}Dod. suggests that rights of reprisal might be significant; Coke suggests that 
if goods were taken illegally and not restored, the King [of England] might simply 
return them.l96 Coke and Dod. also said that nobody could be hanged for piracy based on 
robbery on the Thames [River] because that is within an English county [thus outside the 
Admiral's jurisdication?].I97 
In the second case, Hildebrand, Brimston, & Baker's Case,198 English 
shipowners were trying to recover their ship in an in Tem proceeding at 
Admiralty. The ship and cargo had been captured by "pirates." The 
petitioners sought the intervention of the King's Bench Common Law court 
to prohibit further Admiralty proceedings, apparently fearing the Admiral's 
interest in "pirate" goods would make it difficult for them to recover what 
they felt was theirs. 
Those men [petitioners] were the owners of a ship, and sent it to the Indies to trade. On 
the high sea the sailors took the ship through "Piracy" (as is assumed in the Admiralty 
court) and as the ship returned here to the Thames the Admiral seized it and all that is on 
it as "pirate goods," claiming it all for himself under the terms of his Royal warrant, and 
the merchants are taking the sails and tackling out of the ship and are suing for them in 
the Admiralty court. The Petitioners now pray for a "Prohibition" to that court, to stop 
the action. Coke agrees that the Admiralty has, by the grant of the King, all "Pirate 
goods;" i.e., the property of pirates. But the Admiralty does not have the goods which 
pirates took from other men, because that is not witltin the Royal grant; the owners have 
those things. And if the Admiralty wants those goods, it may not sue for them in prize 
because they are within the body of a county of England, that is, on the Thames. Dod.: If 
a man borrows a horse, and commits a robbery while riding it, the horse is not forfeit; so 
here, the ship is not forfeit simply because those who were in the ship committed piracy. 
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Coke agreed, and he asked the Petitioners if they were convicted of piracy; to which 
they replied that nobody had been convicted. So the Prohibition was granted on the 
ground that the taking had been within the body of a county of England.199 
It seems plain from both these cases that Coke was primarily concerned with 
the division of jurisdiction in England between the Admiralty courts and the 
Common Law courts; that to him "piracy" was simply the Admiralty word 
for an offense against the law of England that was based on the "Civil Law," 
i.e., the Roman law based system that English courts with extra-territorial 
reach applied to transactions occurring outside England, and not the 
Common Law; that it carried legal results at the Civil Law which were not 
the same as the legal results the same action would have drawn at Common 
Law. 
In summarizing the legal situation long after these cases were decided, 
Coke addressed "Piracies, Felonies, Murders and Confederacies committed 
in or upon the Sea" by first noting that James I's amnesty for felons given on 
his coronation in 1602 did not extend to pirates because theirs was not an 
offense at Common Law, but at Civil Law, outside the kingdom, without the 
legal result of forfeiture ofland or corruption of "bloud" (i.e., disinheriting 
the children).2oo His entire discussion of the substance of the offense is based 
on the technical construction of statutory English law except for a major 
assertion that only subjects of England could legally be tried for "piracy." To 
Coke "piracy" at Common Law was a type of "petit treason," and those who 
are not subject to the King of England cannot break the tie of allegiance, since 
there is no such tie, therefore they cannot commit treason, therefore, with 
only minor exceptions, there cannot be a foreigner guilty of "piracy. "201 Since 
resident foreigners, denizens of the realm, do come within the allegiance of 
the King for some purposes, it might appear that Coke's language is 
somewhat too general and his conclusion too broad, but since "piracy" 
cannot occur within the realm, where the Common Law applies to the 
exclusion of Civil Law, that exception would not apply and Coke's analysis 
seems beyond dispute. The effect of Coke's approach, which seems to set out 
the traditional English position as reached by a judge concerned with 
questions of jurisdiction and limiting the Crown's discretion, is simply to 
make "piracy" the legal word of art that Admiralty tribunals and 
commissions set up under the Act of 1536 applied to some but not all of the 
"crimes" listed in that Act. As a kind of "petty treason," it would seem that 
all cases of "mutiny" in an English vessel, i.e., a vessel with a master whose 
authority over the ship's company and passengers is fixed by English law, 
could be denominated "piracy." Also, an attack by one English vessel on 
another could be denominated "piracy" since both vessels would have been 
conceived to have a legal existence deriving from a common superior, the 
Admiral or the Crown, and an attack by one on the other would necessarily 
involve a breach of legal subordination by the attacking vessel unless 
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otherwise authorized by the Admiral or Crown. But, if the law regarding 
"piracy" were part of the criminal law of England and derived from the 
feudal conception of treason, it could apply only to those within the 
allegiance of the Crown in England, just as King John ' s Norman knights could 
not commit "treason" by attacking John's English subjects, whatever else 
their acts may have meant legally. Under this "treason," personal allegiance, 
conception, the English Admiral's jurisdiction, and thus the jurisdiction of 
Commissions set up under the Act of 1536, would apply only to English 
vessels, not to foreign vessels, in navigable waters (of course, all vessels infra 
corpus comitatus would be subject to the Common Law courts of the Shire, not 
the Admiralty at all). To Coke and the Common Law judges of England in the 
early 17th century, Admiralty jurisdiction itself must then have seemed in a 
sense territorial, with English ships filling the role of counties in England, and 
foreign vessels being ruled by the municipal laws of whatever countries gave 
their captains authority to command the ships' companies and passengers. 
One major gap must have disturbed Coke, although no mention of it 
appears in his known writings. What law governs the actions of a foreign 
vessel attacking an English ship, or an English vessel without license attacking 
a foreign ship? In both those cases, the breach of allegiance apparently 
necessary before the label "piracy" could attach, would be present only in the 
case of an Englishman aboard the foreign attacker or the fortuitous presence 
of an Englishman aboard the foreign vessel attacked. In the first case, it would 
seem that the assault on an English vessel would likely have been analogized 
to a similar assault in an English county's territory; the foreign attacker 
would have been guilty of an assault or robbery within the jurisdiction of the 
Admiralty under the Act of1536, thus triable by a Commission; but the crime 
would not have been "universal" or "law of nations" "piracy," it would have 
been "assault" or "robbery" or some Admiralty term, perhaps "piracy," 
equivalent to that. In the second case, there would have been no crime in 
England unless the breach of the terms of a commission or letters of mark and 
reprisal justifying the forfeiture of a deposit or other civil penalty. The gap in 
English law and jurisdiction here seems to have been the basis for the 
difficulties Queen Elizabeth's administration tried to solve by the Warrant of 
1577, and the path by which the vernacular word "piracy" began to enter the 
legal vocabulary applied to Englishmen injuring foreigners abroad. 
It should be noted that foreigners aboard English vessels were, by Coke's 
notion, "denizens" within the allegiance of the King of England, thus there 
was a territorial basis in the nationality of a vessel for attaching English 
jurisdiction to some foreigners. Coke's conception of the "high seas" (or 
navigable waters) did not apparently make them part of any "territorial" part 
of England or trace the Admiral's jurisdiction to any concept of territoriality 
other than the analogy between a vessel itself and a bit of English territory for 
the purposes of jurisdiction, and the notion that Common Law courts' 
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jurisdiction stopped at the edge of navigable waters. The Admiral did not rule 
the seas, only English vessels on the seas and perhaps Englishmen in foreign 
vessels for some limited purposes where they, as the "denizens" of a foreign 
sovereign, had to satisfy two allegiances and could be the victims of English 
"pirates" in the traditional sense as persons against whom a "petty treason" 
at English law could be committed. 
From this point of view, the later notion that to be "piracy" there had to be 
an exchange between two vessels of different legal subordination was a 
complete reversal of the "petty treason" definition in English Common Law 
as applied in Admiralty. Also, from this point of view, the notion was 
excluded that England ruled the British seas as a matter of territorial right as 
Grotius might have argued. The Grotian view of mare clausum might have had 
considerable appeal to statesmen, but required a reconsideration of the 
fundamentally feudal English conceptions of jurisdiction. It was, of course, 
out of these inconsistencies that the confusions of Regina v. Keyn grew, as the 
English assertions of territorial rights in the "Narrow Seas" (the English 
Channel), the North Sea and elsewhere, or even in the three-mile strip of 
navigable waters surrounding the British Isles, were not matched by 
legislation placing those "territories" within the body of a county or within 
the "territorial" jurisdiction of the Admiral as the law-giver for English 
ships. 
Summary. Based on Queen Elizabeth's Warrants of 1569 and 1577, and the 
conceptions of territoriality that seem to underlie them, and the summary by 
Coke in the reign of James I some fifty years later emphasizing a breach of 
feudal personal ties as the root of the conception of the substantive crime of 
"piracy," it seems clear that later English assertions of jurisdiction over 
foreign "pirates" for their acts against other foreigners, or even against 
English vessels abroad, did not grow from any "natural law" concept of 
universal jurisdiction over thieves, or the universality of property rights. The 
assertions grew from the impact on English vessels or English persons of foreign 
depredations, the impact on an English ship being analogized to an impact 
amounting to physical presence in an English county, and the Admiral's 
jurisdiction being that of a county judge with regard to events within English 
traditional jurisdiction but outside the physical bounds of an English county. It 
seems that this conception is also what gave rise in later years to the notion, first 
expressed by Sir Leoline Jenkins in 1680,202 that to be "piracy" two ships had to 
be involved; one of them being a ship flying the flag of the country whose 
"Admiral" was seeking a jurisdictional basis to hear the case. There is 
apparently no basis in the early English law for "universal" jurisdiction over 
foreigners abroad in connection with acts denominated "piracy." 
One other case before the King's Bench at about this time appears to have 
ended the question of the legal status of the Barbary states as far as concerns 
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English Common Law. In 1617 an Englishman named Howe was alleged to 
have sent his servant, Saddocke, with a known counterfeit jewel to 
"Barbary," where the jewel was sold for 800 pounds English money to the 
"Roy de Barbary." The King of Barbary, after discovering the fraud, 
imprisioned Southerne, another Englishman there, until Southerne repaid the 
value of the fraud. The transaction appears to be similar in sense to holding a 
foreign merchant through a capture under letters of marque and reprisal, 
responsible for the value of goods wrongfully taken by his countryman, 
except that there appears to have been no attempt first to exhaust the English 
remedies, perhaps because the "King of Barbary" did not choose to submit 
himself to English remedies as a matter of royal pride. Southerne then sued 
Howe for the amount of his ransom. Lord Popham threw the case out saying 
that there should be no legal indemnification to the plaintiff on the basis of his 
imprisonment without conviction in Barbary because that was merely an act 
of a "barbarous King," for which he should seek remedy through a petition to 
the Crown, not through the courts.203 Whatever else might be doubtful in the 
conclusion or reasoning of the case, the dictum that the "barbarous King" 
was nonetheless a King for being barbarous, implying that the Barbary states 
were states for purposes of English municipal law , and their rulers entitled to 
the dignity of foreign sovereigns, was clear. The case was frequently cited 
afterwards for that proposition, despite the fact that the same result would 
have flowed had the King been merely a pirate chief (why should Howe have 
been responsible for the lawless acts of an outlaw any more than for the 
lawful, or legally unchallengeable, acts of a King?).204 
From this brief survey, it would seem that there were several different 
conceptions of "piracy" reflected in the English municipal law of the late 
16th and early 17th centuries and within those conceptions, several major 
issues of definition. One conception, expressed most persuasively by Lord 
Coke, was that "piracy" was not at all part of the Common Law of England, 
but was part of the "Civil Law" enforced in England in appropriate cases. To 
Coke, those cases were only those to which English concepts of jurisdiction 
gave purview to English officials responsible for enforcing the Civil Law. 
With regard to "piracy," he used the word to refer to a host of Civil Law 
offenses within the jurisdiction of the English Admiral by tradition and Royal 
delegation. That jurisdiction gave the Admiralty courts purview over 
offenses that would be Common Law offenses had they been committed with 
the "corpus comitatus," the body of an English county, and included any 
forcible takings, whether properly considered "robbery," "murder" or, 
apparently, any other violation of the King's peace. The people subj ect to that 
jurisdiction were those within the King's "ligeance," including English 
subjects wherever they might be, and foreigners acting within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the Admiral, i.e., in English ships. It did not apply to foreigners 
who acted under commissions of their own sovereigns, regardless of where 
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and who their victims. Nor did it apply to foreigners without commissions 
acting beyond the "territorial" reach of English jurisdiction (including ships 
administered under English law). To Coke, the jurisdictional rules and ties of 
allegiance were the essence of the matter; the law defining the substance of 
the offense could be changed by statute. 
To David Lewes and presumably other Admiralty judges and officials, the 
word "piracy" carried much wider connotations. There appeared to them to 
be a wider general law forbidding "piracy" under which the Admiral and his 
delegates could act, if not indeed any person with or without commission. But 
what the precise definition of "piracy" was, whether it included all "Turkes 
& Infydells" regardless of their political organization or specific activities, 
and what happened to "pirate" goods once captured, were questions they 
seem to have left unanswered. Their conception seems to have derived from 
the use of the term "piracy" in vernacular English, taking what seemed 
politically useful, and ignoring those parts of the common usage, like 
reference to "lawful prize," that seemed to get in the way. The highest 
officials of England seem from time to time to have adopted this common 
usage, but despite Lewes's position on the Admiralty court and as a 
Commissioner under the statute of28 Henry VIII, his general notions appear 
never to have been translated into legal documents or English legal practice. 
To Sir Julius Caesar and other Admiralty judges, the concept of "piracy" 
was important as part of the Civil Law of property applied through in rem 
proceedings by English Admiralty courts. There seemed to be a tendency to 
use the word in connection with property seized within Admiralty jurisdic-
tion without the authority of a commission or letters of marque and reprisal. 
But the legal result of that usage was connected with the disposition of the 
property, not the person who seized it. The usage did not reflect a concept of 
criminal law, but of property law; the 16th and 17th century English Civil 
Law version of the ancient Roman law of postliminium. 
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[Oralions] O. H. Vince, trans!')(LCL 1954) 151-153. See also "lesIon" atp.156 translated "pirates" atp.157. 
On "Ieislrikos" as a form of political economy accepted as normal in ancient Greece see below and quotation 
from Aristotle at note 26 below. 
18. \Vhat is addressed here are sources focusing on Roman law and Roman perceptions. Since many 
educated Romans were literate in Greek, and some of the leading historians of Rome, such as Plutarch and 
Polybius, were of Greek heritage, writing in Greek, a simple distinction based on language would be 
misleading. 
19. 2 Cicero, COlllra Verres II (L.H.G. Greenwood, trans!') (LCL 1953) iv, 21, at p. 304: "Fecisli ilem ul 
praedones solent; qui cum hosles communes sinl omnium ••• " This passage is translated in the same work (p. 305): 
"You bellavedjllsl as Ihe pirales are wonllo behave. They are Ihegeneral enemies of all mankind • •• " Cpo 2J.B. Scott, 
Law, lile Slale, and Ihe Inlernalional Communily (1939), p. 326: "Pirates ... are the general enemies of all 
mankind," citing Cicero, The Verrine Oralions II, iv, 21. A more precise analysis of the word "praedones" 
would seem unnecessary here; one etymological study is enough for one book. Derivatives of the Latin 
word "praedor, " "to make booty, to plunder, spoil, rob," Lewis & Short, rev'n, Freund's Lalin Diclionary 
(Andrews, ed.) (1879) 1417, are commonly translated "pirate" or "piracy." 
20. 14 Livy, Hislory of Rome (A.C. Schlesinger, trans!.) (LCL 1959) cxxviii at p.159. The period described 
is 38-37 B.C. 
21. /d., p. 158: "Cum Sex. Pompeius rursus lalrociniis mare infeslum redderel nee pacem, quam acceperal, praeslarel, 
Caesar lIecessario adversus eum bello susceplo duobus navabilus proelis cum dubio evenlu pugnalio." Again, it would 
seem unnecessary to delve into the precise usage of another Latin word, "lalrociniis, " whose relevance to 
this study is margina!' Derivatives of the Latin word "Ialro," "hired soldier, brigand," Lewis & Short, op. 
cil. note 19 above 1041, are commonly translated "pirate," "piratical," "piracy," etc. 
22. The most important, repeated by several later translators and scholars to support the assertion that 
"piracy" was a way oflife to Homeric-Age Greeks, although the passage does not use the word "peiralo" or 
any of its derivatives in the original, is from the Odyssey, ix, 39-42: Odysseus is speaking: 
Iliolhen me pheron anemos Kikonessi pelassen, Ismaroi. Enlha d' ego polin epralhon, olesa d' aulous, ek polios d' 
alochous kai ktemala polla labontes dassamelh', hos me lis moi alembomenos kioi ises. 
The wind bearing me from Ilium made me approach the Ciconians in Ismarus; and there I laid waste 
the city, and destroyed them. And taking their wives and many possessions out of the city, we 
divided them, that no one might go deprived of an equal share ... 
This careful translation by T.A. Buckley in Homer, op. cil. note 10 above, 116, avoids the English word 
"pirate." 
23. Of course, Odysseus's band was poetically a group of warriors without fixed base seeking to return 
to Ithaka after the sack of Troy (Ilium). Although they derived their political existence from allegiance to 
Odysseus, the "King" ofIthaka, their precise composition and Odysseus's own legal power to mount raids 
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against towns not in communication or "at war" with Ithaka is not examined. Presumably to the author(s) 
of the Odyssey, the question did not arise. 
24. The sack of Troy is usually placed several centuries earlier by scholars. But M.l. Finley convincingly 
argues not only that the fabled sack never took place, just as the stirring events of the epic Niebelungenlied and 
Beowulf could never have taken place outside of poetic imagination, but, more importantly, that the world 
reflected in the Homeric poems was the world of the historical tradition of their author(s), reflecting 
realities of the 10th and 9th centuries B.C. M.l. Finley, The World of Odysseus (2nd rev'd ed., Pelican Books 
1978) 48-49. 
25. Finley, op. cit., p. 63, after quoting the passage in Homer translated by Buckley in note 22 above. 
26. U., p. 64. Aristotle mentions plundering [leistrikos] as one of five general categories of political 
economy: "the pastoral, the farming, the freebooting [sic], the fishing, and the life of the chase [Hoi men Olm 
bioi tosoutoi schedon eisin, hosoi autophuton echousi ten ergasian kai me .Ii' allages kai kapelaeias porizomai ten trophen, 
nomadikos, georgikos, leistrikos, halieutikos, thereutikos]." Aristotle, The Politics (c. 350 B.C.) 1256b, (E. Barker, 
trans!', 1946) 20 (1975 ed.) I, viii, 8. 
27. J. Bronsted, The Vikings (1965), passim esp. p. 26-27. The word "Viking" seems to have an obscure 
origin unrelated to attacks or attempts. 
28. 2 Polybius, The Histories (W.R. Paton, transl.) (LCL 1954) iv, 68, p. 461. In the original Greek the key 
phrase is "Euripidas, echon Eleion Juo lochous meta ton peiraton kai misthophoron ••• " 
29. "[ Amyntas] . •. epephane paraJoksos peiratais tisin, apestalmenois hupo Demetriou . •. hoi Rodioi biasamenoi ton 
neon autanJron ekurieusan, en hois en kai Timokles ho archipeirates. " 10 Diodoms Siculus, [HlSto,y] (R.M. Greer, 
trans!.) (LCL 1954) xx, 97, 5 at p. 400-401. 
30. 10 Livy, [History of Rome] (E.T. Sage, trans!') (LCL 1935) xxxvii, xi, 6-7, p. 320-321: "Hinc NicanJro 
quoJam archipirata quinque navibus tectis Palinurum iusso petere ••. " 
31. See Plutarch's description of the same events at notes 36-39 below. 
32. 14 Livy, op. cit. note 20 above, xcix, p. 122-123: "Cn. Pompeius lege aJ populum lata perequi piratas iussus, 
qui commercium annonae intercluserant, infra quaJragesimum diem toto mari eos expulit; belloque cum his in Cilicia confecto, 
acceptis in Jeditionem piratis agros et urbes JeJit." The Cilicians [Kilissi] had had an unsavory reputation at least as 
early as pre-Aristotle Greece. See Demokos, "All the Cilicians are bad ..• ," in The Greek Anthology Oay 
ed.) (Penguin 1981) No. 38 at p. 47. 
33. 5 Plutarch, Parallel Lives of Greeks and Romans (C.B. Perrin, trans!.) (LCL 1917) xxiv, p. 173-175. 
34. U., p. 175. 
35. This Roman hegemony was achieved not by mere assertion or, indeed, by simple conquest, but in the 
main by diplomacy and by treaty. See Livy, Rome and the MeJiterranean (H. Bettenson, trans!.) (Penguin 
Classics 1976), passim, for a lively English translation of the principal part of books 31-35 ofLivy's History. 
The Roman hegemonial system involved military alliances in return for which Rome guaranteed the 
personal position of the person invested as the embodiment of the legal power of the client state. A very 
clear and evocative description is Sallust, TheJugurthine War O.C. Rolfe, trans!.) (LCL 1931, 1960) 14. A 
lively modern translation is Sailust,Jugurthille War; Conspiracy of Cataline (S.A. Hanford, trans!.) (Penguin 
Classics 1963). See esp. the speech of Adherbal to the Roman Senate in 116 B.C. in the Loeb edition 14.1-25 
at 14.7, p. 158; Penguin edition ch. IV, p. 47 sq. The British imperial system appears in many ways to have 
been patterned on the Roman, with "recognition" under the British interpretation of international law 
filling the place ofinvestiture under the donation of the Roman Senate. Since the British interpretation of 
international law was not necessarily identical with international law objectively derived, and the 
municipal constitutional and inheritance law of the state principally involved actually determined 
representational powers, not international law as such, the British practice amounted to the establishment 
of British imperial law and the extinguishing of the foreigu state as a person under international law; it led 
to many wars when pressed as a matter oflaw beyond British political power since it was essentially a 
political, not a legal, maneuver. Examples are dissected in Rubin, Imernational Personality of the Malay 
Peninsula (University of Malaya Press 1974) passim, particularly the acquisition of Singapore as analyzed at 
p. 167-169,253-277. The process is analyzed in some detail in chapter IV below. 
36. Plutarch, op. cit. note 33 above, xxv, p. 177: "egrapse .Ie' Gabinios, heis ton Pompeiou sllllethon, lIomon ou 
nauarchian, antikrus .Ie' monarchian autoi JMonta kai Junamin epi pantas anthropous anupeuthunon." 
37. Just what these" crimes" were, and against what law other than the Roman hegemony that did not 
become law until after the conquest and the evolution of Roman conceptions oflaw under Augustus, is not 
clear. Furthermore, it appears that their "unpardonable crimes" consisted of resistance to the Roman 
sovereignty, since those who had participated in commerce-raiding but who surrendered seem to have 
been freely and humanely treated as conquered enemies. This passage looks like an illogical interpolation 
by a post-Augustan Greek scholar guarding his safety under a rigid Roman imperial system more interested 
in justifications than in historical accuracy. 
38. Plutarch, op. cit. note 33 above, xxvi-xxviii, p. 181-187. It has been suggested that the "pirates" 
whom Pompey had settled at Dyme returned to sea roving about 45 B.C. Cicero, contemplating a trip to 
Achaia in July 44 B.C.,just four months after Julius Caesar's assassination in the Roman Senate chamber, 
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wrote: "It is not surprising that the Dymaeans, having been driven out of their land, are making the sea 
unsafe. " 6 Cicero, Letters to Atticus (D.R. Shackleton Bailey, transl. and notes) 151 (1968),letter XVI.1 (409) 
para. 3. In the original Latin: "Dymaeos agro pulsos mare infestum habere nil mirum. Id. 150. Shackleton Bailey 
suggests that the "pirates" who had been settled there by Pompey in 67 B.C. and the Dymaeans were the 
same folk, apparently "dispossessed by Caesar and returned to their old calling." Id. 281. Cicero does not 
seem shocked or to have any reference to criminaliry when he refers to them as "pirates" a few days later in 
another letter to Atticus: "It looks as though the legions can be dodged more easily and safely than the 
pirates, who are said to be in evidence [ ... devitatio legionumfore videturquam piratum, qui appareredicuntur]. " ld. 
164-165, letter XVI.2 (412). The "pirates" and the "legions" seem equally hazards to safe travel. The 
"legions" referred to were presumably the forces under the control of Marc Antony seeking to wrest 
control of Rome from the Senate after the death of Caesar. It was indeed one of the legionaries under 
Antony's command who killed Cicero attempting to escape Italy about a year and a halflater. See text at 
note 47 below. 
39. Id., xxix at p. 189-191: " ... alia tous te peiratas ekselon etimoresato, kai ton Oktaouion .•. apheken." 
40. Those results were essentially to put the losers at the discretion of the victors; the men were 
frequently killed and the women enslaved. There were no trials, no accusations or defenses, no lawyers 
involved. See Euripides, The Trojan Women (415 B.C.). See below. 
41. Livy, History, i. 23. An excellent modem translation of Books I-V of this work is Livy, The Early 
History of Rome (A. de Selincourt, transl.) (Penguin Classics 1971). See p. 59-60. 
42. Id., p. 60-61. Livy's version may reflect more religious myth than political history. Modem research 
in this area began with the reanalysis of Roman and Greek religious and political forms by N.D. Fustel de 
Coulanges, La Cite Antique (1864). See Fustel de Coulanges, The Ancient City (transl. unknown) (Doubleday 
Anchor Books 1956), Introductory note at p. 5-6. 
43. See below. 
44. Livy, op. cit. note 41 above, i, 32, at p. 69-71. 
45. Id., p. 381-383. 
46. Cf. Cicero, De Officiis, I, xi, 36: "As for war, humane laws touching it are drawn up in the fetial code 
of the Roman People under all the guarantees of religion; and from this it may be gathered that no war is 
just [lawful?], unless it is entered upon after an official demand for satisfaction has been submitted or 
warning has been given and a formal declaration made [Ac belli quidem aequitas anctissime fetiali populi Romani 
iure perscripta est. Ex quo intellegi potest nullum bellum esse iustum, nisi quod aut rebus repetitis geratur aut denuntiatum 
ante sit et indictum]. " Cicero does not say that Rome never fought a war without going through the religious 
rituals, only that such wars should not be considered "lawful." The Latin word "ius" in this context seems 
to relate solely to the form of "law," not to ''justice'' or moraliry. The English distinctions between 
"justice" and policy-based "law" are in many cases reversed in Latin, or simply disregarded; in this case 
Cicero was obviously referring to the ''jus fetiali" adopted as a matter of discretion into Roman positive 
law and not reflecting "justice" except indirectly. To Cicero, "true law [vera lex]" was moral and overrode 
the positive law in cases of conflict. Cicero, De Re Publica, III, xxii, 33. Grotius, writing in the 17th century 
quoted Cicero's linking of the form of declaration with the phrase "bellum iusturn" as an aspect of Roman 
law to support the very different notion that to be "lawful" under his concept of the law between states 
war must be declared publicly: "Sed ut ius tum hoc significatu bellum sit • .• ut audivimus, ut et publice decretum sit, et 
quidem ita decretum publice ut eius rei significatio ab altera partium alteri facta sit •.. Grotius, De lure Belli ac Pacis (1625, 
1646) III, iii,S (photographic reproduction 1925). F.\V. Kelsey, translating this passage for the Carnegie 
Endowment edition of 1925, correctly translates "iustum" as "lawful." 3 Grotius, On the Law of War and 
Peace (CECIL 1925) 633-634. T~is double tra?,~po~!tion ?,f a ~oman positive law form i~~o internati~nal 
law, and the reversal of meamng between IUS and lex as the correct word for moral law or 
"justice" as distinguished from positive law, has created much confusion in later writings. In fact, Grotius 
seems to have read Cicero entirely correctly; to Grotius a "declaration of war" was, despite the quoted 
passage, clearly not required to bring into play the international law of war. An attack against a state or a 
refusal of reparations when legally due were, to Grotius, equivalent to a declaration of war under natural 
law, thus reducing the formal declaration to its place in positive municipal law. Id., III, iii, 6.1: "Naturali iure 
aut vis illata arcetur, aut ab eo ipso qui deliquit poena deposcitur, nulla requiritur denuntiatio." In fact, public 
declarations of war in the days of the Roman empire were exceptional despite the religious ceremonies 
given such emphasis by Livy and Cicero. 4 Dio Chrysostom, Discourses (Discourse 38, To the Nicomedians) 
(H. Lamar Crosby, transl.) (LCL 1956) 48 at p. 67: " ... while peace is proclaimed by heralds, wars forthe 
most part take place unproclaimed [eirene men epikerussetai, polemoi de hos epi to pleiston akeruktoi gignontai]." 
Both "epikerussetai" and "akeruktoi" come from kerusso-to proclaim. It seems clear from the context that 
Dio Chrysostom, discoursing shortly after his return from exile in 96 A.D. (id. 49; 1 id. (Cahoon introd.) 
viii) apparently thought it common knowledge at that time that wars could be begun without formaliry, 
but some formaliry was needed to end them. Grotius quoted this passage from Discourse 38 to support his 
assertion that the law of nature allows people to dispense with the formaliry of declarations of war at least 
in some cases. In fact, the fetial practice had died out long before Livy described it and had become a more 
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political than religious ceremony fully a century or two prior to the time ofLivy and Cicero. Ogilvie, A 
Commentary on Livy Books 1-5 127-130 (1965). 
In addition to overstating the importance of religious ritual to the legal classification "war" or "peace" 
in practice, Cicero also seems to have confused to some extent the moral or legal right of a state to fight a 
war and the right of an individual to assert soldiers' privileges under the law of that state. He quotes Marcus 
Cato the elder for the proposition of Roman law that "the man who is not legally a soldier has no right to be 
fighting the foe [negat enim ius esse, qui miles non sit, cum hoste pugnare]" (De Officiis, I, xi, 37), but does not assert 
that an enemy is bound by the same rule, thus seems to imply that it is not a rule of natural law or 
international law, only a rule of Roman municipal law applied to determine whether a Roman citizen was 
exercising a military privilege to kill or not should the question arise. 
47. The complex politics of Rome at this period are not important to the present analysis. Cicero had 
sided with Pompey the Great against Julius Caesar at times, and with the Senatorial party of Brutus and 
Cassius against the triumvirate of Marc Antony, Lepidus and Octavian that seized power on the death of 
Julius. See 7 Plutarch, op. cit. note 38 above, 83 sq., esp. p. 206-207 making clear Plutarch's opinion of 
Antony's responsibility for Cicero's death, and the reasons for it. See also 3 Cicero, Letters to Atticus cited 
note 38 above, 179-181, letter VIII.8 (131), paras 4-5, and letter VIII.2 (152), penultimate paragraph, for 
insight into Cicero's relations with Pompey in 50 B.C. 
48. See note 19 above. 
49. De Officiis, III, 29: " ... Nam pirata non est ex perduellum numero definitus, sed communis hostis omnium: cum 
hoc nee fides nee jus jurandum esse commune." 
50. Grotius, op. cit. note 46, II, xiii, 15; Kelsey translation volume at p. 373. As Grotius interpreted the 
quoted portion of Cicero's work, Cicero argued a non sequitur: 
That there is no perjury if the ransom for life, which had been agreed upon even under oath, is not 
paid to pirates, for the reason that a pirate is not entitled to the rights of war, but is the common 
enemy of mankind, with whom neither good faith nor a common oath should be kept. 
Cicero did not in fact mention the "rights" of war, and, as Grotius pointed out, there seems no reason why 
an oath to God should not be kept with even brigands; it hardly seems logical or moral to construe a 
violation of the law to lead to the conclusion that the violator is necessarily no longer protected by law. 
Even convicted criminals are in fact legally protected in many ways in many legal systems, including that 
of ancient Rome. 
51. See below. Nothing has been found in Cicero's writing or Plutarch's or any other Roman sources of 
that time that can fairly be read to relegate "pirates" to overall treatment as criminals under Roman or any 
other law in classical times. 
52. Cicero, De Officiis III, xii-xvi. 
53. 7 Plutarch, op. cit. note 33 above,441 at 444 sq. Plutarch's narrative of the famous episode in the life of 
the youngJulius Caesar (he was 19 years old at the time) uses a derivative of the Greek work "peirato" in one 
place only (i. 8 at p. 444), in placing the capture near the "island Pharmacusa, by pirates [peiraton], who 
already at the time controlled the sea [ten Pharmakoussan neson hupo peiraton ede tote • .• katechonton ten 
thalattan]." Later, these "pirates" are referred to as Cilicians [Kilissi] (ii, 2, p. 444). They thus appear to be 
the specific people also involved in the Pompeian war of 67 B.C. No other passage has been found in which 
the word "peirato" or any of its derivatives was applied at this time to any other people. It is interesting to 
note that SueIOnius in his recitation of the same incident (although placing it a few years later) does not use 
the Latin word "pirata" or any ofits derivatives at all: "While crossing to Rhodes •.. he [Caesar] was taken 
by pirates [praedonibus] near the island of Pharmacusa ..• [Hue . .• circa Pharmacussam insulam a praedonibus 
captlls est . .•. ]."1 Suetonius, The Lives of the Caesars G.C. Rolfe, trans!.) (LCL rev'd ed. 1928) i, 4 at p. 7. 
Suetonius was writing about 120 A.D. IJ., Introduction by Rolfe at p. xii. 
54. Cicero, Selected Works (M. Grant, trans!') (Penguin Classics 1971) at p. 177 note 1. Among Cicero's 
last works were 14 "Philippics" Against Antony. The revival of the "pirate" communities of the Eastern 
Mediterranean was noted by Cicero in a letter to his friend Atticus. See note 38 above. 
55. A convenient summary of dates, names and structure of the Justinian Digest and its place in the legal 
literature is Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law (corrected ed. 1969). The dates and other general 
information retailed here appear passim, esp. p. 30, 39-42. 
56. Corpus Juris Civilis (Mommsen & Krueger text, Kunkel ed.) (1954), XLIX.15.19.2, Paulus, On Sabinus, 
Bk. xvi: "A piratis aut latronibus capti liberi permanent." My translation is identical to that in 9 J.B. Scott, The 
Civil Law (1932) at p. 184, except for the interpolation of the word "legally" to avoid the absurd reading 
that captives are in fact free. 
57. CorpusJuris Civilis XLIX.15.24: Ulpianus, Institlltes: "Hostes sunt, quibus bellum publice populus Romanus 
decrevit vel ipsi populo Romano: ceteri latrunculi vel praedones appellantur et ideo qui a latronibus captus est, servus latronum 
non est, nee postliminium i/li necessarium est: ab hostibus autem captus, ut puta a Germanis et Parthis, et servus est Irostium 
et postliminio statum pristinum recuperat." 
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58. Id. L.16.118: Pomponius, Book II, Ad Quintum Mucium: " 'Hostes' hi sunt, qui nobis aut quibus nos 
publice bellum decrevimus: ceteri latrones aut praedones sunt. " 
59. It apparently dates back to Greek conceptions. See text and works cited at note 17 above. 
60. See below at note 120. 
61. The phrase appears to have gained currency as a shortening of the passage from Cicero quoted in 
note 49 above. The source of the paraphrase "hostes humani generis" has not been found. Blackstone 
attributed it to Sir Edward Coke. 4 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (American Edition 
1790), p. 71. The phrase appears in Coke, Third Institute of the Laws of England (1628) (first published 1644) p. 
113: "pirata est hostis humani generis." But the form, as a Latin insertion in an English text, makes it look like a 
stock phrase Coke was borrowing from another source. See note 201 below. Coke finished his Third Institute 
in 1628 and died in 1634. The Third and Fourth Institutes were published at Parliamentary order from Coke's 
notes ten years later, when it was felt that Coke's well-known views of the supremacy of the law to the 
prerogatives of the Crown would help in the Parliamentary struggle against Charles I. Bowen, The Lion and 
the Throne (1956), p. 510. Another possible source for Coke's phrase is Sallust, op. cit. note 35 above, 81.1, in 
whichJugurtha refers to the Romans themselves as "men with no sense of justice and of insatiable greed, 
common enemies of all mankind [Romanos iniustos, profunda avaritia communis omnium hostis esse ••. ]" (Hanford 
transI., Penguin ed. p. 113; LCL ed. p. 302). 
62. This is not the place to analyze the Roman law of postliminium. Its modem descendant is visible in 
the classical law of prize and salvage, and will be addressed as necessary in Chapter II below. 
63. See note 35 and text at notes 2 and 3 above. 
64. The earliest usages recorded by the Oxford English Dictionary are: 
••• 1387 Trevisa, Higden (Rolls) VI, 415 the "see theves" of Danes (L. Dani piratae); 1426 Lydg. De 
GuiI. Pilgr. 23963, I mene pyratys of the Se, which brynge folk in pouerte. 1430-40 - Bochas Lxii 
(1544) 38 this word pirate ofPirrhus toke the name. 1522 J. Clerk in Ellis Orig. Letti. Ser III.1.312, 
Pirats, Mores and other Infidels ... 
OED "O-P" p. 901. Higden (or Higdon) and the Polychronicon are explained in 13 Encyclopedia Britannica 
(11th ed.) 454 (1910);John de Trevisa's translation and its place in the development of the English language 
is put into perspective in 9 id. 592. Trevisa's translation was apparently issued in 1387; there seems to be 
some petty inconsistency in the secondary sources about the date. As noted in the text above this note, it is 
not significant for present purposes, since the word "pirate" does not in fact appear in the English 
translation by Trevisa and the equation of the Latin "piratae" with the Middle English "see theves" appears 
to have no legal, or even any clear vernacular, meaning worth preserving except as an illustration of 
picturesque speech and some surviving underlying sense of the impropriety by the law of England as 
perceived in the 14th century of the activities of Vikings about three centuries earlier. 
65. Braudel, La Mediterranee et Ie monde mediterraneen a l'epoque de Philippe II (1949). Because of the 
importance of the specific words I have translated the French original myself despite the existence of a fine 
English translation by Sian Reynolds of the 1966 2nd (revised) edition of Braudel's masterpiece. Braudel, 
The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II (S. Reynolds, transI.) (1973). In the original, 
p. 694, the text is as follows: 
Sur I'Ocean, au XVIe siei:le aussi bouleverse que la mer Inttrieure par les pirates, et des pirates peut-etre plus cruels, 
la course prend un masque, se deguise en guerre semi.officielle avec la multiplicite des lettres de marque . ••• On a dit 
et r"epete que la piraterie etait fille de la Mediterranee. Image juste, mais sou vent perdue de vue: les historiens n'ont 
d'attention et de reprobation que pour les corsaires barbaresques. Leur fortune, qui fut grande, aerobe Ie reste du 
paysage. Tout s'en trouve deforme. Ce que I'on aesigne, chez les Barbaresques, sous Ie nom de piraterie, s'appelle 
heroisme, pur esprit de croisade chez les Chevaliers de Malte et us non moins feroces coureurs de mer que furent les 
Chevaliers de Saint-Etienne, bases a Pise par les soins de Cosimo de Medicis. 
66. Id. For convenience, citations to Braudel below will be used to refer to his work as translated by 
Reynolds, and the Reynolds translation will be quoted without closer analysis of its use of the word 
"pirate" or its derivatives. 
67. Id.,p. 749. 
68. Id.,p. 728. 
69. Id., p. 822: "As early as 1552 and again in 1565,Jewish protests had singled out for complaint the ships 
of the 'most evil monks' of Malta, that 'trap and net which catches booty stolen at the expense of Jews', " 
citingJ. HaCohen, Emek Habkha, la valreedes pleurs .•• 172 (1881) for the inner quotes. Braudel, op. cit. 822 note 
371. 
70. Id., p. 870. 
71. Id., pp. 883-884. 
72. Cf. Defoe, Robinson Crusoe (1719) ch. 1. Defoe is also supposed to be the author of A General History of 
the Pirates (1718) under the pseudonym of Capt. Charles Johnson. 
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73. Chamberlain, The Chamberlain Letters: A Selection . .. (E.M. Thomson, ed.) (Capricorn Books 1966) 12 
(letter no. 16 to his friend Dudley Carleton in the standard collection edited by N.E. McClure). 
74. Id. 124 (letter no. 132 to Carleton dated 29 January 1612). 
75. ld. 226 (letter no. 434 to Carleton dated 12 July 1623). 
76. Naval Songs and Ballads (NRS, Vol. 33) xx-xxi, 25-29 (1907). Rising national pride, so evident in 
Shakespeare's historical plays of this period, particularly Richard II, II. iAO (1595) Oohn of Gaunt's paean to 
England) and Henry V (1599), led CaptainJohn Smith in the last chapter of his Travels to attribute the war 
capabilities of the Turks and Moors to English renegades, whom he calls "pirates." That view found its 
way into English folklore, apparently through the writings of Andrew Barker, A True and Cer/aine Report of 
the Beginnillg, Proceedings etc. of Captaine Ward and Danseker, the Late Famous Pirates (1609), cited in Sir Godfrey 
Fisher, Barbary Legend(1957) 160. According to Fisher, Dansekerwas executed by the Dey of Tunis in 1611. 
ld. p. 142. Ward died in the Tunis plague of 1622-23. Id. p. 161. The idea that the Turks, whose fleets 
dominated the Mediterranean under Suleiman the Magnificent until their defeat at the battle of Lepanto in 
1571, had to learn military tactics or seamanship from an Englishman, seems at least something of an 
exaggeration. There was in fact a revolution in maritime ventures at this time, in which new sail 
technology made ocean voyages feasible that had been too risky before, and the Mediterranean Muslim 
powers rejected it in favor of old, maneuverable, short-range galleys. But that change seems irrelevent to 
the activities of Ward and Danseker. Parry, The Age of Reconnaissance (1964) 69-84; Hess, The Forgottell 
Frontier (1978) 208-209. 
77. Chamberlain, op.cit. note 73 above 281 (letter no. 374 to Carleton dated 10 March 1621): "We hear 
that Si;,Robert Mansell and his fleet have done just nothing, but negotiated with those of Algiers for certain 
slaves. 
78. Naval Songs and Ballads, pp. 31-32, "The lamentable cries of at least 1500 Christians: Most of them 
being Englishmen ... " 
79. Id., pp. xxii-xxiii. 
80. See below. 
81. Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, East Indies, China and Japan, 1622-1624 (Sainsbury, ed.) No. 143 at 
p. 64 (1878,1964). This is in a report dated 27 August 1622 from the British East India Company's Council in 
Batavia (Richard Fursland (President), Thomas Brockedon and Augustine Spaldinge) to the Company in 
London. 
82. ld., No. 367 at p. 196. Fursland had died and was replaced on the Council by Henrie Hawley and John 
Goninge; Thomas Brockedon apparently acted as President. 
83. Id., No. 368 dated 14 December 1623 at p. 202, report to the Company in London. 
84. Id., No. 565, p. 365, signed by Brockedon, Hawley and Goninge. 
85. Id., No. 303, p. 125, Minutes of meetings concluding 23 June 1624. Eventually, the Company paid two 
tenths to the King in order to obtain the release of their vessels from arrest by the Admiral. 
86. ld., No. 481, p. 294, Minutes dated 23-25 June 1624. 
87. In addition to Braudel,loe. cit. above note 65, see Fisher, op. cit., note 76 above, esp. pp. 137-145 and 
sources cited there. 
88. Belli, De Re Militari et Bello Tractatus (1563 ed. photographically reproduced) (CECIL 1936) Part II, ch. 
xi: " ... excipi Piratae ••• qui enim omnes habent pro hostibus, debent ab omnibus expectare rependi vices • •• " The 
translation by H.S. Nutting is published in another volume of the same set. The English excerpts in the text 
above this note are from p. 83 of the translation volume by Nutting. On the post-glossa tors, see Nicholas, 
op. cit. note 55 above at p. 47. 
89. Belli, op. cit., (Nutting, transl.) p. 83. The Latin (p. 39) refers to persons who "sint extra omlle legum" 
but does not use any single word for "outlaw." 
90. Id., p. 88, Part II, ch. xiv. Belli quotes Cicero verbatim. See note 46 above. See also note 50 above and 
note 124 below, where the position of Grotius and his criticism of this passage by Cicero are set out more 
fully. 
91. Ayala, De lure et Officiis Bellicis et Disciplina Militari O.P. Bate, transl.) (CECIL 1912) I, ii, 15. The 
original says: 
Hine iura belli, captiuitatis, & postliminy, quae hostibus tan tum eonueniunt, non posse rebdlibus con venire, 
consequens videtur: sieut nee piratis & latronibus (qui hostium numero non continentur) conueniunt, quod ita in/elligi 
debet, vt ipsi iure belli agere non possint: ideoqi dominium rern eaptarum non acquirunt, quod hostibus tan tum 
tributum est in ipsos vero iure belli faeuire, multoque magis quam in hostes, Iicet: suntenim odio digni maiorf, &non 
debet esse melioris conditionis rebellis & Iatro, quam legitimus & iustus hostis. 
Oddly, the Latin version is photocopied from the first edition of1581, but the translation seems to be based 
on the 1597 edition. 
92. Ayala's father was a Spaniard, married to a Belgian and resident in Antwerp for some 16 years before 
the birth of Balthasar in 1548. The Ayala family were very well connected with the Habsburg monarchy. 
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The Act of Abjuration was passed by the States General of the Netherlands in 1581. Until 1648, Spain 
denied the legal labels resulting from the ability of the Netherlands to maintain its independence militarily. 
The standard works on this watershed episode in European history are J.L. Motley, The Rise of the Dutch 
Republic (1856) and The United Netherlands (1860). 
93. Gentili, De lure Belli Libri Tres (1612) O.C. Rolfe, trans!', introd. by Coleman Phillipson) (CECIL 
1933) 12a-14a. 
94. IJ., Book I, ch. ii. The English translation throughout is by Rolfe. The Latin is from the 
photographic reproduction of the edition of1612 in 1 Gentili, op. cit. Rolfe's translation of"iusta" as 'Just" 
seems very dubious. See note 46 above. 
95. IJ., p. 22, quoting the passages from Ulpian and Pomponius set out in notes 57 and 58 above. In 
Gentili's quotations as in the originals, the word "pirata" or its derivatives does not appear; those debarred 
from entering the legal state of war are termed "latrunculi" or "praeJones." Thus the Rolfe translation of 
Ulpian, "All others are termed brigands or pirates" (p. 15) seems a serious mistranslation of Gentili's 
quotation from Ulpian: "caeteri latrunculi, vel praeJones appellantur." Also, Gentili's conclusion immediately 
following the quotations from Pomponius and Ulpian, "That is to say, the war on both sides must be public 
and official and there must be sovereigns on both sides to direct the war [Publica ergo esse anna vtrinq; oportet, & 
utrinq; esse Principes, qui bellum gerant]," seems a non sequitur. 
96. IJ., ch. iv. 
97. IJ. Again, Rolfe's translation seems imprecise; Gentili did not say that Pomponius and Ulpian 
actually came to that conclusion, but that that legal conclusion flowed from their definition. 
98. IJ. "Piratae omnium mortaliu hostes sunt communes. Et itaque negat Cicero, posse cum istis interceJere iura belli. " 
99. IJ. "Si praeJonibus pactum pro capite pretium non attuleris, nullafraus est ••• " Rolfe translation: "If you do 
not pay brigands the price demanded in exchange for your life, you do no wrong ... " 
100. IJ., last lines of the chapter: 
SeJ quiJ selltimus nos Je his Callis, qui capti postremo bello Lusitanico ab Hispanis, & tractati sunt non quasi iusti 
hastes? Tractati sunt quasi piratae: qui Antonio militarent, pulso iam Je regno vniuerso, & in regem agnito ab 
Hispanis nuqua. At ipsa historia vincit, eos non fuisse piratas: non Jico per argumentum Juctum a numero, & 
qualita te virorum, ac nauium; seJ per literas,quas regis sui ostenJebant, cui regi seruiebant, non Antonio, esti 
maxime pro Antonio. quoJ illos non tangebat. 
101. See text at note 93 above. A collection of Gentili's briefs before the English Royal Chamber was 
published posthumously in 1613. Gentili, Hispanicis AJvocationis (1613,1661), reproduced photographically 
by CECIL in 1921. The English translation of the 1661 text published in Vo!' II of the same set is by F.F. 
Abbott. 
102. See, e.g., letter of1295 (23 Edw. I) authorizing an English captain to make capture [licentia marcanJ'l 
up to the value of the goods spoiled by "the men and subjects of the realm ofPortuga!." 1 Marsden, ed., 
Documents Relating to Law anJ Custom of the Sea (NRS, Vo!' 49) (1915) 38. 
103. The OxforJ English Dictionary definition is in Vo!' VI, p. 179. It defines "marque" as meaning merely 
"reprisal" and traces it back to medieval Latin "marcare," "to seize as a pledge." The first English use 
given is the law-French of a statute, 27 Edw. III, stat. 2 c. 17 (1353) quoted in part in the text above this note. 
See note 176 below. The American Heritage Dictionary, pp. 751, 1529, traces the word back to the Indo-
Germanic root "merg-": "Boundary, border" via Old Provent;al "marcar," "to seize." The phrase 
"marquanJi sue gagianJi" ("marque and recapture"?) appears in a document of 1293 cancelling a similar 
license that had apparently been issued earlier. 1 Marsden, op. cit., p. 19, 38-39. 
104. The practice of holding prize courts only in the territory of the capturing country as an aspect of 
belligerency does not seem to have become clearly established until somewhat later. 2 Marsden, op. cit. 
(NRS, Vol. 50) (1916) xii. 
105. Gentili, Hisp. AJv. cited note 101 above, Book I, ch. iv at p. 15. 
106. IJ., ch. xv at p. 68: " ... stenJi piratis locum oportunissimum navigationibus propinquissimum Hispanicis, 
habitat.m, mercatoribus Anglis, ubi praeJas suas possint suis Jistrahere, si jusistuJ constituitur fisci illus terrae. Hoceine pro 
mercatura?" The translation by Abbott seems unnecessarily awkward. 
107. IJ.; ch. xxii at pp. 101-105. This is not the place to argue substance, but it might be noted that 
Gentili's argument seems to confuse liens based on salvage-like services with property rights derived from 
a thief. The first derive from principles well known in Gentili's time. Aside from the analogy to 
postliminium and the Roman law principles set out in part inJustinian's Digest and mentioned above, the 
Laws of Oleron, cited at note 150 below, articles 3, 22 and 30, had already been part of the Law of England 
for about 400 years and established the basis for the modern English law of maritime salvage. 
108. See below, Chapter II. 
109. He is not specific, but seems to be referring to ch. iv cited at note 105 above. 
110. IJ., ch. xxiii, pp. 105-112atp. 112: " ... quoJeripiturnostrisnegotiatio Tunetana, Algeriana, alia non una per 
I,aee Venetorum Jicta, quoJ sint illae civitates nil aliuJ nisi receptacula piratarum, neJ in illis sint nisi piratae, & sint in illis 
ipsi quoque magistratus piratae. " 
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111. Gentili's approach, which might be considered the birth of "positivism" as an operating theory of 
international law, is most lucidly elaborated and the role of "recognition" harmonized with current 
practice by Kelsen, Recognition in International Law, 35 AJIL 604 (1941), and Gross, States as Organs of 
International Law and the Problem of Autointerpretation, in Lipsky, ed., Law and Politics in the World 
Community (1953) 59-88 reprinted in 1 L. Gross, Essays on International Law and Organization (1984) 367. 
112. Dumbauld, The Life and Legal Writings of Hugo Grotius (1969) 3-4; "Voila Ie miracle de Hollande, " id., at p. 
56 note 165. 
113. Id., p. 23, 58. Grotius died in 1645, reportedly regretting that "by undertaking many things, I have 
accomplished nothing!" Id., p. 18. 
114. Id., p. 16. 
115. 2 Grotius, op. cit. note 46 above, Book III, chs. i and ii (p. 630-631). 
116. Id., p. 631. The key passages in the original Latin are: "Non autem statim respublica aut civitas essedesini, 
si quid admit tat injustum, etiam communiter, nee coetus piratarum aut latronum civitas est, etiamsi forte aequalitatem 
quandam inter se servent, sine qual nullus coetus posset consistere. Nam hi criminis causa sociantur: iIIi etsi interdum delicto 
non vacant, juris tamen fruendi causa sociati sunt, et exteris jus reddunt ••• " 3 Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis (Whewell 
ed.) III, ii, 1 (1853) p. 54-55. Unless the context indicates otherwise, all citations below to Grotius's Latin 
original text are taken from Whewell's edition, and all English translations are by Kelsey. 
117. See above note 57. 
118. Caesar, De Bello Gallico, VI, xxiii; Tacitus, De Morib. Germ. ch. 46, Ann. xii, 27, Hist. iv, 50. These 
citations by Grotius do not seem particularly strong to support his point, but the point itself, that the 
Germanic tribes were treated as legal enemies in war despite the Roman opinion that their political and 
social organization was contemptible, is beyond dispute. 
119. Appian, Bell. Illyr. ii; 9 Plutarch, op. cit. above note 33. 
120. It was pointed out in the text above at note 57 that Justinian's Digest addresses the legal inability of 
"pirates" to effect a change in the personal status of captives, but extends that legal incapacity in the case of 
property only to "Iatrones" and "praedones." 
121. Grotius, op. cit. Book III, ch. iii, sec. ii para 3. 
122. Grotius does not say how this comes about legally, implying that it is not by "recognition," but by 
the force of natural law. 
123. Grotius, op. cit. Book III, ch. iii, sec. 8 last sentence, quoting with approval St. Augustine, De Civ. 
Dei IV, iv: "[H}oc malum si in tantum perditorum hominum accessibus crescit, ut et loca teneat, sedes constituat, civitates 
occupet, populos subjuget, regni nomen assumit [If by accessions of desperate men this evil grows to such 
proportions that it holds lands, establishes fixed settlements, seizes upon states and subjugates peoples, it 
assumes the name of a kingdom J." It is hard to see how this description could not be applied to the "pciraton" 
of67 B.C. 
124. Grotius used the word "pirata" or its derivatives in five other places in DeJure Belli ae Pacis: (1) In 
confuting Cicero as mentioned at note 46 above (Book II, ch. xiii para. 15(1»; (2) In a passing reference to 
Roman taxes for Red Sea navigation beingjustified by the expenses of suppressing "piracy" (Book II, ch. iii 
para. 14); (3) In a passage slightly amending Cicero's position that oaths to enemies must be kept while 
oaths to "piratae" need not be kept-Grotius eviscerates Cicero's entire polemical point by adding "unless 
an oath prevents," i.e., unless you have promised the pirate that you would keep your word to him! (Book 
II, ch. xvii para. 19; cf. above note 50); (4) In a passage approving the exchange oflegation with rebels but 
not with "pirates and brigands, who do not constitute a state [Pirataeet latrones, qui civitatem nonfaciunt]" and 
therefore do not come under the rule of the law of nations-but this rigid position is immediately softened 
by observing that "Sometimes, nevertheless, persons of such character obtain the right oflegation on the 
strength of a pledge of good faith [Sed interdum tales qui sunt,just legationis nanciscuntur fide data]" (Book II, ch. 
xviii, para. 2(3»; and (5) In a possible slap at Gentili through mention of the record showing Pompey to 
have concluded his war with the pirates "in great part by means of treaties [Atqui belli piratici magnam partem 
Cn. Pompeius paetionibus confecit]" (Book III, ch. xix para. 19(2)(2». Curiously, the indexes to neither the 
Kelsey translation nor the Whewell edition carries a reference to the first of these uses. 
125. Id. III, ix, 19(2). This language appears in the Amsterdam (Blaeu) edition of1632. I have not been 
able to check the 1631 and 1625 editions. It appears in all later editions. 
126. In 1604 Grotius drafted an argumentative brief, completed in 1606, to justify the Dutch seizure in 
the Straits of Singapore of a Portuguese "prize" at a time when the Dutch did not claim belligerent rights 
against Portugal despite the union of the Portuguese and Spanish dynasties between 1580 and 1640. Basing 
his argument on a "natural" right of trade and thus the inadmissability in law of Portuguese monopoly 
treaties with the Sultans of the Malay Archipelago, Grotius concluded that the Portuguese actions were 
criminal and that Dutch countermeasures could properly include captures in reprisal. 1 Grotius, De lure 
Praedae Commentarius (1604) [sic] (Williams and Zeydel, transl.) (CECIL 1950) 327. The entire background is 
conveniently set out and Grotius's principal arguments paraphrased and summarized in Dumbauld, op. cit. 
23-56. The broader historical background is set out in Rubin, International Personality of the Malay Peninsula 
(1974) 29-32. 
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127. In the \Villiams and Zeydel translation the word "pirate" is used where, in note 126 and here, I have 
used the word "criminal." It is not certain that either is correct. Volume II of the set contains a 
photographic reproduction of the actual Latin manuscript, and in the page corresponding to p. 327 of the 
translation in Volume I, (2 Grotius, De lure PraeJae Commentarius, p. 147) I cannot find the word "pirata" or 
any of its derivatives. The word "Iatro" does appear but not in a place that seems to correspond to either of 
the two places in which the translators have used the word "pirate." Although Grotius' handwriting seems 
clear enough, I am not prepared to match my amateur acquaintance of Latin and my almost total 
non-acquaintance with Dutch calligraphy of1604-1606 against the expertise of the translators. Still, for the 
reasons set out above, it would be well to be cautious about this translation and its use of the word "pirate." 
128. Grotius, DeJure Belli ac Pads Book II, ch. iii, para. 13(2). 
129. E.g., Athenian claims asserted against Megara, Thucydides, op. cit., IV, cxviii, and Dio Cassius's 
mention of "all the sea which belongs to the Roman Empire," Roman History, XLII, v. 
130. The evolution of "England" to "Great Britain" and the "United Kingdom" (including Scotland, 
which has its own legal history and current municipal law), involves a political narrative of daunting 
complexity. Fortunately, it is not necessary for present purposes. It was the law of England, not the law of 
Great Britain or the United Kingdom, that became the most influential set of prescriptions and was 
administered by the most wide ranging system of naval activity and courts, and which lies at the roots of 
American conceptions of the interplay between the municipal law of "piracy" and international law . The 
law of Great Britain and of the United Kingdom will be referred to as appropriate later in the narrative. 
131. It is not proposed in this place to trace the word or the concept (if there is any discrete concept) of 
"piracy" in non-legal English usage. It might be useful to those so inclined to mention that the earliest trace 
of the concept seems to be in the epic Beowulf(eighth century A.D.). In line 242 there is reference to the 
sea-watch guarding the Danish coast that "Iathra naenig/mid scip-herge sceth than ne meahte [none of our enemies 
with their fleet of ships might harm us]. " Chickering, Beowu/fi A Dual Language Edition (1977) 63. The word 
"lathra" is translated "enemies" by Chickering. It is commonly translated "pirates." Cf. translation by 
David \Vright in Penguin Classics edition (1957) at p. 32. Wright also translates as "pirates" (p. 33) the 
word "feonda" in line 294. The similarity of the word "Iathra" to the Latin "Iatro" is too clear to be missed. 
The Latin word "pirata" or its derivatives does not appear in Beowulf. 
132. Regina v. Keyn (frequently indexed as R. v. Keyn, Reg. v. Keyn or The Queen v. Keyn)[1876] L.R. 
2 Exch. Div. 63, reprinted at length in 2 British International Law Cases (BILC) 701 at 756-800. That case 
turned on the question of whether the statutory municipal laws of England applied to acts by foreigners on 
board foreign vessels in waters less than three miles from the English coast in the absence of a clear 
indication from the Parliament that the law was intended to apply beyond the land, except in British flag 
vessels. Fourteen judges heard the arguments. One died during the course of the proceedings and the final 
decision, that the law of England did not apply to foreigners in foreign ships even in England's territorial 
waters in the absence of a clear expression of Parliament's intention, was carried by a 7-6 majority with 
substantive views expressed by nine of the judges in individual opinions. 
133. Marsden, ed., Select Pleas in the Court of Admiralty (Selden Society, Vols. 6 and 11) (1894, 1897) and 
Marsden, ed., Documents Relating to the Law and Custom of the Sea (NRS, Vo!s. 49 and 50) (1915,1916), cited at 
notes 102, 104 above. 
134. Cockburn relied heavily on Hale's Pleas of the Crown, but does not seem to have checked Hale's 
sources. Hale, Pleas of the Crown (1685 ed.) 77, in fact refers to "Piracy" and "Depredation upon the Sea" as 
a species of "petit Treason, if done by a [British] subject." Hale implies without any evidence what itwas 
triable at Common Law until the Statute of Treasons, 25 Edw. III statute 5 c. 2 (1352). But his source is 
clearly Coke, who in his Third Institute, emphasized not the "piracy" aspect of the offense, but its 
relationship to the law of "treason," limiting the jurisdiction of British Common Law courts to the 
jurisdiction they had in other cases of "petit Treason" and in no way implying any purview over the acts of 
foreigners outside of England. See note 201 below. Aside from this possible unintended implication in Hale, 
there was no doubt that Hale knew that the offense of "piracy" was triable only at Civil Law, not Common 
Law, in England from 1352 to 1536: 
Since that Statute [of 1352] an offence triable by the Civil Law until 28 H. 8.15 [1536]. 
The Stat. 28 H. 8 alters not the offence; but it remains onely an offence by the Civil Law: and 
therefore a pardon of all Felonies doth not discharge it: but it gives a trial by the course [i.e., 
procedures] of Common Law: ... It extends not to Offences in Creeks or Ports within the Body of a 
County, because punishable by the Common Law. 
"Civil Law" was the body oflaw administered by Admiralty and some other non-Common Law courts of 
England. See below. Thus, to the degree Cockburn meant to imply that "piracy" in any way pertinent to 
the case of foreign actions on board a foreign ship was historically an offense against English Common 
Law, he was certainly wrong with regard to actions after 1352, and probably wrong with regard to actions 
before then. 
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135. 18 Edw. II (1325) and 25 Edw. III (1352). 
136. 2 BILC 759. 
137. 1 Marsden, Documents at p. 99-100 note 1. 
138. Id. Table of Contents regardingp. 12, headnotes at p. 2, 6, 10,31,46,74,89,136,371,388,391. This 
list is not exhaustive. 
139. E.g., Holdsworth, A History of English Law (1922-1928). 
140. Since in some cases Marsden modernizes the spellings, and in others he seems to prefer what seem 
quaint and false antique spellings, it is impossible to be certain about the accuracy of his reprinted 
"original" texts without duplicating his entire research; a patent impossibility at this time. 
141. 1 Marsden, Documents 2. 
142. Id., p. 7. 
143. Id., p. 10-11. 
144. Id., p. 8 and 69. Marsden interprets these documents of1276 and 1341 as involving the King in suits 
before his own Common Law courts for a share of the value of a "prize" taken by English seamen without 
license of the Crown. The King apparently lost. 
145. IJ., p. 19, 38-39. See notes 102 and 103 above. 
146. IJ., p. 19 (revoking a letter of "marque or reprisal [marquandiseugagiandll" in 1293); 38-39 (informing 
the administrators of the realm of the proper issuance of letters of marque by "our nephew, John <>f 
Brittany" in 1295); 88-89 (transferring the trial of English malefactors from the Common Law courts to the 
jurisdiction of the Admiral's court because the robbery had occurred at an unspecified place at sea, not 
within any particular shire of England in 1361-it is not clear whether this case involved any foreigners or 
letters of marque). 
147. Loc.cit. note 143 above. 
148. IJ., p. 84-88. 
149. IJ., p. 88-89, cited note 146 above. 
150. 1 Peters, Admiralty Decisions . .. (1807) Appendix, p. iii. 
151. 1 Marsden, Documents, pp. 100-101: "qui malefactores, et pacis nostre perturbatores diversas roberias 
depredaciones sediciones ac inteifectiones"; English by Marsden. 
152. IJ. p. 101-102: " ... legem et consuetudinem regni nostri Angliae et legem maritimam." 
153. IJ., p. 132-134. The Latin original uses the word "pirata" (p. 135). I omit mention in the text of a 
treaty of 1414 between Henry V and the Duke of Brittany which Marsden translates as containing an 
obligation not to "receive any traitors, fugitives, banished men, pirates, or exiles." IJ., p. 127-128. As noted 
above, W ~rsden's translations are not always reliable; Marsden does not quote any Latin or French text and 
it is unliKely that the original was written in English; nor is Marsden's reported English version the English 
of the time of Henry V. 
154. Id., p. 145-146. 
155. IJ. 
156. IJ., p. 146-147. 
157. IJ., p. xv, xviii. 
158. Id., p. 149, where it is indicated that the Admiralty courts had been allowed to atrophy and were 
revived only in 1520. 
159. 27 Hen. VIII c. 4 (1535), in 4 Pickering, The Statutes at Large (1763) 348 sq. 
160. IJ., 348-349. The 18th century English must be Pickering's transliteration. The original language is 
not given in this source. Presumably it was identical with the language of the Preamble to 28 Hen. VIII c. 15 
(1536). See below. 
161. 4 Pickering, op. cit., 441-443; 26 AJIL Spec. Supp. 913-915 (1932). Reproduced in Appendix LA below. 
162. See note 134 above; note 201 below. See the laws of Oleron, cited note 150 above, arts. V-VII, 
XII-XIII, XIX. The blend between mere contract service and a status relationship entered into by contract 
(as the feudal relationship was entered into by contract forms also) is too complex to analyze here. See 
Pollock & Maitland, The History of English Law (2nd ed.) (1898) passim. 
163. "Mutiny" enters the legal vocabulary in England only with the adoption of the Mutiny Act of1689, 
1 \VilI. & Mary c. 5 (1689), referring not to mariners but to soldiers who "excite, cause, or join in any 
mutiny or sedition in the army, or shall desert their majesties' service in the army." 
164. Op. cit. note 161 above. 
165. "A mere common crime, however wicked and base, mere wilful homicide, or theft, is not a felony; 
there must be some breach of that faith and trust which ought to exist between lord and man," 1 Pollock & 
Maitland, op. cit. note 162 above, 304. By Coke's time "felony" had come to cover all serious Common Law 
offenses, but not Admiralty offenses and not treason, which had become a statuatory offense with its own 
procedures. See Coke, Third Institute 15; note 201 below; Chapter II text above notes 4-33. See also 2 Pollock 
& Maitland, op. cit. 502. As to the relationship between "trespass" and "felony," see id. 511-512. 
166. The precise territorial boundary between Admiralty jurisdiction and the Common Law jurisdiction 
evolved over time. The first boundary was merely between things done upon the sea and things done within 
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the realm. 13 Rich. II c. 5 (1390). \Vithin two years Parliament had decided a clearer line was needed, and 
drew it at the bridges nearest the mouth of the river, offenses upstream belonging to the Common Law 
courts, because infra corpus comitatus, offenses downstream to the Admiralty. 15 Rich. II c. 3 (1392). An 
excellent summary of the evolution of English and American statutory law and the struggle for jurisdiction 
between the Common Law judges and Admiralty is in Robertson, Admiralty and Federalism (1970) 28-64. For 
convenience, and because the details of that struggle are only peripherally interesting to this study, I have 
referred generally to "navigable waters" as the extent of Admiralty jurisdiction with specific details given 
only where pertinent to particular incidents or questions relating to the definition and treatment of 
"piracy." 
167. Cf. Sir Wi\liamScottin the Hercules [1819] 2 Dods. 363, 165 Eng. Rep. 1511 atp. 1517;26 AJILSpec. 
Supp. 910 (1932). 
168. On the origins and modem reflections of the Civil Law, see Nicholas, op. cit. note 55 above, p. 2; 
Admiralty actions based on the adjudication of property rights, actions in rem, trace back to Roman law, 
thus Civil Law, concepts. rd., p. 98-103. The experts in Civil Law in England were called "civilians," and 
sharp distinctions with elements of jealousy are evident in the attitudes of Common Law judges to the Civil 
Law and the civilians at this period. See Lord Coke's references in Palachie's Case (1615) translated in the 
text after note 194 below. 
169. 2 Marsden, Select Pleas, p. 84-86. 
170. Like Gentili (see text at note 93 above), Caesar was Italian by birth. He was the leading British 
Admiralty judge, 1584-1605. 3 Dictionary of National Biography (DNB) 656. 
171. 2 Marsden, Select Pleas, p. 161. Sir Julius simply recited as if proved that the vessel was "piratarum 
super alto mari infra jurisdictionem marittimam Admirallitatis Anglie." He did not define "pirate," or "high seas," 
or his conception of the Admiral'sjurisdiction as it might have applied in the case. 
172. 1 Marsden, Documents, p. 298. The holding that "he is [et esse]" (lit.: "and be") a "pirate" seems 
unsupported by any reference to operative facts. It is not known why Marsden did not translate those two 
words in his transcription quoted here. 
173. Apparently the same person that had become notorious in English folk ballad at about this time. See 
text at note 76 above. 
174. 1 Marsden, Documents, pp. 373-373. 
175. Molloy, DeJure Maritima (1677), Book I, ch. iv, para. xxi, p.12. "Prohibited" meant that a legal writ 
of "prohibition" would issue from a Common Law court forbidding further Admiralty proceedings. The 
procedure was popularized in the struggles between the Common Law judges led by Sir Edward Coke and 
the prerogatives asserted by judges of other courts, of which there were many, in the early 17th century. 
The fullest and probably still most readable and accurate summary of the scope of authority of the various 
English courts of the time is Coke, Fourth Institute, cited at note 61 above. A "market overt" was merely a 
market in which merchants displayed their wares and sold them to any buyer. Originally defined to include 
only fairs and staples, by the end of the 18th century at the latest it included all the open shops in London all 
days except Sundays. The law permitting a merchant in a market overt to pass good title to stolen goods, 
including goods stolen by "pirates" (there seems to have been no distinction between goods stolen at sea or 
on land at the time the basic rule was reduced to statute in 21 Henry VIII c. 11 (1529)), was regarded as 
"calculated to answer the necessary ends and security of public commerce." 2 Wooddeson, A Systematical 
View of the Laws of England (1794) 431. The rule had an exception in the case of goods stolen either on landor 
at sea if the thief were actually caught or convicted. rd. p. 412. 
The statute of 1529 said: 
••• That if any felon or felons hereafter do rob, or take away any money, goods, or chattels, from 
any of the King's subjects, from their persons or otherwise, within this realm, and thereof the said 
felon or felons be indicted ••• and found guilty therefor ... that then the party so robbed, or owner, 
shall be restored to his said money, goods, and chattels. 
4 Pickering, op. cit., 175. Since the statute applies only to takings from the King's subjects, and only to 
takings within the realm, and neither Molloy nor \Vooddeson gives any basis for his interpretation other 
than the statute itself for applying its terms to takings from foreigu merchants anywhere, or from English 
subjects at sea, other than the rule in Justinian's Digest discussed in the text at notes 56-58 above, the precise 
evolution of the rule seems doubtful. One possible explanation is given in 1 Hale, The History of the Pleas of 
tile Crown (1778 ed. by Sollom Emlyn) 542: "Tho the statute speaks of the king's subjects, it extends to aliens 
robbed; for tho they are not the king's natural-born subjects, they are the king's subjects, when in England, 
by local allegiance." That still does not explain any application of the statute to goods "pirated" from any 
merchants, English or foreign, at sea. \Vooddeson believed that it was a rule of English Common Law. 
\Vooddeson.op. cit., p. 429. But the Common Law did not apply to offenses at sea. Wooddeson was the 
third Vinerian Professor of English Law at Oxford (Sir \Villiam Blackstone had been the first), and his 
lectures, published in 1792-94, were regarded by many as highly as the magisterial work of his more famous 
predecessor, Blackstone, the author of the Commentaries. See Chapter II text at note 152 sq. below. 
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176. Molloy, op. cit., para. xx. The statute is 27 Edw. III statute 2 c. 13 (1353). Assuming Molloy's 
summary of the law reflected accurately the legal position in 1677, it is a bit confusing. The statute he cited 
is part of the famous Statute of the Staple. 2 Pickering, op. cit., 78 (1762). In Pickering's translation it says: 
13. Item, we will and grant, That if any merchant, privy or stranger, be robbed of his goods upon 
the sea, and the goods so robbed come into any ports within our realm and lands, and he will sue for 
to recover the said goods, he shall be received to prove the said goods to be his own by his marks, or 
by his chart or cocket, or by such good and lawful merchants, privy or strangers. (2) And by such 
proofs the same goods shall be delivered to the merchants, without making other suit at common 
law. 
Id., p. 87. The last sentence relates to the fact that the law of the staple was the Law Merchant, not the 
Common Law. Id., p. 92, 27 Edw. III 2 c. 22 (1353). It is noteworthy thatthe statute does not give any special 
favor to English merchants, but applies equally to merchants "strangers" (foreign) as to merchants "privy" 
(English). Molloy gives no citation to cases or statutes to explain the construction giving rights of recovery 
to English merchants that are withheld from foreigners. Of course, the word "piracy" does not appear in 
the statute of1353. As noted in note 103 above, the word "marque" does appear in another chapter of the 
Statute of the Staple, c. 17, dated in the Oxford English Dictionary to 1354 instead of1353 as in Pickering. 
The full text of that chapter illustrates the special care taken in England to safeguard the property rights of 
foreign merchants, and thus, impliedly, the erosion of that concern by the mid 17th century when Molloy 
was writing: 
Item, That no merchant-stranger be impeached for another's trepass, or for another's debt, 
whereof he is not debtor, pledge, nor mainpernour: (2) provided always, That if our liege people, 
merchants or other, be indamaged by any lords of strange lands or their subjects, we shall have the 
law of marque, and of taking them again, as hath been used in times past, without fraud or deceit. (3) And 
in case that debate do rise (which God defend) betweixt us and any lords of strange lands, we will 
not that the people and merchants of the said lands be suddenly subdued in our said realm and lands 
because of such debate, but that they be warned and proclamation thereof be published, that they 
shall void the said realm and lands with their goods freely, within forty days after the warning and 
proclamation so made ... 
2 Pickering, op. cit., 89. The statute and the problems discussed in the text illustrate also the impossibility of 
maintaining private recapture under a theory of the Crown's internal responsibility without engaging the 
Crown's external responsibility; there is apparent a transition from letters of marque and reprisal as a way 
consistent with feudal law to avoid going to war on a "sovereign" level, to letters of marque and reprisal as 
an exercise of belligerent rights valid only on the "sovereign" (or public) level. See Clark, The English 
Practice with regard to Reprisals by Private Persons, 27 AJIL694 (1933). A summary of this evolution, with 
citations useful to those interested in further study, can be found in Sohn & Buergcnthal, International 
Protection of Human Rights (1973) 23-40. 
177. 1 Marsden, Documents, p. 38B-394. The Privy Council extract is at note 1 on p. 394. Quaere if this is 
the same Newporte mentioned in Chamberlain, op.cit. note 73 above 34 (letter no. 61 dated 2B February 
1603) as having taken a treasure rumored to be worth 2 million pounds in Nombre de Dios and Cartagena. 
17B. See text at note 86 above. 
179. 1 Marsden, Documents 224, from a recital in an unsigned opinion Marsden identifies as probably a 
copy of a 1579 legal memorandum from David Lewes,judge of Admiralty, to the Lord Admiral setting out 
the bases for the Admiral's legal authority. This is the earliest document found setting forth a basis for what 
later came to be asserted as "universal" jurisdiction in all countries to enforce their domestic laws against 
foreign "pirates" for their acts solely directed against foreign victims. That the roots of that concept lay in 
the municipal (English) law of "outlawry" and not in any international practice or Roman law, appears to 
have been forgotten by later writers and statesmen. See Chapter III below. 
, 180. 1 Marsden, Documents 173 note 1, paraphrasing "Instructions to Vice-Admirals of the coast" dated 
1563. 
IB1. Id., p. 216-217. 
IB2. Id., p. 217. 
183. Id., p. 21B, setting out a sample commission. 
IB4. Id., p. 202-204. 
IB5. Id., p. 21B note by Marsden paraphrasing Burghley's letter. 
186. Id., p. 220-221. 
187. Id., p. 224-225. 
18B. Id., p. 227-229. 
189. Id., p. 235-236. 
190. Id., p. 252. 
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191. After Elizabeth was succeeded by James I in 1601 there was a further tightening of the 
administration, and commissions to companies engaged in normal mercantile voyages in the Mediterranean 
or along the African coast began specifically to include authoriry to capture "pyrates." !d., p. 377-378 
(Commission dated 1609 from James to the Lord Admiral, Charles Earl of Noting ham, authorizing him to 
allow ships of the Levant Company to take "anie pyraticall shipp ... , of what nation soever, ... to bee 
tryed and proved by lawe and justice ... and soe suffer the payne of our [sic] lawes for theire pyracie ... "); 
p. 385-386 (Order of1612 from Notingham to his staff to issue a commission to Humphrey Slaney "to resist 
and take such piratts and robbers att seas as shall piratically sett upon them ... " as they trade to "Guiney" 
(Guinea». There is an implication that pirate-hunting in the absence of such a commission was 
unauthorized by English law, and an Englishman doing it might find himself in serious trouble at home 
whatever the strength of David Lewes's or Gentili's legal arguments about the nature of "piracy" at 
international law. By the end of the 17th century it seems to have been standard practice in England to 
require those who might encounter "pirates" to procure a license to capture them before setting out. See, 
e.g., the \Varrant by Charles II (signed by Samuel Pepys) in 1684 authorizing ''John Castel ... to seize and 
destroy all such pyrats, freebooters, and sea rovers, which he shall meet within the limits of[the Royal 
Affrican] companye's charter ... " 2 Marsden, Documents 112-113. Apparently this authoriry did not extend 
to "pirates" outside the limits of the charter. When, in 1697, the East India Company found "pirates" of 
the Kidd and Every sort (see Chapter II note 91 sq. below) a serious threat to their trade, they petitioned the 
Lords Commissioners executing the office of the Lord High Admiral of England for a license "to seize and 
take all pyrates infesting those seas within the limits of the Company's charters." They asked at the same 
time for authoriry to set up an Admiralry tribunal "to trye and condemn such pyrates as they shall take." 
!d., 178-180. 
192. !d., p. 300, Proclamation of 1599. 
193. 1 Rolle 175 (1615), King's Bench, Easter Term. An English version sub nom. The King against March 
taken from 3 Bulstr. 27 is reproduced in 3 BILC 767-769. 
194. The captor was "Sam. Palachie." "Joseph Pallache" is mentioned in Fisher, op. cit., 175, as the 
Moroccan commander of an Atlantic fleet three of whose prizes reached England in 1614. Chamberlain, op. 
cit., 212-213 (letter no. 213 to Carleton dated 24 November 1614) refers to "a Jew pirate arrested that 
brought three prizes of Spaniards into Plymouth. He was set out by the King of Morocco, and useth 
Hollanders' ships and, for the most part, their mariners. But it is like he shall pass it over well enough, for he 
pretendeth to have leave and license under the King's hand for his free egress and regress ... " 
195. It is not clear whose words are thus reported by Rolle. Sir Edward Coke and Sir John Doddridge are 
identified by Rolle as members of the panel. Coke gives some details lacking in Rolle's more or less official 
report. Apparently the Spanish Ambassador had complained directly to the King's Council, which referred 
the case to the Chief Justice (Coke), the Master of the Rolls (Doddridge) and Sir Daniel Dun (judge of 
Admiralry ). "And the said referees heard the Counsel learned both in the Common and Civil Laws, on both 
sides on two several days in this Term: and after conference between themselves, and with others, these 
points were resolved ... " Coke, Fourth Institute cap. XXVI at p. 152-154. 
196. The major doubts reported by Rolle were resolved in favor ofPalachie on the basis of a precedent 
pronounced by Lord Popham in King's Bench, 1605, in which a Dutchman landing captured Spanish goods 
in England while England was at peace with both Holland and Spain, was supported. According to Coke's 
summary: "It was resolved by the whole Court of the King's Bench upon conference and deliberation, that 
the Spaniard had lost the properry of the goods for ever, and had no remedy for them in England." Coke 
summarized the law: 
[H]e that will sue to have restitution of goods robbed at Sea, ought by Law to prove two things. 
First, that the Sovereign of the plaintiff was at the time of the taking in amiry with the King of 
England. Secondly, that he that took the goods was at the time of the taking in amiry with the 
Sovereign of him whose goods were taken: for if he which took them was in enmiry with the 
Sovereign of him whose goods were taken, then it was no depredation or robbery, but a lawful 
taking, as every enemy might take of another ... 
Coke, Fourth Institute 154. It seems significant that Coke does not mention commissions or letters of marque 
and reprisal to authorize the taking. 
197. The translation from the quaint law French of the time is mine. The English version reported in The 
King against Marsh and cited at note 193 above seems obscure in places and not to follow the original law 
French. The original is as follows: 
[Sam. Palachie, a subject of the] Roy de Moroccho, & pretend que il est Embassador de son Royal United 
Provinces & sur Ie mere il prist un Spanish niefe (esteant guerre enter Ie Roy de Barbary & Ie Roy de Spain) & puis 
arrive ove ceo [avec r;al] en Engleterre, & Jarrenment Ie Spanish Embassador prosecute anvers luy come un Pirat, & 
divers Civilians fuemnt commaund per Ie Roy a montre lour opinions de cest matter, lesqueur agree que un 
Embassador est priviledge per la ley de nature & Nations, mes sil commit alcun offence encontre la ley de nature ou 
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reason, il perdera son priviledge, mes nemy sil offend encountre un possitive ley d'alcun Relme com? pur apparrel & c. 
Et divers auters questions fuerunt faits per les Civilians; mes quant jeo & alcunJustices al comen 1_1' fuernnt demand 
pur notre opinions, ils disoint que les Civilians fuerunt beside Ie malter, car cestuy que est destre tridcy purpiracie est 
destre trie sur l'estatute de 28 H.8 cap. [blank space in text] que dit que serra trie pur piracie come pur felonie fait 
sur Ie terre al comen ley, & pur ceo nest piracie nisi ad estre felonie si mesme Ie fact ad estre commit sur Ie terre, mes en 
cest case ceo n'ad estrefelonie si ad estre commit sur Ie terre [sic] car est loyall pur un enemie a prender de 
I'auter, & accordant a notre opinions fuit rule accordant, & 2 R[ichard] 3.2. est que si alcun voilt 
proseclltre vers auter SlIr 27 E[ dward] 3 cap. 13. il que est robbe doit proover que il mesme fuit de amicitia Domini 
Regis, & que cestuy que luy spoliavit fuit sub obedientia Domini Regis vel de amicitia, car si fuit inimicus non fuit 
spoliatio sed legalis captio. Des en Palachies Case fllit agree per les Civilians que l'Embassador poet proceeder vers 
luy civil/ie per les biens icy pur ceo que ils sont en solo amici, (R. Quaere ceo car semble que per la ley de nations un 
enemie poet loyalment prenderde l'auter) Dod. est un reprise/l en Ie Register, Coke ceo estfo. 87. si biens ne sont 
restore que sont i/loyalment prise per subject d'auter Roy donque Ie Roy grantera ceo. Et per Coke & Dod. home ne 
poet estre pendus pur piracie sur un robberie fait sur Ie Thames car ceo est infra corpus comitallls. 
The statute of27 Edward III cap.13 cited in the case is undoubtedly the part of the Statute of the Staple 
quoted at note 176 above, 27 Edw. III 2 cap.13. There does not appear to be any language in the statute to 
support Coke's assertion that a merchant claiming rights under it must prove that he comes from a "friend" 
of the King and that he who robbed him was within the" obedience" of the king or one of his royal friends. 
The statute 21 Henry VIII c. 11 (1529) quoted in note 175 above was interpreted this way, as the lawyers 
apparently sought to make absolute sense of Common Law interpretations that had grown up without a 
clear statutory base. 
The citation to 2 R. 3.2 is very confusing. Pickering's compilation, the more or less standard Statl//es at 
Large, does not give any enactments at all for the second year of the reign of Richard III (1484). None from 
the prior year seems even remotely relevant. The statute 1 Henry VII c. 2 (1485) relates to foreign merchant 
"denizens" in England, removing from them an exemption from customs duties that had been granted in 
various earlier letters patent and other documents, alleging abuses by which non-denizen foreign 
merchants were underselling English merchants by evading the customs duties. It looks like simple 
protective legislation favoring an important English constituency, irrelevant to the subject. 4 Pickering, op. 
cit., 526. It was ch. 13 of the Statute of the Staple that gave foreign merchants the legal right to use English 
courts, and Coke's interpretation seems merely to reflect a Common Law gloss on its meaning. 
Another, quite different statute, seems relevant although not cited by Coke: 14 Edward III st. 2 cap. 2 (1340): 
Also whereas it is contained in the Great Charter [c. 30] that all Merchants shall have safe and sure 
Conduct to go out of our Realm of England, and there to come and abide ..• ; \Ve ..• will and grant 
... That all Merchants, Denizens and Foreigners (except those which be of our Enmity), may 
without Let safely come ... , paying the Customs, Subsidies, and other Profits reasonably thereof 
due ... [Et come y soit contenuz en la Grande Charte qe tOlltZ marchantz eient sauve et seure conduyt daler hors de 
nostre roialme d'Engleterre ••. ; Nous . •• volons et grantons .•. qe touz marchantz denezeins et foreins, forspris 
ceux qe sont de nostre enemite, puissent sanz estre destourbe sauvement venir en ledit roialme ..• ] 
1 Pickering, op. cit., 508. But this statute relates to coming and going, not to access to the courts. It is, of 
course, possible to speculate that if an "enemy" merchant had no legal basis for coming to England in this 
statute, he could not legally appear in any guise before an English court; that his only right at English law as 
an enemy alien would be to depart safely within a time fixed by English law. But that would be to attribute 
to Coke a logic that he does not himself state. 
198. 1 Rolle 285 (1615), King's Bench, Hilary Term. 
199. Hildebrand, Brimston, & Baker fueront sue en Admiraltie Court, Ie case fuet tiel, ceux homes fueront owners d'un 
neife, & ceo mist al Indies a merchandiser, & sur Ie alt mere les Mariners, & rendue commit Piracie (come est suppose en 
L'admiraltie Court) & quant Ie neife retllm icy sur Ie Thames L'admiral seise Ie neife, & tout en ceo come bona Piratarium 
clamant eux per Ie grant del'Royne, & les Marchants prisont les sailes & tackling hors del' neife, & pur ceo est Ie suite en Ie 
Admiraltie Court. Covent. praie un Prohibition al Cour surcest malter. Coke est voier que Ie Admiraltie ad per legrand [sic; 
grant?] del'Royn bona Piratarium, hoc est les proper biens de Pirats, mes il navera per ceo les biens que les Pirats emblee 
d'auter homes, car ceux ne sont destregrant, car l'owners doint eux aver arare [?], & si L 'admiraltie duissoit aver eux ancoril 
ne doit suer la pur eux esteant prise intra corpus Comitatus, scilicer, sur Thames. Dod. si home borrow un chiva/l, & SIlT ceo 
commit un robberie uncose Ie chiva/l n'est forfet, ac icy Ie neift n'est forfeit [sic] pur Ie piracie de ceux que fueront deins Ie 
neife, ql/od fuit concessumper Coke, & il demand de Covent. an ils fueront convict del'Piracie, que dit que nemy. Et 
Prohibition fuit grant pur ceo que Ie prisa/l suit infra corpus Comitatus. 
200. Coke, Third Institute, Cap. XLIX, p. 111. 
201. Id., p. 113: 
Before the statute of25 E. 3, if a subject had committed Piracy upon another ... this was holden to 
be petit Treason, for which he was to be drawn and hanged: because Pirata est hostis humani generis, 
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and it was contra ligeanciae suaedebitum: but if an Alien, as one of the Normans, who had revolted in the 
reign of King John, had committed Piracy [sic. Coke obviously means "what would otherwise be 
piracy"] upon a subject, this offence could be no Treason, for though he were hostis humani generis, 
yet the crime was not contra ligeanciae suae debitum, because the offender was no subject, but since the 
statute of 25 E. 3, this is no Treason in case of a subject. 
The Statute of25 Edw. III referred to by Coke is the Statute of Purveyors (tax collectors), statuteS of that 
year (1352) (2 Pickering, op. cit., 49), chapter 2 of which has come down to us as the "Statute of Treasons " 
cited at note 134 above. By this statute, earlier uses of the word "treason" in law were superseded, and a list 
of exclusive definitions was given: 
\Vhen a man doth compass or imagine the death of our lord the King or of our Lady the Queen, or 
their eldest son and heir ... or if a man do levy war against our Lord the King in his realm, or be 
adherent to the King's enemies in his realm giving them aid and comfort in the realm, or elsewhere 
••• [ .•• quant homme fait compasser ou imaginer la mort nostre seignurle Roi ma dame sa compaigne ou de lour 
fitz primer & heir • •. & si homme leve de guerre contre nostre dit seignur Ie Roi en son roialme ou soit adherent as 
[sic; adherant aux?] enemys nostre seignur Ie Roi en Ie roialme donant a eux eid ou confort en son roialme ou par 
ail/ours • .• ] 
The statute goes on to call "treason" the violation of feudal or common law obligations owed to lesser 
mortals also: 
And moreover there is another manner of treason, that is to say, when a servant slayeth his master, 
or a wife her husband, or when a man secular or religious slayeth his prelate, to whom he oweth 
faith and obedience ..• [Et ovesque ceo il y ad autre manere de treson cest assavoir quant un sewanttue don 
[son?] meistre une femme qe tue son baron quant homme seculer ou de religion tue son prelat a qi il 
doit foi & obedience ... ] 
The former was eventually called "high treason;" the latter "petty treason. "2 Pickering, op. cit., 51-55. 
202. See below at Chapter II note II-45 sq. 
203. Southern v. Howe, 2 Rolle 5 (1617): "Auri icy nest alcun loyal dampnification al Plaintiff. carilfuit imprison 
Illes /lull loyal proceedingfuit ewe vers luy, mes solment il fuit compell perforce d'un barbarous Roy, &donque il doet suerper 
Petition • .• "There were other grounds for the decision, such as the rule caveat emptor (let the buyer beware), 
under which Howe and his servant did no legal wrong to the King of Barbary, and thus could not be 
compelled to bow before the foreign law under which the fraud (at least when worked against the king) 
would nullify the deal. But this is not the place to trace the development of English rules of conflict oflaws 
or the law of fraud. 
204. Again, as so often in this study, an interesting side-track must be resisted. For a full understanding of 
the background against which the classification of the "King of Barbary" as a king and nothing else (he was 
not argued to be a "pirate" as far as appears from Rolle's report of Southerne v. Howe) a full course in 
English commercial, criminal and constitutional law of the early 17th century would be necessary. 
